

What's the Story? [Norwegian Glory]

*An Intertextual Approach to Climate Change Communication in
the Norwegian Media*

Marte von Krogh



**Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Philosophy in
Culture, Environment and Sustainability**

Centre for Development and the Environment

University of Oslo

Blindern, Norway

September 2009

This thesis is based on true stories...

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS.....	vii
FOREWORD: MY STORY.....	viii
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 STORIES ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE	1
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES	4
1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	8
1.4 THESIS OUTLINE	9
2. THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF STORIES - THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INSPIRATIONS	10
2.1 NARRATIVE THEORIES.....	10
2.1.1 <i>Intertextuality and communication</i>	14
2.2 REALITY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND DISCOURSES.....	17
2.2.1 <i>Environmental discourse</i>	18
2.3 SOURCES UNDER SCRUTINY.....	23
2.3.1 <i>The global stories</i>	24
2.3.2 <i>The Norwegian stories</i>	25
2.3.3 <i>Limitations</i>	28
3. THE GLOBAL STORIES OF CLIMATE CHANGE	30
3.1 THE “SCIENTIFIC” STORY	32
3.1.1 <i>The author</i>	32
3.1.2 <i>Formulation of the problem</i>	33
3.1.3 <i>Suggested solutions</i>	34
3.1.4 <i>The underlying value dimension</i>	36

3.2	THE “WAKE-UP” STORY	37
3.2.1	<i>The author</i>	37
3.2.2	<i>Formulation of the problem</i>	38
3.2.3	<i>Suggested solutions</i>	38
3.2.4	<i>The underlying value dimension</i>	40
3.3	THE “DOOMSDAY” STORY	41
3.3.1	<i>The author</i>	41
3.3.2	<i>Formulation of the problem</i>	42
3.3.3	<i>Suggested solutions</i>	43
3.3.4	<i>The underlying value dimension</i>	45
3.4	THE “SKEPTICAL” STORY	46
3.4.1	<i>The author</i>	46
3.4.2	<i>Formulation of the problem</i>	47
3.4.3	<i>Suggested solutions</i>	49
3.4.4	<i>The underlying value dimension</i>	50
3.5	AND SO THE STORIES GO.....	52
4.	CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN MEDIA	53
4.1	THE NORWEGIAN STORYTELLERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE.....	54
4.2	THE GLOBAL STORIES TALKING TO NORWAY	57
4.2.1	<i>The “Scientific” Story in the Norwegian Media</i>	57
4.2.2	<i>The “Wake-up” Story in the Norwegian Media</i>	62
4.2.3	<i>The “Doomsday” Story in the Norwegian Media</i>	65
4.2.4	<i>The “Skeptical” Story in the Norwegian media</i>	70

4.2.5	<i>Concluding remarks</i>	75
5.	CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL CONTEXT	76
5.1	THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL NARRATIVES.....	76
5.1.1	<i>The Environmental Story</i>	79
5.1.2	<i>The Humanitarian Story</i>	81
5.1.3	<i>The Norwegian Fairy Tale</i>	82
5.2	NORWAY TALKING TO THE WORLD	83
5.2.1	<i>The Environmental Story in the Norwegian Media</i>	84
5.2.2	<i>The Humanitarian Story in the Norwegian Media</i>	87
5.3	THE MAJOR STORY: NORWEGIAN GLORY	89
6.	MEDIA STORIES ABOUT NORWEGIAN CLIMATE POLICIES	97
6.1	THE POLITICAL VOICES.....	97
6.1.1	<i>The Nay-Sayer Voices</i>	97
6.1.2	<i>The Honorable Voices</i>	100
6.1.3	<i>The Critical Voices</i>	102
6.2	THE HEGEMONIC STORY: NORWAY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMANITARIAN CUTTING EDGE	107
7.	CONCLUSION: MYTHS AND FUTURES	113
7.1	DEBUNKING MYTHS	115
7.1.1	<i>Climate Change Myths</i>	115
7.1.2	<i>Norwegian Myths</i>	116
7.2	THE NEED FOR A NEW STORY?	118
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	121
	APPENDIX A: Media articles	130

APPENDIX B: Translated media quotations.....	140
APPENDIX C: Media statistics.....	147

ABBREVIATIONS

AF	Aftenposten (Norwegian newspaper)
AP	Arbeiderpartiet (the Norwegian Labour Party)
AR4	Fourth Assessment Report
CCS	Carbon Capture and Storage
CO ₂	Carbon Dioxide
DN	Dagens Næringsliv (Norwegian newspaper)
FrP	Fremskrittspartiet (the Norwegian Progressive Party)
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
SPM	Summary for Policy Makers
SPU	Statens Pensjonsfond – Utland
SYR	Synthesis Report
UN	United Nations
VG	Verdens Gang (Norwegian newspaper)

FOREWORD: MY STORY

I was born in one of the wealthiest and greenest countries in the world – a world otherwise stricken by environmental crisis, social inequalities, needs and greed. *Brundtland* and *Blekkulf* told me their stories, and placed the misery of the world on my shoulders. “Sustainable development” became our mantra, that we should all think globally while acting locally. I felt a great responsibility, being one of the luckiest children on earth: I wanted to save the world. And as I grew older, I also wanted to understand this complex reality. Our common future seemed still challenged, but all the while Norway continued to prosper. And then came the story of climate change. What a story! What a story?

My motivation for writing this thesis has been driven by my “world-saving agenda”, facing the current warnings about global warming. I believe climate change is an environmental challenge that especially makes us, oil-wealthy Norwegians, responsible for transforming our own society into a more nature friendly one, in addition to saving the “world out there”. While writing this thesis and exploring the myriad of claims about climate change and our environmental future, I have understood even more that reality is complex and contingent. The stories of climate change are embedded in moral, cultural and political conditions – it is a jungle out there!

Many people have helped me to navigate the chaotic terrain of climate change communication and led me to inspiring perceptions while writing this thesis, not to mention all the good people connected to SUM and my inventive businessman at home. I would most of all like to thank my supervisor, Nina Witoszek, for being such a creative, critical and conscious guide.

Marte von Krogh

Oslo, September 2009

1. INTRODUCTION

Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and oceans temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice and rising global average sea level [...] Most of the observed increase in global average temperature since the mid-20th Century is *very likely* due to the observed increase in anthropogenic [greenhouse gases] concentrations (IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, 2007).

1.1 STORIES ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE

“Climate change”, “global warming”, “the greenhouse effect”: These designations are the most common ones for discussing the environment today. Whatever the phenomenon is called, climate change is often portrayed to be the biggest environmental challenge of our time – of all time. According to a host of scientific reports, policy documents and public news articles, the earth is getting warmer and we are facing a global crisis. The diverse stories of climate change constitute different aspects of the complex *grand story* of our time, defining and describing changes happening to the whole world as we know it.

This emerging plurality of global climate change narratives involves abstract and probabilistic science, labyrinthine laws and regulations, grandstanding politicians, speculative economics and the complex interplay of individuals, societies and our natural surroundings (Hannigan, 2006). Hence, the stories of global warming constitute one of the most complicated and pressing challenges of interpretation of our time. Although the quote from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report represents a so-called scientific consensus on the “credible explanation” of the processes of global warming, climate change is in no way treated as a merely scientific phenomenon – at least in the real world. The stories of climate change are fundamentally about the effects arising from human use of carbon energy and therefore about

atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHG).¹ But these stories are not only dealing with GHG levels “out there in nature” per se, separated from human existence. Rather, these are stories about the immense challenges facing humanity; climate change is seen in relation to problems of poverty, development and resource management – both in the developed countries and the developing countries.² The stories of climate change are talking about speculative issues, taking into account unpredictable social and natural systems.

The scientific modeling of the future of climate change is fraught with uncertainties and the challenge of addressing these complex issues is both daunting and pressing. Global warming has become an issue of general concern, where human energy use is the main menace. But still there is considerable disagreement over how to respond to this challenge. Many scientists point to the potential of carbon reduction and the need for social change, though there are a variety of envisioned strategies – be it through emphasizing changes in technology, policy, business or cultural values. Some argue that technological reforms are a sufficient response to our global environmental challenge, and speak the language of science and economics. Others claim that there is a fundamental discrepancy between continued economic growth and the preservation of the environment and understand global warming to represent a cultural challenge to the industrialized world. They believe that the cumulative effects of unlimited growth in population and increasing per capita consumption have accelerated the already severe damage to ecological systems and argue that we, in the affluent Western countries, must contemplate the destructive excesses of our current lifestyles and, by extension, our technological and economic activities. Thus, such voices advance more radical responses to the challenge of

¹ I use the terms *GHG*-, *CO₂*- and *carbon*- emissions in a “non-technical way” as representing the same problem: human use of fossil fuel, which contributes to climate change.

² I use these terms – however academically problematic – to describe different states of human affairs, where the *developed countries* represent our Western world and the *developing countries* represent the rest of the world! I will write this thesis from a “Western” perspective, focusing on climate change stories evolving in the industrialized North – mainly in West-Europe and the U.S. – manifested in the Norwegian context.

climate change and see the need for a fundamental awakening in the human consciousness, in order to change the perspectives of our role as humans on earth. As a result, the case of climate change has given rise to different *environmental discourses* both on what might constitute social progress and on our perspectives of, - and relationship to, the natural world (Dryzek, 2005). These discourses stimulate distinct forms of environmental awareness and can be seen as connected to value-laden stories – stories that inform us about how to live our lives and relate not only to nature, but to the world as such. Many stories of climate change talk on behalf of – and try to appeal to – humanity and the global environment. But at the same time, these attempts to address the entire world ultimately lead to a local manifestation and appreciation.

In December 2007, the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee dedicated that year's Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC. This nomination was seen as an effort to put global warming on the international program, linking the climate issue to humanitarian duty. Al Gore was shown as a hero of our time, daring to raise the debate about global warming up to a moral level. Backed by the scientific consensus from the IPCC, climate change was no longer presented as a scientific dispute, but rather seen as a human-made challenge which called for action. Norway, a small and oil-rich country, was the right place to highlight this renewed global agenda for our time. We Norwegians – said to be living in one of the wealthiest countries of the world, and constructing our identity around beautiful nature, environmentally friendly attitudes and global responsibility – should surely relate to the challenges of global warming. However, the fact remains that Norway is one of the world's largest exporters of fossil fuel and has one of the highest levels of CO₂-emissions per capita.³ So what does climate change mean for us Norwegians? Given that Norwegian wealth and lifestyles are intimately connected to the problems of global warming, which stories about

³ See i.e. Statistics Norway (SSB, 2009a): http://www.ssb.no/olje_gass_en/, and Carbon Footprints of Nations: <http://www.carbonfootprintofnations.com/content/ranking/79/>.

climate change stimulate our awareness of this challenge? Is climate change presented in a way which relates it to our way of living? *What are the Norwegian stories of climate change; is this global environmental threat communicated towards the general Norwegian public in a way that fosters civil engagement and social change?*

1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVES

My intention is neither to tell or analyze *the* whole story about climate change – which would be literally impossible – nor to construct *one* big story.⁴ Rather, I will in this thesis characterize and interpret the various stories about climate change which are formed in and inform the public sphere (Ryghaug, 2006). My aim is to focus on how scientific knowledge of climate change is mediated, or the ways in which this information is interpreted and passed on to the general public. I am concerned with the Norwegian context and the ways in which the Norwegian public are exposed to the climate challenge. I therefore want to explore the ways in which climate change narratives are constructed, translated and multiplied in a common, communicative dialogue in the Norwegian press. Naturally, the debate over global warming has an international aspect, with arguments arising from a “global dialogue” on the issue. Thus, the stories of climate change are circulating around the world. To put the global warming issue in an international context, I will first bring attention to some influential stories about climate change that are competing on the global stage. I will focus on four different “storytellers”, each with a different worldview, language and moral message: the IPCC, Al Gore, Bjørn Lomborg and James Lovelock. These speakers are focusing on different problems and presenting different solutions to our global challenge, and hence constructing different kinds of crises, different ideas about nature and different cultural values. My first objective is to explore

⁴ I take as a presupposition that anthropogenic climate change is, in fact, happening and that the various scientific evidences are strong enough to argue this.

the underlying meanings and moral values of these climate stories. And because climate change is translated into an issue of public concern and accordingly discussed on different levels – from the worldwide web to the neighboring neb – I will explore how these global stories are manifested locally. The next step of my analysis will therefore focus on how these global stories are absorbed into the Norwegian climate change discourse, and to what extent. The Norwegian climate change discourse is investigated by conducting a qualitative media analysis on the climate issue, with the main part of my thesis analyzing how three influential Norwegian newspapers are communicating and debating global warming. In my media analysis, I will also discuss how the texts on climate change reflect the Norwegian cultural context. By analyzing how the challenge of climate change is adopted into a Norwegian reality, I aim to discover which underlying values are present in the Norwegian media coverage on the climate issue. Through this approach, I will elaborate on what kinds of environmental awareness are expressed in the media samples and accordingly transmitted to the Norwegian public. Media are seen as a crucial aspect of public discourse and social change – spreading stories, ideas and ethics of the climate issue. My primary objective is to explore to what extent the Norwegian press provides a stimulating and mobilizing story of climate change.

With my above stated objectives, I have certain presuppositions implicit in the focus of my theses, which should be disclosed: I will argue that environmental awareness, like that of climate change, should neither be reduced to a subject in only technological or governmental affairs, nor to an issue for the private individual. In other words, the solution *also* lies in a revival of public engagement (Skorstad, 2005). The appeal of environmental messages is becoming significant in both electioneering and marketing (Mülhaüser, 2006). Public discussion about climate change might engage the values that underpin our decisions as social beings – citizens, voters, producers and consumers. In turn, the public must be sufficiently informed to understand the state of science,

and engaged enough in civic life to make sound judgments about policies that address the risks identified by science (Schneider, 2005).

I am most interested in to what extent the Norwegian media might stimulate a *green public sphere* – which is understood as distinctive in its questioning of industrialist presuppositions, a challenge at a cultural level that serves to reconstitute our concept of what is reasonable (Torgerson, 1999:130). I am thus influenced by the idealistic concept of “ecological democracy” (Dryzek, 2005), which represents renewed democratic politics that engage the public and promote ecological values.⁵ I am also inspired by the analysis which states that Norwegian environmental politics are depoliticized, in which environmental problems are discursively relocated from industry as the site of production to the individual as site of consumption (Straume, 2005: 192). In addition, I am aware of the analysis of Norway as a country which lacks powerful, green movements (Dryzek et al., 2003). Hence, I will focus on to what extent climate change is presented as a challenge to the reality of Norwegian life, and whether this environmental threat fosters ecological consciousness among Norwegian citizens. Through my media analysis, I will try to get a better understanding of the cultural and political processes through which the claims of environmental science are formed and transformed in the Norwegian context. I aim to discover some of the discursive processes of communication, norms and forms of “moral entrepreneurship” by which our concerns around climate change, get constructed and are contested.

For privileged people, like most Norwegians, environmental problems such as climate change seem increasingly distant in both time and space. Norway is known as an excellent performer in cross-environmental comparisons and internationally we market ourselves as environmentally progressive. But simultaneously as our government sets ambitious targets for CO₂-reductions at

⁵ I am aware of the many claims, especially by political scientists, that the environmental crisis is too serious a matter to be left to democratic procedures – such as voting (Straume, 2005: 202). See i.e. Wyller, 1999.

home and around the world, our domestic CO₂-emissions, our national petroleum wealth and our consumption practices are climbing to higher and higher levels (SSB, 2009b). In this national picture, it looks like there is something missing in our methods of constructing environmental awareness. The general stories of climate change can fairly be understood as representing an opposition to the reality of Norwegian life – with the foundation of our welfare society resting upon revenues from fossil fuels. The challenges global warming presents need not only be understood in relation to the Norwegian economy and politics; the climate issues can also be seen as a *cultural* challenge.⁶ This relates to how we construct meaning in our lives, in which our national memory and collective way of apprehending the world contribute to stories about the “Norwegian reality”. These national narratives can in turn be seen as produced within and attuned to specific political economic relations – although such narratives are understood as encompassing politics as well (Norgaard, 2006). In other words, the general representations of climate change might challenge our very idea of being Norwegians – of who we are, how we live, and how we relate to nature and the world as such.

In the context of Norwegian media, an important focus is how the global climate change stories merge and diverge with pre-established Norwegian narratives. Within this perspective, it is interesting to see not only which aspects of the global stories are communicated, but also which messages are being silenced as a result of preconceived ways of understanding the world. I therefore want to inquire to what extent the various stories of climate change circulating in the Norwegian media confront our “Norwegian reality”. I will thus try to place my Norwegian analysis in a more challenging – as well as a more interpretative –

⁶ Culture are to be understood as “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life” (Geertz 1973:89). Culture is often used intermittingly with society/the social, and should be seen as dynamic and changing – while building on past systems of significant codification. I will focus on a national level and concentrate on the “Norwegian culture”. The Norwegian culture can also be treated as the implicit systems of meaning and frames of references that underpin the various practices through which we communicate environmental issues and politics (Fisher and Hajer, 1999).

framework, as I focus on factors that have to do with the production of knowledge and ideology. I am interested in the various symbolic ways in which climate change is presented as a “meaning-making story”, although a more “materialistic” approach to the issue also exists. Climate change as a phenomenon challenges scientific, political and moral questions as much as it unites different professions and sciences, and connects academic discourses to actual scientific problems and material structures in every day life.

1.3 MAIN RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Related to my stated objectives in this thesis, I have several central research questions which will guide me in my analyses: At the global level, I ask how some of the significant global storytellers of climate change portray this environmental concern – how do they formulate the problem, what kind of solutions do they suggest, and what is the value dimension inherent in their respective climate change stories? At the Norwegian level, I ask how the Norwegian media present the chosen global climate change stories. On the same level, I ask how the media reflect some Norwegian narratives – how do the given global “climate realities” merge with the assumed “Norwegian reality”? In this context, I also ask what the normative dimensions of the stories circulating in the press are – to what extent do these representations confront our culture and politics. Are they challenging our conventional ways of thinking? Last but not least within this context, I ask to what extent the dominant stories circulating in the press foster public deliberation on the climate issue – is global warming presented as an issue that has the potential to mobilize the Norwegian public?

My central research questions in this thesis are thus addressing two levels of climate change stories: the global climate change stories and the Norwegian climate change stories. Within the Norwegian context, I am also focusing on two types of stories: the climate change stories and the Norwegian cultural narratives.

I aim to connect these levels and types of stories and in this way be able to say something about the possible moral implications and mobilizing potentials provided by texts on climate change in the Norwegian media.

1.4 THESIS OUTLINE

In the next chapter – chapter 2 – I will present my theoretical and methodological inspirations. I am most influenced by the theories of narrative and intertextuality; and also by the concept of discourse analysis and environmental discourses. In chapter 3, I establish the international framework of my Norwegian media analysis, as I elaborate each of the four global stories on climate change in separate terms. In chapter 4, I turn to the Norwegian media context and show how the four global stories are reflected in national media coverage on climate change. In chapter 5, I aim to link the media stories on climate change to the cultural context of Norway. I will therefore first present two notable Norwegian cultural narratives which form the national framework of my media analysis. In the next part of chapter 5, I continue my Norwegian media analysis and elaborate how these two cultural stories are reflected in the media texts on climate change. In the last part of chapter 5, I provide my overall interpretation of the major stories on climate change in the Norwegian media – understood as the intertextual merging between the presented and elaborated global stories and Norwegian cultural narratives. In chapter 6, I turn my attention to the political voices in the media sample and focus on how the four different global climate stories as well as the two Norwegian cultural narratives are reflected in the publicized political agendas. I will in this chapter give an account of what the hegemonic political stories of climate change communicated in the press are, and I will also provide critical remarks about the mobilizing potential of these hegemonic climate stories. In the last chapter – chapter 7 – I sum up the findings, and point to some problems and potentials in what I have analyzed as the dominant Norwegian climate stories.

2. THE POWER AND INFLUENCE OF STORIES - THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL INSPIRATIONS

This thesis is written from a combined social science and humanities perspective. Sociology, linguistics, philosophy, anthropology and other disciplines now address the question of how environmental concerns come into being. The focus on climate change awareness in the public sphere involves too many component parts to be understandable if one were to limit oneself to only one of the many established academic disciplines. Therefore, I see the need for an interdisciplinary and pluralistic approach when focusing on a complex issue such as the communication of climate change.

As there is neither one superior theory, nor one coherent concept nor an exhaustive introduction to the contextualization of the issue of climate change, I shall use only one of many possible approaches – which will be presented to help the reader to understand my choice and use of theoretical concepts and methodological tools later in my thesis.

2.1 NARRATIVE THEORIES

The idea of the *narrative* has been applied with immense theoretical variety and the term is currently very fashionable in academic texts, but the concept is often used inaccurately (Svarstad, 2002:75). I will nevertheless use the term in a broad manner – inspired by the theories of Jerome Bruner – and treat narratives as collective meaning-making stories.⁷ I see narratives as “mental forms” inherent in our acquisition of knowledge which structure our experiences of the world and function as one potent way of finding meaning in an overwhelmingly complex reality. In effect, we are dealing not only with a mode of representation, but also

⁷ Some theories distinguish between a “*story*” and a “*narrative*”, where *story* refers to an individual expression, while *narrative* represents a collective manifestation (Svarstad, 2002). I will treat both categories as reality-constructions that are common among a group of people – as cultural meaning systems.

with a mode of constructing and constituting reality (Bruner, 1991). Narratives can hence at a general level be considered as a cultural tool used more or less unconsciously when communicating with other people, one which has the power to influence our perception – and construction – of the world we live in, both individually and collectively (Bruner, 2006). I thereby treat narratives as the structural level through which we humans order our expressions and experiences, and try to understand them. This approach will be further elaborated in chapter 5 on the Norwegian cultural context, where I analyze two Norwegian cultural narratives – *the environmental story* and *the humanitarian story* (see 5.1).

Generally speaking, it is through stories that one's situation in the cultural and political landscape is defined. It is through stories that we acquire identity and make sense of what is happening around us, what has happened and what can happen in the future (Bruner, 2006). A narrative can further be understood as a recounting of human plans gone off track, as a way to domesticate human error and surprise (Bruner, 2003:31). We do, in other words, live through stories and minor violations of presumed norms by rendering these breaches into a familiar, acceptable form. The accounts of climate change accordingly represent both a potent violation of some ordinary national stories, while also being influential stories in themselves. These climate change stories can hence be seen as a public antagonist. One of the ways such a public antagonist is confronted and accomplished is by storytelling's inherent *particularity*. Even stories with a presumed "universal" appeal – like the global climate change stories – require local particularity to achieve authenticity. We never experience "the big picture", but manage to navigate in and make meaning of the world through our collective – though particular – stories. Culture does, after all, prescribe our notions of ordinariness, where domestication is a major method of maintaining a culture's coherence (Bruner, 2003).

When focusing on the Norwegian context, I understand the clashing stories of climate change as communicated in relation to an underlying cultural-political web of national narratives. I am hence not very concerned with how narratives as text are constructed, that is with a specific structure, actors and plot. I will rather use the concept as a *sociomental* category (Zerubavel, 2000) – as an instrument of the “collective mind” in the construction of reality. A national narrative implies the symbolic representation of a collective identity, shaped by history and culture. The vitality of such national narratives lies in their potential to come to terms with contending views and clashing stories (Bruner, 2003). At the same time, these constitutions are open to transformations; any national narrative has to be sustained and legitimized – which connects such cultural meaning systems to the fields of politics and power. Significant national narratives are hence understood as dominant representations of some collective “reality”. These representations can thus be seen as related to *ideology* – understood as a concept that characterizes a fairly broad, coherent, and relatively durable set of beliefs that affects one’s orientation not only to politics but to everyday life in general (Benford and Snow, 2000:613). Such dominant stories can moreover be conceptualized as *myths*:

Myth is depoliticized speech. One must naturally understand political in its deeper meaning, as describing the whole of human relations in their real, social structure, in their power of making the world [...] myth does not deny things, on the contrary, its function is to talk about them [...] it gives them a clarity which is not that of an explanation but that of a statement of fact (Barthes and Sontag, 1983:131-132).

Ideological myths refer thus to fairly pervasive and integrated set of beliefs and values that have considerable staying power. Dominant stories provide legitimated knowledge about the world, and this dissemination of knowledge is understood as a political activity based on cultural conditions (Quinn, 2009). In

contrast, clashing stories function as innovative amplifications and extensions of – or antidotes to – existing ideologies and their basic components (Benford and Snow, 2000).

Different stories of climate change represent and provide knowledge about the environmental crisis. The issues of climate change involve highly elusive, scientific and technical insights, and I will focus on the democratization of this knowledge. Although I do not intend to discuss actual perceptions of climate change in this thesis, I am concerned with public discourse on the matter and will thus share some of my thoughts on the public understanding of climate change. As I have already argued, the hope of overcoming the challenges of global warming lies not only in science, technology and policy interventions. One objective of this thesis is to focus on the potential of different climate change stories to empower citizens to become full participants in these crucial public policy debates. We are said to be living in a global “risk society” (Beck, 1992), but the hazards facing us are not seen or felt – at least here in the rich Western world; the presence of these risks is knowledge-based. To involve aspects of learning and knowledge in a study of environmental communication is quite important, but also very demanding. *Knowledge* can be seen as a rather intangible category. I will in my thesis relate the notion to the theories of “narrative knowledge”, and thus see environmental knowledge as a form of understanding which is neither based on practical experience, technological skills nor established scientific truthfulness (Fisher, 1987; Skorstad, 2005). “Reality” is understood to be mediated through some representational practice. And knowledge of this reality must be transmitted between people. It must be explained, defended, and spread through language, argument, and appeal (Heath et al., 2007:41). Accordingly, a narrative construction of the “environmental reality” is not necessarily correct in a scientifically valid way, but understood as real by those who operate inside of it.

Both the national narratives of Norway and the climate change stories circulating around can be considered subject to mythical processes, as both genres of stories try to represent some kind of “reality”. Neither a national identity nor explanations of an environmental future can be realistically verified. It is, rather, impossible to draw a strict line between where the production of knowledge ends and the execution of power starts in these narrative productions – simply because these two dimensions are part of the same narrative processes (Fisher, 1987).

2.1.1 Intertextuality and communication

As I am interested in exploring the interactions between the four chosen global stories of climate change and the powerful narrative knowledge in the Norwegian context, I will use the concept of intertextuality. *Intertextuality* indicates that various dialogues and conciliations are going on between different texts and storytellers, within and between genres, and between different systems of representation and narratives (Agger, 1992). The concept is often used in analyses of a linguistic, philological or literary form – building on theories from Mikhail Bakhtin and Julia Kristeva (ibid.). I am inspired by their theories, but will most of all use the concept as a “philosophical asset” in my focus on climate change communication.

In general, different stories of climate change are presented in the global marketplace of ideas and are contested through communication and negotiation. As I approach climate change as socially represented stories, these stories have a social history and can thereby be seen as based upon and negotiating with already established or entrenched modes of representation. At the same time, this global marketplace of meaning can consolidate certain representations and hence bring new awarenesses into being. Concurrently, narratives that are accepted through such dialogues can be integrated into the identity of a society. This dialogical approach – constituted through text and language – can be understood as a part of human condition, and even as a prerequisite for thinking:

The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic relationships with other ideas, with the idea of others (Bakhtin, in Neumann, 2003:137).

I see my different climate change stories as “talking to” each other – although not necessarily through conscious influence or intentional allusion. The intertextual concept pays tribute to the more subtle ways in which human communication and consciousness are based on otherness, both in text and thought. As various links exist between different climate change stories or discourse events, different storytellers are thus faced with choosing from an assortment of narratives, idioms and viewpoints. In their “subtle” ways, different global climate change stories can merge with one another and possibly create a new agenda: climate change awareness. Accordingly, the Norwegian awareness of climate change can be understood as connected to the global dialogue on the issue. This evolving awareness necessarily adapts to the Norwegian context and its politico-cultural reality. Thus, the kinds of knowledge that are negotiated and integrated into the Norwegian society depend on power, where insights are communicated to create, maintain, and continue the interpretations needed for stabilizing political supremacy. At the same time, such dialogues can be seen as intertwined with the current narrative knowledge within Norway. This approach to intertextuality stresses the workings of culture and highlights the question of national identity that is apparently crucial in the context of contemporary societies (Agger, 1992). In a seemingly globalized and insecure world – especially with respect to environmental threats – aspects of social boundaries are of increasing importance. This is not only seen in actual international politics where global treaties are running slow, trying to combat national protectionism and embedded socioeconomic interests. The same workings can also be found at the cultural, sociomental level – where we all are telling our particular, yet collective, stories so as to understand who we are and what we are doing in these complex, changing times.

As already stated, our knowledge about the world is dependent upon communication. *Communication* is in this thesis understood as the production of meaning in the interaction between human beings as it occurs in specific social, cultural and historical contexts (Harré et al., 1999). Climate change is seen to represent a major change to the world as we know it, and many of the scientific claims are accordingly about finding suitable responses to this presented upheaval. Communication of these issues can thus be understood as

a continuous and dynamic process unfolding among people that facilitates an exchange of ideas, feelings, and information as well as the forming of a mutual understanding and common visions of a desirable future [– in a particular context] (Moser, 2007:15).

This definition includes pre-established aspects of credibility, authority and meaning, but also incorporates the plurality of promising viewpoints, so as to counter propaganda and open the possibility of new meanings and needs. An open, stimulating dialogue is seen as a prerequisite in any context of participatory democracy.

As there is growing awareness that the dominant ways of describing the “environment” influence social deliberation and responses to warning signs from the environment, communication of such matters plays a pivotal role in how societies and governments face global warming and the changes it might cause (ibid; Cox, 2007). Climate change is a matter of scientific inquiry, but it is also a subject of disputed concerns in the field of social understanding and meaning: The intricacy of science, the politicizing of claims of knowledge, and the encroachment of the “technical sphere” on public sphere deliberations, are all seen to threaten our capacity to engage intelligently and creatively with the increasing signs of environmental distress and deterioration (Cox, 2007). Many scientists and academics argue that better communication is seen as essential if we are to respond sufficiently to the challenge of climate change. The problems behind this environmental threat are surely embedded in powerful socioeconomic

structures and value systems. Communication of climate change is hence a matter of legitimate concerns – of collective approval of the issues at stake. Moreover, expression of these issues and concerns is highly contingent on changing global and national circumstances, where different storytellers are relating what the climate challenge is about.

2.2 REALITY, THE ENVIRONMENT AND DISCOURSES

In this thesis I approach “reality” as it is constituted through stories, and such stories can be captured through *discourse*. The idea of “discourse” has been highly influential within the socially-based environmental studies and has been utilized in a variety of ways. Some define discourse in relation to linguistics; others relate the concept to everyday speech. The most common approach by social scientists restricts the concept to mean a specific delimitation of the shared meaning of a phenomenon (Svarstad, 2002:67). There are thus many discursive approaches and many corresponding levels of inquiry, which all turn attention to the role of language as the site of realization of meaning. In all their different outlooks, the wide-ranging use of this concept can be seen in relation to the origins of discourse in linguistic and social theory, highly influenced by the theories of Michel Foucault.

I will in this thesis use discourse analysis as a methodological tool to interpret and establish meaning in my selected texts. As discourses can be found anywhere, I will first specify and delimit their analytical usage – with regard to both their scope and their temporal dimension. With regard to the scope, I will on the one hand focus on environmental discourses, restricted to the discourse typology of John S. Dryzek (2005). On the other hand, I will distinguish between so called global discourses and the more specific Norwegian ones. This distinction is mainly an analytical tool, as the idea of “global discourses” remains problematic and, indeed, many have come to the conclusion that national identity

defines discourse communities (Mülhauser, 2006). In the Norwegian cultural context, I will describe some specific “Norwegian discourses” which express the Norwegian identity (see 5.1).

With regard to the temporal dimension of my study, I will, in the global context, restrict my analysis to the most recent publications from the IPCC, Gore, Lovelock and Lomborg. These four “storytellers” all published and promoted significant texts during 2006-2007: *The Fourth Assessment Report*, *The Inconvenient Truth*, *The Revenge of Gaia* and *Cool It*, respectively. In the Norwegian context, I restrict my analysis to a period of 10 months of news publication, from September 2007 to June 2008. My study of Norwegian media will represent a qualitative content analysis of three newspapers: *Aftenposten Morgen (AF)*, *Verdens Gang (VG)* and *Dagens Næringsliv (DN)* (see 2.3).

2.2.1 Environmental discourse

Over the years, the structural properties of *environmental discourses* have developed into a distinct discourse category, comprised of the linguistic devices that articulate arguments about the relationship between humans and the natural environment (Mülhauser, 2006). This more specific approach involves science, economics and ethics – but is neither a scientific nor an economic nor a moral discourse, though these are often its tropes (Harré et al., 1999). The primary focus is on the endangerment of nature and the human species in a global context. Environmental discourses are seen as attempts to make sense of the global, environmental changes that are currently affecting the world.

Implicit in my study is the claim that language and discourse have a central role in our understanding of climate change. Language is, of course, not the only vehicle through which global environmental concerns take shape. However, language is seen as having a prime role in how such issues are discussed, negotiated and used for various social and political interests (ibid.:4). Language

is a major instrument through which we can create, sustain or change attitudes towards the environment (ibid.). I will in my thesis apply the concept of environmental discourse as it is used by Dryzek, who offers a politically charged discourse typology. His typology allows the discovery, separation and organization of the myriad of environmental claims expressed in my text material. Dryzek sees discourse in relation to a socially constructed meaning system, and defines it as

a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them into coherent stories or accounts. Each discourse rests on assumptions, judgments, and contentions that provide the basic term for analysis, debates, arguments, and disagreements (Dryzek, 2005:9).

Environmental discourses can thus be viewed as broader sets of linguistic practices which are embedded in networks of social relations and tied to narratives about the construction and state of the world – both the natural and the social. The discursive order in which we weave together the world can in other words be understood as the workings of the narrative process itself, where language is the dominant tool in human meaning making (Harré et al., 1999). This implies the recognition of a certain stability of specific meaning systems. But at the same time, environmental issues do not place themselves in well-defined discursive boxes; they are contested and interconnected in many ways. A “meaning” cannot be settled once and for all (Svarstad, 2002), and the environmental reality is also subject to “meaning work” – in which the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing ideas and meanings take place (Benford and Snow, 2000:613). In the same way, Dryzek argues that the more complex an environmental problem is, the larger the possible perspectives of it (Dryzek, 2005). In this way, discourses on climate change become manifold and intertwined.

One major point of Dryzek’s typology (which I find interesting) is given to what extent different environmental discourses frame ecological concerns as

representing an anomaly to the existing industrial order, or if such challenges are defined within the “culture of progress” (Fisher and Hajer, 1999). The case of climate change can accordingly be framed as manageable within the already existing institutions of science, technology and society; or it can represent a deeper cultural critique of modern societies themselves. Dryzek mainly focuses on political aspects in his analysis, where the core idea is that the way we think and talk about basic concepts concerning the environment has consequences for the politics and policies that occur in the environmental field (Dryzek, 2005). Thus, discourses on climate change are, on one level, representing power and politics, featuring debates and disputes about environmental policy choices – both internationally and locally. Within this perspective, discourses in themselves embody power in the sense that they condition the perceptions and values of those subject to it. At the same time, discourses are intertwined with certain material political realities (ibid: 9). On a more fundamental level, the discourses and stories about the fate of our global environment also contain arguments about appropriate ethical positions to apply on environmental affairs. These issues are intertwined with a variety of moral and aesthetic questions about human livelihood, public attitudes, and our proper relation to other entities on the planet (ibid.). Within this perspective, environmental discourses are seen as culturally significant. The global character of current environmental issues and rhetorical claims about globalization has somehow resulted in an exaggerated emphasis on integration and interdependence – also in the discourse communities. But I will in my analysis stress the persistence of national cultural forces, as the knowledge from environmental discourses merges with other meaning systems, which are related to national identity and other cultural phenomena.

On this level, I will distinguish “cultural critique” from “cultural politics”. The political dimension refers to how environmental discourse in itself is a cultural force, related to dominant perceptions and values. The critical dimension is left to the various assertions within environmental discourse that problematize

existing arrangements and suggest alternative ways of living with nature (Fisher and Hajer, 1999:7). As I am concerned with the rise of a green public sphere, I am accordingly concerned with cultural critique. Since the radical voice of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in the 1960s, cultural critique has always accompanied modern environmental discourse. But with the recent mainstreaming of environmental issues and the uptake of environmental discourse in established spheres of institutional politics, the dimension of cultural critique has lost much of its impact (Dryzek, 2005).

Through looking at the history as well as the content of environmental discourses, Dryzek depicts how four major discourses have developed and what effect they have had on different industrialized societies.⁸ Since Dryzek sees environmental concerns as stemming from the industrial society, environmental discourses cannot simply take the condition of industrialism as given. Rather, such discourses have to be positioned in relation to the long-dominant discourse of industrial society⁹ and then depart from those terms (ibid: 13). This outlook fits well with my choice of climate change stories, as they all stem from – and more or less address – highly industrialized countries, including Norway.

Dryzek's proposed point of departure involves two dimensions: The first is either "reformist" or "radical", while the other is either "prosaic" or "imaginative".¹⁰ Seen in combination, this leads to four environmental discourses, which represent different approaches to nature and society: *survivalism*, *environmental problem solving*, *sustainability* and *green radicalism*. Survivalism describes the

⁸ I will briefly present these four environmental discourses, although I draw on Dryzek's typology throughout my thesis. For more on these specific typologies, see Dryzek 2005.

⁹ "Industrialism" is characterized as an overarching commitment to economic growth. Though industrial societies have featured different ideological forces (i.e. liberalism and socialism), they all share a similarity by giving no commitment to preserve nature as such or question the growth-ethos. For more on industrialism, see Dryzek 2005.

¹⁰ The *reformist* way represents the modest manner both in describing environmental problems and defining sufficient solutions; whereas the *radical* approach poses the imagery of apocalypse and urges for big changes. The *prosaic* dimension takes the political-economic chessboard set by industrial society as a given and sees environmental issues as an economic challenge; while the *imaginative* way wants to redefine this chessboard, treating environmental concerns not in opposition to economic ones, but potentially in harmony (Dryzek, 2005: 14).

earth as a limited stock of resources and prescribes drastic multidimensional action to prevent global disaster; environmental problem solving recognizes the existence of ecological problems but views them as tractable within the basic framework of industrial society; sustainability attempts to creatively resolve the conflicts between environmental and economic values; and green radicalism rejects the basic structure of industrial society and the way the environment is conceptualized in order to promote the transformation of human consciousness, economics, and politics (ibid: *blurb*). Dryzek also defines a fifth discourse category: the *Promethean* industrial discourse. Such an idiom does of course not figure as a pro-environmental discourse, as it provides neither calls for socioeconomic changes nor a recognition of natural limits.

The history of environmental affairs is hence the history of environmental discourses, which merge with other related meaning systems. Ecological awareness and the “crisis of our time” are hence seen as discursive phenomena. This comes about through a shift in our ways of seeing and assessing what we see – made possible by the adoption into our discourses of new vocabularies, new judgmental categories, new metaphors and analogies that have promoted awareness of much that was formerly unnoticed. As already argued, the cultural critique accompanying environmental concerns has recently lost its significance. This is mainly seen in relation to the concept of “sustainable development”, introduced as an important, international discourse in the early 1980s.

Sustainable development has become vital as an integrating discourse covering environmental issues from the local to the global, as well as a host of economic and development concerns (ibid: 143). In addition, this discourse refuses the idea of absolute natural limits – and thusly replaced the apocalyptic postulate of survivalism which characterized the environmental agendas of the 1970s. And now sustainability discourse has promoted a set of hegemonic, institutional practices through which a particular interpretation of sustainability is produced, reproduced and transformed (Lash et al., 1996). Along these lines, the

environmental *problématique* is seen as predetermined in an ongoing conversation between powerful actors who have produced a discourse of sustainable development that refers as much to the maintenance of modern techno-industrial arrangements as it does to our basic socio-cultural relationship with the natural environment (Fisher and Hajer, 1999:4). This version of sustainability is especially prevalent in the Western, industrialized world and is also referred to as “techno-corporatist ecological modernization” (Dryzek, 2005:172). Within this discourse, ecological problems are left to scientists, politicians and business leaders; no human, *cultural* challenge is recognized as integral to the environmental predicaments (Lash et al., 1996:19).

Given the current warnings about climate change and our environmental future, it seems like the manifested idea of sustainability has been an insufficient discourse, which has not produced the sort of social changes that appear to be necessary. The challenges of global warming are, moreover, often described through images of apocalypse – the natural world appears again as having limits! I believe we need a new agenda which engages the broader public in these ecological challenges, and I thus treat the discourse of green radicalism as a necessary corrective measure to the hegemonic discourse of sustainability. I therefore want to focus on the extent to which the chosen climate change stories circulating on a global scale constitute a chance for a more multi-layered debate of the environmental problems, which can renew environmental awareness at the local level.

2.3 SOURCES UNDER SCRUTINY

Both the global climate stories and the Norwegian media texts will be analyzed as interpretative narratives, representing different environmental discourses, informing what climate change responses can mean in practice. I will argue that our primary source of knowledge and our best chance of grasping the “reality” of

climate change is contained in these stories and texts that people share and debate. I will thus focus on the different inherent moral, cultural and political implications in these texts, navigating between individual statements and their broader contexts. At the same time, this largely sociomental approach is connected to real-life politics and power, where such collective stories and ideas have a reciprocal influence on actual events. A discourse analysis can seldom be totally separated from concrete material interests or institutional processes at work (Lindseth, 2006). I will thus pay attention to the political reality of Norway as an attempt to “contextualize” the Norwegian climate change stories (Neumann, 2001). Even more essential in this thesis is the understanding of how the phenomenon of climate change firstly is constructed by different social realities on a global level, and secondly adapted and adjusted to specific Norwegian discourse communities.

2.3.1 The global stories

The global climate change stories I have chosen, whose authors are the IPCC, Gore, Lovelock and Lomborg, will form the starting point of my analysis. I will elaborate their recently published texts, *The Fourth Assessment Report*, *An Inconvenient Truth*, *The Revenge of Gaia* and *Cool It*, respectively, which were all distributed during 2006-2007.

As there is a great variety between these four authors and their texts, I will pay attention to the writers’ position and authority, as well as their dissimilar communicative strategies. There are, of course, significant differences between the “scientific body” of the IPCC and the three other individual voices. I will, nevertheless, not distinguish between individual and collective speakers. I find it more important to try to grasp the diverse worldviews implied by their stories, and investigate what kind of environmental awareness these different stories might stimulate. I will thus focus on the different tones and warnings in these assorted climate change stories, and analyze what kind of corresponding

problems, solutions and values the climate challenge entails. As all my global stories speak in support of “scientific facts”, I will try to understand their discursive devices and rhetoric with respect to how these “truths” implicate the broader public. My global stories will then form the basis for my analysis of the Norwegian media coverage on the issue of climate change.

2.3.2 The Norwegian stories

In the Norwegian context, I will use Norwegian media as primary storytellers and interpret Norwegian newspapers as a stage of cultural and political meaning.

Although the media landscape has changed considerably over the past two decades and the weight of the electronic media is steadily increasing, the printed newspapers can still be considered an essential site of public exchange – which draw on, relate to and compete with other media of communication.

My Norwegian media study will be based on a qualitative content analysis of three newspapers: *Aftenposten Morgen (AF)*, *Verdens Gang (VG)* and *Dagens Næringsliv (DN)*. These papers were chosen because of their relevance and availability. They are all edited in Oslo and read by a substantial part of the Norwegian population – especially by the inhabitants in the densely populated Greater Oslo Region. There are several noteworthy differences between these papers including their focuses, political affiliations and quality of content. But together these three papers can be seen as a site for national discourse, representing different strata of the Norwegian society. In addition, these papers have an important similarity, as they all presented a distinctive “climate focus” during the chosen time frame from 01/09/07 to 01/06/08. The Peace Prize, the Bali-conference and the national *Klimaforliket*, part of the variety of global publications on the climate change issue, made global warming into a hot topic (literally) during this period¹¹; the newspapers maintained, respectively, *Het*

¹¹ See Appendix C for statistical overview.

Klode (AF), *Klimapanelet* (VG) and *Klode i Krise* (DN) as up-to-date profiles. My study gives only a snapshot of the Norwegian stories around climate change. In spite of its limited scope, I believe it allows us to see in which way these newspapers have attempted to bring climate change to the forefront of public life. In short, they may be seen as instructive and representative for mainstream culture and politics in Norway.

My texts were collected through a search engine called *Atekst*, which is the most extensive Norwegian database for print media available online. All editions of the three selected newspapers during the topical ten months were subject to different levels of content analysis. The first step was a search for the key words “*klima* AND endring**” (“climate and change”), “*global* AND oppvarming**” (“global and warming”) and “*klima* AND miljø**” (“climate and environment”). With these three search criteria, I got a large number of hits. I also did a more specific search for the different climate profiles and “climate journalists” in the respective newspapers, so as to get a more concentrated selection of relevant texts. Next I “scanned” through the various articles before identifying a sample of articles that were relevant to my research. Finally, the selected articles were analyzed in depth to ascertain the dominant styles of stories about the climate change issue.

The collected data for my analysis consist of 171 texts from the three papers in total, which is a typical and manageable sample for a qualitative media analysis (Gould, 2004).¹² Most of the texts can be described as news reports and features, though I also include genres such as comments and letters to and from the editor. Although genre is seen as an important aspect of media’s representational resources, my analysis only include a systematic differentiation between texts produced by journalists and other associated columnists in the papers and texts

¹² See Appendix A for overview of selected articles.

from independent contributors.¹³ This is done to present some of the internal dynamics and dialogues going on between the different Norwegian storytellers of climate change.

Newspapers in general have a disputed role: Do they work as a watchdog, an educator, a co-producer of common consciousness or are they merely propaganda for the dominant power structures? Contest as they role may be, I will consider these newspapers to be crucial sites for definition and re-definition of the meanings associated with climate change, and thus as a vital aspect of public communication and social change. Media coverage of climate change issues is, of course, constrained and shaped by the same production restrictions that govern news work in general, and my analysis accounts for both internal norms and external pressure (Hannigan, 1995). I treat the newspapers as a powerful vehicle passing on information, ideas, stories and values about our environmental challenge. Norwegians top the list of the world's most avid newspaper readers (Norgaard, 2006) and the Norwegian press is seen as a key player in establishing political agendas.¹⁴ Hence, the Norwegian media provide valuable and relatively independent insights regarding public interest, awareness, concern and action on the climate change issue.

As I attempt to contextualize the analysis of Norwegian media within the larger global framework, I will explore to what extent the Norwegian texts are indifferent towards the four chosen global stories, or oppose or support them in various ways. I will also relate my analysis to the more archetypical narratives that already exist within Norwegian culture as they are understood through other analyses. I will, in other words, treat the selected newspaper articles and global

¹³ See Chapter 5 for more on the different storytellers in the chosen Norwegian media texts.

¹⁴ Norway has a remarkable number of newspapers and magazines. The media are economically stimulated by a state subsidy scheme for daily newspapers and three groups of owners have a dominant position in the newspaper market. However, the Norwegian media industry is still considered to be rather autonomous. See i.e. <http://www.journalisten.no/story/57367> or *Makt – og demokratiutredningen 1998-2003*.

narratives on climate change as intertextually related. This is how I will determine whether the Norwegian media articulate pre-established cultural and political conventions or attempt to radically challenge status quo and bring in new insights. A basic assertion in my thesis is that discourses simultaneously enable and restrict environmental awareness in the public sphere.

I will most of all pay attention to the shared discursive tendencies in the selected media coverage, and focus on the general framework of the discourse of climate change. I aim to investigate the normative parameters of the Norwegian production and interpretation of the reality of climate change. The purpose of my discourse analysis of Norwegian media is thus to assess not so much the impact of particular elements in the media, but the impact, as a whole, of the implicitly transmitted ideology as it relates to the dynamic processes in which social reality is constructed.¹⁵ I am, in other words, concerned with the general cultural and political aspects of production of climate change knowledge. However, media texts do not directly mirror Norwegian public opinion, or the Norwegian culture *per se*. I will use my sample as a prism for refracting and representing the mechanisms of culture at work. Because media have a central place in the formation, construction and restraint of public opinion, studying their texts can reveal how they operate on a sociomental level (Perse, 2001).

2.3.3 Limitations

As I approach the underlying meanings of different Norwegian climate change stories, I will work on three main levels: with reference to the elaborated global stories, analysis of the assorted press articles, and presentation of cultural and political embeddedness. My research represents only a limited portion of

¹⁵ To support the interpretations of my findings, I will draw on insights from supplementary sources – such as other relevant studies, texts and documents.

literature pertaining to the climate change, and there are surely other storytellers in addition to those that I have chosen.

I also face personal limitations; I am aware of biases from my own perspective. I believe that we, as rich, privileged Norwegians, have to question our cultural values, which are based on industry and economic growth, and accept responsibility for our part of the challenges of climate change. I see a transformation of lifestyle and cultural values – especially in Norway – as lying at the heart of the struggle to address climate challenge in a sufficient, meaningful way. To use Dryzek's terms, I see the need for a great transition: one which would unveil a radical and imaginative story.

3. THE GLOBAL STORIES OF CLIMATE CHANGE

The IPCC, as a “scientific body”, is a prominent speaker in the discussion on climate change. When its *Fourth Assessment Report* was launched in 2007, the world got a decisive warning call about our bleak environmental situation, and the report’s future scenarios have been discussed in many international fora. At the same time, there are other actors on the global stage, adding their versions and visions of the climate change agenda to the public debate. Most of these significant speakers support their outlooks with so-called “scientific evidence”, although with a different premise. Some of the stories are told with the rhetoric of morality more than rationality, and some speakers communicate controversial claims. In this enormous body of climate change information, there are several charismatic storytellers who have managed to popularize their own interpretations of scientific data, and use language that excites the general public. Al Gore, James Lovelock and Bjørn Lomborg are among these speakers – who all have been engaged for some time in the environmental debate and attained international attention for their recent publications on the climate challenge.

I will in this chapter present the four selected global stories about climate change authored by the IPCC, Al Gore, James Lovelock and Bjørn Lomborg. I call their stories, respectively, *the “scientific” story*, *the “wake-up” story*, *the “doomsday” story* and *the “skeptical” story*. These stories espouse different perspectives on the problems of and solutions to climate change, and are hence reflecting different underlying value systems. Global warming is often presented as a scientific problem with political solutions. But this account is actually rather ambiguous when discussing climate change, and I will therefore give a short introduction to the complex field of “environmental science” before I portray the four mentioned stories:

Knowledge of environmental risks – like climate change – is always mediated in and through competing discourses, with the goal of promoting certain claims of

truth while opposing competing interpretations. This capacity to define potential risks and hazards is broadly aligned with the distribution of power among *credible*, *authorative* and *legitimate* definers of reality. Global warming is first and foremost portrayed as a social problem but acquires legitimacy in the eyes of the public mainly from scientific activities – in contrast to other moral issues in society (Hannigan, 2006). However, the complex field of “environmental science” is also blurred with a moral dimension, as there is a growing awareness that environmental problems are caused by cultural and political processes (ibid.). The supposedly “objective” base of science is an illusion, at least when talking about the prospects of climate change (Schneider, 2005). The traditional boundaries between facts and values are being transcended (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993). Accordingly, there is a growing awareness that there is no value free position that allows anybody – including scientists – to maintain an objective perspective on interaction between natural systems and human societies (Paavola and Lowe, 2005). At the same time, the issue of climate change is primarily presented in terms of possible *responses* to this challenge – which again entail human values. A complex issue such as climate change is thus fraught with uncertainties, including values themselves. All in all, this poses a challenge for the design of scientific investigation, which incorporates implicit value judgments about what should be investigated.

Results from the research on climate change – originating from the scientific community – are hence influenced by the different environmental discourses in which they appear. And although there is a tendency to treat these environmental controversies as simple factual disputes, they represent much more. These environmental discourses also raise fundamental questions about what we value: about the kind of beings we are; about the kinds of lives we should live, about our place in nature, and about the kind of world in which we might prosper (DesJardins, 1993).

3.1 THE “SCIENTIFIC” STORY

3.1.1 The author

The Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has established itself as an arbiter in all debates related to climate change. The IPCC was founded in 1988 as an intergovernmental UN body, and is generally treated as the preeminent authority in the scientific community when defining and dealing with climate change issues. The IPCC states that its aim is to “*assess on a comprehensive, objective, open and transparent basis the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant to understanding the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation.*”¹⁶

The IPCC produces reports on these topics by examining peer-reviewed technical literature; the IPCC itself is not conducting research. The reports are written and agreed upon by various researchers with temporary contracts, and representatives of the authorities from the different UN countries also help to write the reports that specifically address policymakers.¹⁷ Since 1988, the IPCC has produced a large number of reports and documents, and in 2007 the four-volume *Fourth Assessment Report* (AR4) was published. The most recent report, the *Synthesis report* (SYR), summarizes the findings of the three *Working Group Reports*¹⁸ and provides a synthesis that specifically addresses the issues that concern policymakers in the domain of climate change. The SYR also includes a *Summary for Policymakers* (SPM).

The SYR can be seen as a very important part of the AR4 – integral to the work

¹⁶ <http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm>

¹⁷ <http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2007/februar/1170339853.65>

¹⁸ The first report is about the state of the climate, the second report is about what consequences global warming might result in, while the third report is about what measures are necessary to combat climate change.

of the IPCC – being *the* report which tries to communicate outside the scientific community and stimulate public dialogue. The release of this report in November 2007 contributed strongly to putting the climate change issue on the international agenda, and the IPCC's work drew an extraordinary amount of attention in the media of the Western world. I will thus concentrate on the SYR and its accompanying SPM in this analysis.

3.1.2 Formulation of the problem

The SYR has three parts: it confirms that climate change is occurring “very likely” because of human induced GHG emissions; it illustrates the impacts and potentials for adaptation; and finally it presents an analysis of costs, policies and technologies for curbing the effects of climate change.

Although SYR can be understood as a piece of difficult science, with rigid language and complex measurements, it has been prepared in “*a non-technical style while ensuring that scientific and technical facts are recorded correctly*” (IPCC, 2007: v). The SYR claims in its preface that it is designed to assist governments and other decision makers in the public and private sector in formulating and implementing appropriate responses to the threat of human-induced climate change. This representation of climate change claims to be “objective”, fulfilling the important principle of the IPCC to be policy relevant, but not policy prescriptive. In this way, the IPCC offers different scenarios of projected consequences, based on their “scientific probability”. Scientists are by their nature reluctant to express results with absolute certainty, and future projections based on climate models always include some uncertainties. In fact, “pure objectivity” is a myth in science (Schneider, 2005). This is highly important and relevant when discussing climate change, as measurements of the climate also deal with future events. Such measurements have of course no empirical data and are hence entailing subjective judgments (ibid.). Uncertainty is an accepted – and disputed – issue in the scientific community. In an attempt

to make this clearer to policymakers and the general public, the IPCC adopts, for the SYR, seven verbal expressions of certainty.

But, although the climatic challenges, vulnerabilities and risks are presented as more or less *certain* scientific facts, these alleged “facts” also need some kind of “value” to be relevant and stimulate a response. Value judgment is necessary to determine which facts are important. The IPCC seems aware of this concern when it states the role of science in our thinking about what to do about global warming:

Determining what constitutes dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system [...] involves value judgments. Science can support informed decisions on this issue (ibid: 18).

3.1.3 Suggested solutions

The SYR presents numerous projected challenges, probabilities of impacts and risks, and probability scenarios – both in the short- and the long-term. But still the crisis seems manageable, according to scientific and economic reasoning throughout the report. The magic words in this story are “adaptation” and “mitigation”, which together will *reduce or prevent* the risk of climate change. These action-options should be seen as Siamese twins, as “*there is high confidence that neither adaptation nor mitigation alone can avoid all climate change impacts; however they can complement each other and together can significantly reduce the risk of climate change*” (ibid: 19). At the same time there are some possible barriers to the viability of both solutions. The realm of adaptation seems challenging, as “*financial, technological, cognitive, behavioral, political, social, institutional and cultural constraints limit both the implementation and effectiveness of adaptation measures*” (ibid: 56). Accordingly, mitigation action is treated as a complex field, as “*no single technology can provide all of the mitigation potential in any sector*” (ibid: 58). Mitigation measures are also related to the aspects of human behavior, as “*there*

is high agreement and medium evidence that change in lifestyle and behavior patterns can contribute to climate change mitigation across all sectors” (ibid: 59). This is a strong claim with questionable impact, as the SYR presents no clear strategies or examples of how to change ways of life. The report only makes vague suggestions, such as “*changes in consumption patterns, education and training*” (ibid.).

The stories of adaptation and mitigation are mainly told in the language of economics, not ecology. When dealing with short-term issues, the report bears resemblance to the discourse of environmental problem solving (Dryzek, 2005). Climate change does not give rise to any heroic struggle for a new world order. Rather, the coming ecological problems can be addressed within the existing structures of the political economy of industrial society. SYR points to a “*variety of national policies and instruments available to governments to create the incentives for action*” (IPCC, 2007: 61). Such actions are related to both market mechanisms and expert bodies, where risk- and cost-benefit analyses take precedence in the stabilization of GHG emissions. At the same time, “*there is high agreement and much evidence that all stabilization levels assessed can be achieved by deployment of a portfolio of technologies [...]*” (ibid: 68); technological fixes seem to go hand in hand with institutional solutions.

In the long-time perspective, SYR presents the discourse of sustainable development as an efficient paradigm within which to operate: “*Sustainable development can reduce vulnerability to climate change, and climate change could impede nations’ abilities to achieve sustainable development pathways*” (ibid: 70). But “sustainable development” is – as I have argued earlier – a problematic notion, which provides by no means a clear plan of action (Dryzek, 2005). It is a kind of “will have it all” concept which combines ecological protection, economic growth, social justice and intergenerational justice – not only locally and immediately, but globally and in perpetuity (ibid.). Sustainable

development somehow tries to fuse environmental and economic concerns in an imaginative way. But at the end of the day – in its hegemonic manifestation and reassuring quest for progress – actual ecological commitment often gives way to economic concerns.

The scientific story of the IPCC can thus be placed within a progress-friendly, reformist discourse. The story deals most of all with risk management, and states that “*responding to climate change involves an iterative risk management process that includes both adaptation and mitigation and takes into account climate change damages, co-benefits, sustainability, equity and attitudes to risk*” (IPCC, 2007: 64). Again, such future-oriented action works to defend the current economic situation, rather than visualize an alternative future, as “*choices about the scale and timing of GHG-mitigation involve balancing the economic costs of more rapid emission reductions now against the corresponding medium-term and long-term climate risks of delay*” (ibid: 69). The values at work are definitely about economics; how else can you balance economic *costs* of today with future *risks*?

3.1.4 The underlying value dimension

The IPCC admits that decisions on what constitutes “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” also are value judgments determined through socio-political processes, taking into account considerations such as development, equity and sustainability, as well as uncertainties and risks (IPCC, 2001). And although science can contribute to “informed decisions” on these value opinions, this scientific story attempts to articulate such value judgments in a “value-free manner”. SYR – and therefore the IPCC – describes climate change on a global scale, dealing with global averages and probabilities. Climate change is portrayed as a human induced challenge which we have to combat. But the allegedly objective and neutral way in which the predicted challenge is described leaves vast room for interpretation and manipulation. The worldview and

language at work are rather diplomatic and uncontroversial, as this story in itself is legitimized by the so-called “global scientific consensus”. There are no clear voices and no clear positions; only a complex, coherent world where the responsibility of confronting the coming crisis is diffused. Morality is made impersonal by expanding it to everyone, everywhere. The consistent use of the passive voice avoids the individual responsibility, and the story thereby contains no obviously addressed calls for action.

3.2 THE “WAKE-UP” STORY

3.2.1 The author

In 2006 Al Gore captivated the world with the launch of the film *An Inconvenient Truth* and its accompanying book. Gore is seen by his supporters as a “pioneer” in dealing with climate change issues in the U.S. Gore’s authority lies in many years of experience in U.S. politics, including being the former United States Vice President and the Democratic nominee for president in the 2000 presidential election, as well as his long-standing interest in environmental problems. He dealt with environmental issues as a member of the Congress and now continues that work as an energetic storyteller. In recent years, Gore’s strategy has been to travel around the world with his “Inconvenient slide show”, presenting his dramatic perspective on what he calls our “planetary emergency” to ordinary people before it is too late. He has also managed to market and distribute his accompanying book to a broad audience. His message is in many ways the well-directed Hollywood version of climate change.

Gore presents his “wake-up” story with very clear language, speaking like a real politician – even a prophet! As his motivation is to spread “the word” about climate change, Gore’s story is a mix of facts and values situated within an apocalyptic vision of the future. But he is, nevertheless, not condemning the fate of the earth and ourselves therein. Gore is rather presenting a new version of “the

American dream”, where we – you and me – can make a better future come true. All we need is to fully counteract the challenge of global warming and its horrific scenarios (Gore, 2006). This involves waking up and mobilizing the power of the human spirit to transform our precarious circumstances into a brighter future. Gore tries, most of all, to make climate change a relevant issue for people in the wealthy, industrialized world.

3.2.2 Formulation of the problem

Gore’s story starts by presenting the scientific basis of climate change in simple terms to confirm the position of the IPCC. His story then moves on to portray the impending consequences, such as melting mountain glaciers, distressed polar bears, severe hurricanes, extreme weather and melting poles. Gore describes in emotional ways the devastating changes that nature is undergoing. The earth is presented as a finite and fragile system, seen from outer space as a blue, living entity. But Gore uses an anthropocentric language, where the environmental damages from climate change are valued disproportionately with regard to their consequences for human civilization. The processes of climate change will bring about altered and challenging conditions for humans, with unbalanced ecosystems, spreading diseases and flooding water. His story tells us that humanity is sitting on a ticking time bomb, and that we have only ten years to prevent a major catastrophe that could send our entire planet into a tail-spin of epic destruction.¹⁹ Climate change puts us in the situation of choosing between the life and death of civilization; *“and that is what is at stake. Our ability to live on planet Earth – to have a future as a civilization”* (ibid: 298).

3.2.3 Suggested solutions

Gore addresses three driving factors behind the climate challenge: Our level of population, our level of technology, and our level of *ignorance* – he is primarily

¹⁹ <http://www.climatecrisis.net/aboutthefilm/>

attacking the last one. Gore wants us to wake up to what he sees as “the coming Deluge”. However, his story has an optimistic message, since it tells us that we can handle climate change if we change our mentality – and thereby our actions. *“We have everything we need to begin solving this crisis, with the possible exception of the will to act”* (ibid: x). Gore believes in a moral awakening – especially in the rich, western world. His story is very much addressing the archetypical, self-made Americans. To these ends, Gore understands the potential to disturb or upset his privileged audience, as *“the climate crisis presents us with an inconvenient truth. It means we are going to change the way we live our lives [...] but we all must take action so that our democracy creates laws to protect our planet, because we simply can’t afford not to act”* (Gore, 2007:179).

The optimistic tone of Gore’s climate story lies in his focus on future possibilities, in addition to the foreboding problems. For example, he draws inspiration from the Chinese writing for the word “crisis”, which consists of two constituent characters, which individually mean “danger” and “opportunity”. Gore manages to offer an imaginative, motivating story, as he says *“we must choose to make the 21st Century a time of renewal. By seizing the opportunity that is bound up in this crisis, we can unleash the creativity, innovation, and inspiration that are just as much a part of our human birthright as our vulnerability to greed and pettiness. The choice is ours. The responsibility is ours”* (Gore, 2006:296).

The wake-up story of Gore is to some extent talking in the discursive fields of sustainable development as ecological modernization (Dryzek, 2005): Gore argues that the future possibilities of climate change will create new jobs and new incomes, where economic and environmental interests go hand in hand. He focuses on the potentials in energy and technology, and describes how we will start building clean motors, utilize the potentials of wind- and sun power, and stop wasting energy. Within this framework, Gore addresses the Western *nations*,

and argues that “*the most technologically advanced countries have the greatest obligation to use technology wisely and treat the planet responsibly*” (Gore, 2007:156). But most of all Gore addresses the Western *citizens*. His wake-up story puts high confidence in democracies and the effects of public discussion of environmental affairs:

Now it is up to us to use our democracy and our God-given ability to reason with one another about our future and make moral choices to change the policies and behaviors that would, if continued, leave a degraded, diminished, and hostile planet for our children and grandchildren – and for humankind (Gore, 2006:296).

To some extent, Gore’s story can be classified under the discursive fields of green radicalism and environmental problem solving, taking as the point of departure democratic pragmatism (Dryzek, 2005). Gore leaves the resolution of the climate crisis up to the people and wants to cultivate “Homo civicus” (ibid.). His story evokes confidence in new environmental policy instruments, where networks of public-private partnerships and collaborative relationships across regulators, communities and businesses agree to address common concerns. Such an approach to politics – and especially environmental politics – is, of course, rather idealistic, as it poses no conflicts of interest or redistribution of power among the various stakeholders. But Gore sees it from a very different angle; he believes that the climate crisis first of all is a challenge that should transcend individual interests and party-political dividing lines.

3.2.4 The underlying value dimension

As Gore depicts it, climate change is most of all about our unique opportunity as a generation to come together and unite around a compelling moral goal. The moral of the “wake-up” story is hence that climate change is actually a question of morality:

My hope is that those who read the book and see the film will begin to feel, as I have for a long time, that global warming is not just about science and that is it not just a political issue. It is really a moral issue (Gore, 2006:10).

The wake-up story is in other words trying to communicate how global warming affects us at a deeper, existential level. While Gore seems to understand “politics” as representing a social system *made* by humans, he portrays our “morality” as a basic, intrinsic aspect of the human being. In other words, we have to awaken our own, natural instincts to experience a fundamental “wake-up”. In Gore’s story, the climate challenge is not only an issue of CO₂ and technology. For him, climate challenge is also the need to change how we see and sense, so that we can return to our environmental foundations.

3.3 THE “DOOMSDAY” STORY

3.3.1 The author

James Lovelock published *The Revenge of Gaia* in 2006, as a revised and updated report of the state of “the Gaia earth”. Lovelock’s point of departure is that of an independent scientist, working outside the established scientific community, both in England and abroad. He speaks as a “planetary physician” with more than forty years of experience in dealing with environmental issues on a global scale (Lovelock, 2006). Lovelock has a doctorate in chemistry; but he is not affiliated with a university, research institute or student body. On the other hand, Lovelock has an almost unparalleled influence in environmental science based on his particular approach to science. Lovelock is best known for his “Gaia theory”, which he introduced in the 1970s. The Gaia theory presents the earth as a self-regulating living organism, and Lovelock is a pioneering dissident of the Western scientific mindset and its reductionist paradigm.

To some extent, Lovelock has made it his life project to talk outside the established scientific power structures so as to challenge orthodox scientific

reasoning. His Gaia perspective has met a lot of criticism, and has been treated as “non-science” (or nonsense) associated with the work of myths and storytelling. But, as Lovelock himself argues, the Gaia theory should be understood not as a scientific fact to be proven or refuted, but as an alternative way of human scientific understanding. Rather than a mythical story, symbolizing a “romantic” vision of “nature”, the Gaia theory represents more of a holistic approach to natural sciences and the world as such.

3.3.2 Formulation of the problem

In *The Revenge of Gaia*, Lovelock draws a dark picture of the human situation. We have passed a threshold with regards to our involvement with the rest of the environment, and there are few emergency exits. In rather sober, simple terms Lovelock presents his biography of Gaia and the negative effects of steadily increasing industrial growth. He then presents possible forecasts for the 21st Century, drawing on other scientific research, including his own. According to Lovelock, neither air temperature nor sea levels will rise “smoothly”, as per the IPCC predictions. Lovelock expects sudden and unpredictable discontinuities (ibid: 50).

Lovelock believes global warming is now irreversible, and that nothing can prevent large parts of the planet from becoming too hot to inhabit or submerging under water. This would result in mass migrations, famine and epidemics. He explains there is no time left for “sustainable development”, only for “sustainable retreat” (ibid.). Lovelock’s story describes an “earth that is fighting back”, with humanity at war with the environment. But despite sketching such brutal scenarios, Lovelock tries to encourage love for Gaia. He wants to motivate the innermost primitive feelings of human minds to reconnect us to our natural surroundings. This dramatic call for action can, in Lovelock’s perspective, be told in the language of science: of *his* science. Lovelock rejects climate change

rhetoric based on emotional appeals. Rather, he claims, we must work toward a more “sensitive science”.

3.3.3 Suggested solutions

The solutions Lovelock first draws upon are based on energy, as humanity needs energy to survive. This preliminary survival strategy is maybe more provocative than his Gaia theory, as Lovelock argues for the use of nuclear energy. He sees nuclear energy as the safest, large-scale energy solution, compared to other renewable solutions. Lovelock argues further that our fear of nuclear power is somehow irrational and culturally constructed, and he tries to dismantle this fear through scientific reasoning.

Lovelock puts high confidence in technology as he argues for nuclear energy, synthetic food production and more experimental geo-engineering projects. But these efforts are nevertheless seen as efficient, preliminary responses which will give humanity some extra time to do what Lovelock sees as necessary, that is, change our lifestyle and, most of all, our worldview. Lovelock claims, moreover, that we have to put the concerns of Gaia first and forget about “Homo economicus”, or even Homo sapiens, if we are to survive. In his doomsday story, the climate challenge represents a crisis of civilization, and not a crisis of nature. He believes Gaia will survive, but that the human race is at risk.

The doomsday story addresses human population levels explicitly. Lovelock means we have to contain our expansion, and states that “*if we can overcome the self-generated threat of deadly climate change, caused by our massive destruction of ecosystems and global pollution, our next task will be to ensure that our numbers are always commensurate with Gaia’s capacity to nourish them*” (ibid: 141). Lovelock is in this way talking in the apocalyptic discourses of survivalism, where there are natural and definite limits (Dryzek, 2005). But he is a survivalist with a twist, as Lovelock puts the interests of Gaia – not the human

race – first. Within this perspective, Lovelock has been accused of providing an authoritarian and somewhat anti-human vision, as he leaves little room for individual freedom and liberal rights.²⁰

At the same time, Lovelock seems concerned with humanity. His doomsday story also bears resemblance to the discourses of green radicalism, focusing on changing people's attitudes (Dryzek, 2005). Lovelock speaks to the general public, and points to the need for everyone to change worldviews, values and lifestyles. The human race has to position itself *within* the “mother earth”, and start loving nature, as Lovelock puts it. His strongest postulate is hence to cultivate an alternative, ecological subjectivity, whereby agency is given not only to all humans, but also to nature. Nature is seen as a living entity, with meaning and purpose. And this view of life on earth should accordingly be treated as fact.

Although Lovelock tries to speak of “facts”, his scientific view seems to appeal as much to feelings as to rationality. Lovelock presumes that we humans have to deal with nature passionately, as “*we need most of all to renew that love and empathy for nature that we lost when we began our affair with city life*” (Lovelock, 2006:8). Furthermore, Lovelock believes we need holistic metaphors like “Gaia” in order to confront, understand and react to the challenge of climate change. We humans must understand our natural surroundings through living concepts and not through mechanistic metaphors like “spaceship earth” (ibid.), a perspective he has recently developed.²¹ Lovelock makes some radical claims with interesting conclusions. Although he distances himself from the occult versions of Gaia-adoration, he now states that these new age groups are, in a way, more advanced than the natural scientists, when it comes to climate change (ibid.). Lovelock must be understood as an advocate of changing modern

²⁰ See i.e. Anker 2005:247

²¹ According to Anker (2005) Lovelock was one of the main proponents in the 1970s of understanding the earth as a “spaceship”, in which technology, terminology and methodology developed for ecological colonization of space become tools for solving environmental problems on Earth. See Anker 2005:239

urbanites towards “green consciousness”, as he declares that, *“our first duty if we are green should be to convince them that the real world is the living Earth and that they and their city lives are a part of it and wholly dependent on it for their existence. Our role is to teach and to set an example by our lives”* (ibid: 142). On this level, Lovelock idealistically targets individual efforts – rather than social structures and institutions – when talking about climate measures.

But at the same time, Lovelock does have a pragmatic outlook and addresses our current political economy. His story is inscribed in a Eurocentric frame, criticizing European governments and demanding that bureaucratic institutions facilitate market incentives to make nuclear energy available (ibid.). Lovelock also argues that although global climate change needs global agencies such as the IPCC and the UN to deal with the issue, the increasing seriousness of the situation means that independent nations will need to address disasters locally and in protectionist terms (ibid.:153).

All in all, the Lovelock's doomsday story is somehow difficult to categorize. It is a radical and imaginative story, which asks for alternatives when responding to the climate challenge. However, these alternatives are not reactionary attempts at “going back to nature”. Lovelock believes in new technology and his insistence on humanity's “sustainable retreat” is clear:

The sustainability brigade is insane to think we can save ourselves by going back to nature; our only chance of survival will come not from less technology, but more.²²

3.3.4 The underlying value dimension

Lovelock's story is interesting in its way of asking for new, creative ways to deal with global warming. The story is told within both an apocalyptic and an idealistic framework; Lovelock is most of all challenging our conformist

²²

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2008/mar/01/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange>

thinking. The doomsday story tells of a modern, urban civilization that has lost its elementary connections to the environment. Lovelock wants us to put Gaia first and start loving our natural surroundings. Simultaneously, we have to embrace science and technology with passion. And although Lovelock poses some quite provocative challenges to the human uses of technology, it is not because he sees such efforts as “the solution” to climate change. Rather, technological fixes and creative geo-engineering are human means to satisfy the needs of Gaia: “*By itself this fix will do no more than buy us time to change our damaging way of life*” (ibid: 232).

The moral of the doomsday story seems not be about technological fixes, but about our human mental capacity. Lovelock is after all attacking the Western tradition of anthropocentrism, and pays homage to a rather strange version of green radicalism:

This small band of deep ecologists seem to realize more than other green thinkers the magnitude of the change of mind needed to bring us back to peace with Gaia, the living Earth (ibid: 154).

On the other hand, Lovelock’s story might invite to moral apathy, as he says it is already too late to stop the looming climate crisis from occurring. Doomsday seems all but inevitable, and such a message could discourage people from taking any action at all, – or give rise to reckless hedonism. (But that is hopefully a completely different story.)

3.4 THE “SKEPTICAL” STORY

3.4.1 The author

Bjørn Lomborg published *Cool it* in 2007. Lomborg is a political scientist by profession and has for many years worked within academic institutions, teaching statistics and political science. Lomborg is now an adjunct professor at the

Copenhagen Business School and director at the Copenhagen Consensus Centre,²³ a Danish think tank that “tells governments and philanthropists around the world about the best ways to spend aid and development money”.²⁴

Lomborg has been engaged in the public debate about climate change for a long time. He has published books on the topic, not to mention his controversial *The Skeptical Environmentalist* (2001). Lomborg has strong arguments about how we should understand and respond to the climate challenge, and he is considered to be one of the most influential environmentalists by many international rankings. Lomborg can also be seen as a pioneer in the global dialogue on climate change, and as a strong voice trying to change the dialogue itself. Lomborg’s latest book, *Cool it*, alludes in its title to two sides of the climate issue: We have to cool both the earth and the debate about our warming planet.

3.4.2 Formulation of the problem

The arguments of Lomborg’s skeptical story are quite clear and simple. In *Cool it*, Lomborg agrees that climate change is real and man-made. He also accepts of the “scientific consensus” as given by the IPCC, and is not as doubtful as in *The Skeptical Environmentalist*. But still, Lomborg argues that the general statements about the consequences of climate change are greatly overstated. He claims that we have to balance the apocalyptic picture, especially by Al Gore and the general media. Lomborg sees the biggest problem to be the climate *debate*. He states that the public dialogue on climate change is focusing on exaggerated problems and wrong solutions. He argues further that those voices which are not supporting the most radical solutions to global warming – especially what he calls “*extravagant CO₂-cutting programs*” (Lomborg, 2007: x) – are banned from the public discourse. Lomborg declares that by now, critical voices towards present state of

²³ <http://www.lomborg.com/about/biography/>

²⁴ <http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/>

climate talks and policies are summarily judged as reckless puppets of the oil industry.²⁵ Lomborg wants to combat the bombastic rhetoric that characterizes the climate debate and clear the ground for a measured discussion about the best way forward. What the world needs most of all is a “rational dialogue” based on sensible arguments and scientific findings, instead of emotions and “CO₂-hysteria” (ibid.). With Lomborg's presentation of arguments about “why we need to tackle global warming smartly”, he gives an optimistic story about humanity’s prospects and dedicates the book to “the future generations” (ibid.).

The major attention Lomborg gives to the problems of climate change is that it is cheaper to accept and adjust to this challenge, than to try fighting it. Any global warming measure – as Lomborg understands it – must be seen in relation to other mechanisms, and here he talks in the fields of economic analysis. Lomborg argues that many of the suggested measures now being considered to stop global warming will cost hundreds of billion of dollars, and that such considerations are based on emotional rather than strictly scientific assumptions. We have to “do good”, not “feel good”; and “tackling climate change smartly” (ibid.) – through a jungle of cost-benefit analysis.

Lomborg criticizes the policies implemented to combat climate change, especially the “expensive and inefficient” quota mechanisms of the Kyoto-protocol and in EU-policies (ibid.). Thus, Lomborg argues for simpler, smarter and more efficient solutions, and he asks why the debate over climate change has stifled rational dialogue and stifled meaningful dissent. Lomborg tries to focus on long-term solutions and cost-competitive renewables, dealing with climate change as a merely economic challenge:

That humanity has caused a substantial rise in atmospheric carbon-dioxide levels over the past centuries, thereby contributing to global warming, is beyond debate. What is

²⁵

http://www.lomborg.com/cool_it/

debatable, however, is whether hysteria and headlong spending on extravagant CO₂-cutting programs at an unprecedented price is the only possible response (ibid: 56).

3.4.3 Suggested solutions

Lomborg's clearest message is that if "we" – understood as the rich Western countries – want to help "the world", there are more important challenges than climate change to focus on. Poverty, malaria and Aids are among these challenges, which can be tackled in much more cost-efficient ways than the problems of climate change. Lomborg points out that we have to remember the real goal in this debate – which is not about stopping GHG emissions per se, but improving the quality of life and of the environment (ibid). He seems most engaged in the fate of the poor people, rather than focusing on nature and the environment as such. This is simply because he does not see climate change as posing a catastrophic threat. Lomborg believes we can manage to adapt to the changes if we spend our money wisely, and his logic is quite clear: If we want a better world, our best strategy is to become rich – all of us!

When we look into the future, the UN expects that people in both developed and developing countries will become richer. In the industrialized world, people will see their income grow six fold, as seen during the last century. Income in the developing countries is expected to soar twelve fold. This is important when talking about climate change (ibid: 47).

The ethos of industrialism seems to be strong in Lomborg's story, as he does not question any of the basic assumptions of this ideology. His various "rational" calculations and prospects portray a brighter future, where poverty and pollution might be eradicated. According to Lomborg, the world is without limits – with regard to both our economic growth and our use of natural resources. It is economy that matters, and Lomborg does not discuss the intrinsic value of nature or other non-quantifiable resources. At the same time, he seems to put high confidence in the veracity and power of statistical indicators of environmental

trends; he refuses to recognize complexity and uncertainty in ecological affairs (Dryzek, 2005). In Lomborg's skeptical story, the world will do better and better – if we start *doing* good. That means basically to calculate our expenditures more rationally, and make more sensible arguments about what measures are necessary for the climate:

I hope we will cool our conversation, rein in exaggerations, and start focusing on where we can do the most good. This does not mean doing nothing about climate change, but it does mean having an open dialogue about its effects and solutions, a conversation about what our priorities should be (Lomborg, 2007:163).

The skeptical story seems to represent a rather “Promethean” discourse, where “nature” is treated as brute matter, and there are no limits to economic growth and prosperity (Dryzek, 2005). According to Dryzek, so-called “prometheans” have unlimited confidence in the ability of humans and their technologies to overcome any problems – including environmental ones (ibid: 59.). In this view, Lomborg seems first and foremost to believe in the human “technology” of rationality. But Lomborg speaks also of material expertise, as he is concerned with developing more low-carbon energy technologies (Lomborg, 2007:153).

3.4.4 The underlying value dimension

Lomborg's story provides a rather technical understanding of environmental processes and global events; climate change appears to be a problem that we should use our intelligence to resolve. Lomborg is very skeptical towards what he sees as a public preoccupation with exaggerated and emotional claims about our ecological future. He argues that “*global warming is not the only issue, and having some scientists making scary scenarios and dramatic statements simply closes off the vital dialogue on social priorities*” (ibid: 142). The skeptical story is thus not so much about a challenging environmental future, since in Lomborg's world, climate change is not the main issue of concern. He wants to make the world a better place, and his story is most of all about human needs.

Lomborg tells a story with empathy for humanity, as he repeatedly argues that we must improve the quality of life for poor people in the developing world, a manifestly strong moral claim. But Lomborg seems to have very few moral claims concerning our environmental surroundings, and his skeptical story is uncritical of our Western way of living. Natural resources, ecosystems and nature itself exist only for human exploitation, and we have to make use of these resources through rational means. Lomborg portrays the world as inhabited by competitive “Homo economicus”; markets, policies, prices and technologies are sovereign in his skeptical story. Lomborg’s morality seems thus to stem from a cost-benefit analysis, and although there is no doubt that some aspects of the climate challenge are open to economic analysis, it is doubtful that all questions of interest have economic solutions.

According to Lomborg, the real moral problem of the climate challenge is the *debate* on this issue, which takes our attention away from other issues that we can address so much more efficiently. Lomborg claims that although our efforts to establish “climate change policies” mean well, these issues are “*almost expropriating the public agenda, trying to address the hardest problem, with the highest price tag and the least chance of success, it leaves little space, attention, and money for smarter and more realistic solutions* (ibid:123)”. Lomborg wants to “do good”. But we must question whether the moralizing attitude in this quotation realistically gives rise to a new and better world, or if this message provides excuses to continue “business as usual”. Climate change seems neither to be about capturing the public imagination nor limiting our consumerist lifestyles to more sustainable levels. Rather, we must formulate rational and intelligent aid policies to help the developing world to flourish. It looks, moreover, as though the industrial world must go on, spreading its ideology to all parts of the world – so that everybody can produce and consume themselves into prosperity.

3.5 AND SO THE STORIES GO...

According to the four elaborated stories, climate change is happening. But as demonstrated through my analysis, there is neither *one* accepted scientific perspective on the environmental problem, nor *one* political response to the challenge. The IPCC and its scientific story confirm a serious “truth” about climate change, where the challenge seems somehow calculable and controllable. But as the other stories reveal, global warming has no clear answers. The different storytellers are determining what climate change is about, and the way this challenge might affect and engage us. Thus, where the moral weight falls depends on the worldview at work. Gore wants us Western citizens to “wake-up” to our ecological drama, while Lovelock urges us to prepare for “sustainable retreat” and start loving nature, and Lomborg implores more sensible dialogues on the climate issue.

In their different outlooks, these four elaborated stories speak for themselves about what climate change is and how to respond to this challenge. At the same time, the storytellers I present are part of the larger global dialogue, which brings the climate issue in to the public sphere. Their stories refer to and advance their respective perspectives on the environment in various ways, and together they reveal an important message: “Knowledge” about the environment and our climate challenge is not static – there are many probable and possible perspectives upon it, with the various perspectives evolving in relation to each other. These four stories initiate a multi-layered debate of the global climate problem, which has the potential to renew environmental awareness at the local level. Climate change is hotly contested, but *one* thing is clear – the quality and ideological content of the stories of climate change do matter. In the next chapter I will therefore turn to the Norwegian media and present my analysis of how these elaborated global stories are reflected in the Norwegian texts on climate change.

4. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN MEDIA

The four global climate stories elaborated so far are all constituent parts of a broader picture: heightened attention to climate change issues. This trend has stimulated a renewed awareness of the environment in general, with ongoing dialogues and debates about global warming among the different storytellers. These communicative activities are also reflected in the Norwegian context, where extended amounts of information on the climate matter are exposed to the Norwegian public. An important aspect of these presentations and discussions are the stories told by the mass media – which by and large are seen as our modern society's primary storytellers (Hannigan, 2006).

The media analysis in this study includes three different Norwegian newspapers: *Aftenposten* (AF), *Dagens Næringsliv* (DN) and *Verdens Gang* (VG). All three papers created a specific climate section during my chosen ten months of analysis, from September 2007 to June 2008. These newspapers can additionally be understood as representing different sectors and different political agendas of the Norwegian society – the widely distributed AF, the business oriented DN and the tabloid VG.²⁶ My sample consists of 171 texts, with 137 of these are articles written by journalists, editors or associated columnists in the different newspapers; the remaining 34 texts are readers' contributions.²⁷

My Norwegian media analysis is divided into three chapters. This chapter will first provide a short presentation of the significant storytellers of climate change in the Norwegian media. In the second part of this chapter, I will focus on the extent to which and how the selected texts relay the four elaborated global stories advanced by the IPCC, Gore, Lovelock and Lomborg.

²⁶ AF used to be a "respectable", conservative newspaper. It is still the most respectable daily, but it has shifted to the center left in the past 2 years.

²⁷ The first category comprises news coverage, reports, features, editors letters and regular columns (especially climate columns); while the second category comprises various types of op-ed comments. See appendix A for further specification on the different sections and authors.

4.1 THE NORWEGIAN STORYTELLERS OF CLIMATE CHANGE

While searching for specific climate sections and journalists in the selected media landscape, I identified certain significant Norwegian storytellers on the climate case who are to be identified:

I have collected 78 texts from AF, of which 36 articles were written by the journalist *Ole Mathismoen*. Mathismoen is considered the foremost climate journalist in Norway²⁸, and he has been working in AF as a political commentator since 1984. Mathismoen has no formal education on the scientific aspects of global warming but has for a very long time been engaged in issues of climate and the environment. He has covered environmental issues in AF since 1987 and he has also written several books about these matters. Just before the climate section of AF, *Het Klode* (“Hot Planet”), was launched in December 2007, Mathismoen published his latest book: *KLIMA – hva skjer?* (“Climate – what is happening?”).²⁹ Mathismoen is engaged in both presenting the scientific facts about climate change and stimulating political responsibility for this challenge (Mathismoen, 2007). Although he is considered to be a knowledgeable climate journalist, he is also criticized for being too sympathetic towards the policies of the reigning *Arbeiderpartiet*.³⁰

I have collected 45 texts from DN, of which 19 articles were written by the political commentator *Kjetil B. Alstadheim*. Alstadheim is known for his sharp comments on Norwegian politics in general, and he is considered to be one of the most important political journalists in Norway.³¹ Alstadheim is the chairman of

²⁸ According to a report by the PR-agency BWPR, VG 23/12/07

²⁹ *Klima – hva skjer?* is considered to be an informative account of the processes of global warming, fronting the latest scientific findings from the IPCC. The book got a lot of attention in Norway and was nominated to the literary *Brage-pris*, in the category of specialist literature.

³⁰ For instance in the weekly newspaper *Dag og Tid*, where Mathismoen was criticized as being “Stoltenberg’s poodle” – as a “trofast, stødig mikrofonstativ for statsministeren, og reportasjene hans ligner glansa reklameplakater”. See: <http://www.dagotid.no/nyhet.cmf?nyhetid=1381> (03.10.08)

³¹ <http://arkiv.na24.no/Nyhet/327239/Politikernes+favorittjournalist.html>

the Norwegian press gallery, which is the official organization for journalists who want to have access to the Norwegian parliament (*Storting*). Alstadheim has no formal education in the science of climate change, but is highly engaged in the issues of global warming. He is regarded as the second most influential climate journalist in Norway after Mathismoen.

My samples from DN consist also of 11 articles from its climate section, *Klode i Krise* (“Planet in Crisis”), which were written by *Frode Frøyland*. Frøyland is the US-correspondent of DN and has an education in finance, but is also engaged in environmental issues. During two intensive months – from September 2007 to November 2007 – Frøyland traveled to different climate-sensitive parts of the world and reported on what he considered to be the most pressing climate challenges. His various articles from the section *Klode i Krise* resulted in the book *Ved vippepunktet* (“At the tipping point”), in an attempt to “awaken more Norwegians from their climate unconsciousness”.³²

I have collected 48 texts from VG, of which 16 were from the newspaper’s climate section *Klimapanelet* (“the Climate Panel”). *Klimapanelet* was initiated in October 2007 and is considered by VG to be “the expert’s panel” on climate change. This section has four regular writers: Siri M. Kvalvig, Frederic Hauge, Knut H. Alfsen and Helge Drange. *Kvalvig* is a well-known meteorologist and the founder of the Storm Weather Centre.³³ *Kvalvig* is also an engaged public speaker on global warming issues; in 2007 she participated in a national lecture tour about climate change called *Himmel og Hav* (“Sky and Ocean”). This lecture was initiated by the Norwegian Environmental Department as an attempt to raise public awareness on the climate challenge. *Hauge* is the founder and chairman of

³² <http://aftenbladet.no/lokalt/article639543.ece>

³³ The Storm Weather Centre defines itself as one of the leading commercial meteorological institutes in Scandinavia: <http://www2.storm.no/index.php>

the environmental organization *Bellona*³⁴, and he is also a prominent environmentalist – both in Norway and abroad.³⁵ Hauge has no formal education in the science of climate change but became rather famous as an environmental renegade – although Hauge recently abandoned his revolt against the industry in favor of collaboration with the business sector. *Alfsen* is a senior advisor in *CICERO*³⁶ and research director at the Norwegian Institute of Energy Technology (*IFE*). He has a doctorate in theoretical physics, and is co-author of various national and international reports on environmental issues. *Alfsen* was the leader of the secretariat of the national *Lavutslippsutvalget*³⁷ and was also a contributor to the last report from the IPCC (AR4). *Drange* is the director of *Nansensenteret* and a climate researcher at *Bjerknessenteret*³⁸. *Drange* has a doctorate in applied mathematics and climate modeling. He is also an author of various scientific articles on climate change and contributed to the last report from the IPCC (AR4).

Looking at these different storytellers from the point of view of climate expertise, it is interesting to see that the tabloid VG provides the best educated commentators on the climate case. At the same time, all the three newspapers devote significant space and resources to cover the environmental challenge and apparently aspire to give quality coverage on the issue.

I have also included different readers' contributions in my sample, though there are some prominent distinctions between the newspapers and their respective

³⁴ Bellona is now seen as an influential environmental organization, which tries to develop feasible solutions to the various ecological challenges – mainly in relation to energy and resource use.

³⁵ The Time-magazine proclaims Hauge as one of the 45 environmental heroes of the world: http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1663317_1663320_1669923,00.html

³⁶ Centre for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo, one of the leading research institutes on climate science in Norway.

³⁷ *Lavutslippsutvalget* was appointed by the Council of State in 2005, and had the mandate to report on how Norway can manage to cut national GHG-emissions by 50-80 percent by 2050.

³⁸ *Nansensenteret* and *Bjerknessenteret* are located in Bergen, and are also defined as being two of the leading research institutes on climate science in Norway.

debates. AF has the largest portion of readers' contributions and seems to encourage a lively forum for debate; I have 16 texts from this section. The VG also provides a noteworthy site for public engagement; I have included 10 texts from these contributors. DN gives space mainly to prominent figures from the governmental and business sectors; I have included 8 contributors from this paper. The various readers' contributions can be broadly classified into three categories: The *climate change believers* – by which I mean people who argue that anthropogenic climate change is happening and that we are responsible for a solution; the *partial climate change deniers* – by which I mean people who argue that climate change is happening, though it is not anthropogenic and there is less to do about it; and the *total climate change deniers* – by which I mean people who argue that there is no climate change at all.

4.2 THE GLOBAL STORIES TALKING TO NORWAY

In this section, I will present my interpretations of how the media sample reflects the four global climate change stories – the “scientific”, the “wake-up”, the “doomsday” and the “skeptical”. I will analyze these stories separately, in which I focus on how the selected texts mirror their respective approaches to the climate challenge. I will pay attention to both the problems and the solutions related in these stories, and elaborate how the sample reproduces the global narratives. I will also comment on the messages advanced by these voices in the media. My overall interpretation of the intertextual exchange between these global stories and the Norwegian cultural narratives in the media sample is presented in the last section of the next chapter, part 5.3.

4.2.1 The “Scientific” Story in the Norwegian Media

The earth at least 2° C warmer. Too late?

A rise of 2 degrees in the global temperature will lead to extensive extermination of species, and millions of people will risk drought, famine and floods. According to the

IPCC, the probability for avoiding such an increase is already less than 10 percent (Front Page, AF 20/09/07).³⁹

After the Norwegian Nobel Peace Committee decided in September 2007 to give that year's Peace Prize to the IPCC together with Al Gore in acknowledgment of their work on the climate challenge, global warming suddenly became a very newsworthy issue in Norway. The consensus from the IPCC maintains that climate change is to be understood as an established fact, and a lot of attention is given to the scientific predictions for the future of this environmental situation. The IPCC is explicitly referred to in 89 of my texts.⁴⁰

Implicitly, the so-called scientific, "objective" perspective on climate change is well represented in my collected newspapers' presentation on the issue – such as the above quoted headline, which covered the whole front page of AF, akin to a proposition in a scientific document. Especially AF and the dedicated "climate journalist" Mathismoen portray climate change in a thorough, technical way; the climate profile *Het Klode* has, as its stated aim, to inform the public about both the scientific and the political aspects of climate change (AF 04/12/07). The reporters and climate columnists in DN and VG give also a lot of attention to the different scientific scenarios from the IPCC, and the story of an inevitable rise of 2° C in the global temperature is told in many of the texts.

With respect to the problems of the scientific story, many texts present climate change as an explainable – though uncertain – ecological phenomenon with anthropogenic causes. Some articles elucidate the devastating processes of unbalanced CO₂-cycles and the like, but there are no specific places or people mentioned in the presentation of environmental research data. A prominent

³⁹ I have translated the quotations into English. The original, Norwegian wordings are found in Appendix B.

⁴⁰ The IPCC/"FNs klimapanel" is referred to in 46 texts in AF, in 32 texts in DN and in 16 texts in VG.

symbol is the ongoing melting of ice in the remote areas of the Arctic. In an article called “*Blue Arctic*”, written by Drange in *Klimapanelet*, one can read:

Both the possibilities and the challenges connected with an ice-less Arctic mean that the climate development in the north will be scrutinized carefully in the years to come. The fact that the international polar year – a large-scale research collaboration – was initiated precisely in 2007, means that our preconditions to pay attention to the climate development in the Arctic are among the best (VG 01/03/08).

Articles like this are in some way promoting a technical view of climate change – trying to understand and produce “fact based knowledge” about the matter, without questioning the more fundamental reasons behind *why* this is happening and what the consequences are. Many articles point to the fact that it is too late to avoid “serious consequences” of the climate change, in the way that the “shock-melting” [sic] of the Arctic is presented as an explainable process (VG 05/12/07, AF 16/06/08). Such texts try to describe the problems of climate change as neutral actualities – while avoiding politics and human interest. An example of this is found in the writings of the columnist Kvalvig in *Klimapanelet*. Kvalvig states that as a science commentator she has tried to not promote a political orientation, but rather to explain “*the interplay in the climate system and the seriousness of the situation*” (VG 12/04/08).

Mathismoen in AF also seems to have a descriptive agenda about the “scientific truth” in his texts about the climate challenge, although his worries are quite obvious. In one article, Mathismoen asks “*When will the earth get enough of us?*” and claims that his environmental scenarios are stemming from:

[T]he majority of scientists – from a multitude of disciplines [who] increasingly raise protestive warnings. Their reports, published weekly in scientific journals all over the world, are more than mere facts concerning observations and prognoses. There is a great unrest and anxiety to read between the lines (AF 26/10/07b).

On the solution side of the scientific story, numerous articles focus on general technological mitigation projects and international policies. Alstadheim in DN focuses predominantly on political solutions and market regulations to combat global warming. Also several articles from the other two newspapers focus solely on the community of politicians and businessmen when discussing solutions to the climate challenge. The symbolic world of quotas, costs, laws and regulations informs such stories, in an attempt to come to grip with the complicated environmental scenarios.

The magic words of “mitigation” and “adaptation” are recognized – often as “*regulering*” and “*tilpassning*”. The selected texts mainly focus on the problems of mitigation measures. One very prominent story in this case, is on the governmental “moon landing” – which means CO₂-management as carbon capture and storage (CCS) of gasworks. This policy intervention is proclaimed to be an efficient solution to combat Norwegian GHG emissions, though both contributors and reporters are questioning the realism of implementing such projects. Possible difficulties in these projects are often described as “technical problems”, as the very first article of the climate section *Het Klode* in AF. This article takes a critical look at what to do about Norway’s oil and gas extraction. One can read that the natural gas field *Snøhvit* and its much discussed gasworks *Melkøya*⁴¹ are contributing to “*enormous Norwegian CO₂ emissions*” (AF 04/12/07). The article also states that the emissions from *Melkøya* “run wild” [sic], but this seems to be a matter of technology and politics, and not a matter of energy consumption as such:

⁴¹ Melkøya is a gasworks on the coast of Hammerfest. The development of this gasworks overthrew the Bondevik2-government, and the present Stoltenberg2-government has as well met a lot of critique because of delayed implementation of CO₂-management.

With pomp and circumstance *Snøhvit* was formally opened on August 21 this year. A recent Norwegian gas-adventure, with the world's most climate friendly technology was seriously set in motion. [But] (n)either technology nor CO₂ emissions have developed as projected at *Melkøya*. [And] *Snøhvit* is going to be a climate nightmare neither politicians nor *StatioHydro* had dared to imagine (ibid.).

The technological solutions presented in the Norwegian newspapers mostly draw attention to the global carbon picture, through stories of exporting our CCS technology and buying carbon quotas in the international market. The progress-friendly confidence from the IPCC is prevalent, as climate change seems first of all to be the matter of risk-prevention and cost-efficiency in economic terms. The propagator of this view, the economist Nicholas Stern, is often referred to. He figures in columns, interviews and general comments in all the three newspapers.⁴² Using the Stern estimates, such articles highlight and emphasize international trade of carbon quotas as an imperative way to solve the climate challenges.

Although Norway has considerable levels of climate gas emissions, there are very few articles addressing the Norwegian energy use as such. But there are some texts that bring the scientific story of technological fixes down to the household level, like one article in *Klimapanelet* which offers information of how you theoretically can save electricity at home – and save money at the same time (VG 23/02/08).

The message of the scientific story is clearly documented in the selected texts, representing a Norwegian interpretation of so called mitigation measures: Climate change is happening, and we have to focus on international politics, the

⁴² i.e. VG 23/03/08, DN 07/05/08, AF 06/06/08

economic bottom line and technological innovations – or “moon landings”, as the Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg puts it.

4.2.2 The “Wake-up” Story in the Norwegian Media

The next time you get into your car, give a thought to the extremely fast melting ice in the north and to those dependent upon it: The Inuit paddling on hunt for food and the Norwegian driving to the office are inseparably connected. Global warming makes this more evident than ever. And in this lies optimism. We are forced to see what we too long have shut our eyes on (VG 24/11/07).

Al Gore is explicitly referred to in 20 of my texts, and his message was well broadcasted during the already mentioned Peace Prize nomination.⁴³ However, the “wake-up” call to action advanced by Gore is mirrored in my sample not only in relation to this nomination. His style and story can also be understood as implicit in the different newspapers’ editorial choices, as several journalists and columnists are similar to Gore – traveling around the world and reporting what is going on with our natural environment, as climate missionaries. Mathismoen in AF is surely one of these, as he aspires to enlighten the ignorant or unaware public. Mathismoen formulates (t)his duty in an imagined retrospective glance, as he predicts the future and criticizes the present public ignorance on the climate case:

Even as they saw what was happening, even when I traveled around the world and described what I saw, evidence on how the ice was melting in a mad rate around the North Pole, that the glaciers in the Himalayas were transformed to enormous, dangerous lakes, that the deadly drought in Australia was just replaced by even more devastating rain floods, that the enormous herds of wandering gnus and antelopes in Kenya were only a dry period away from total collapse. Even then they protested (AF 19/03/08).

⁴³

Al Gore is referred to in 11 texts in AF, in 5 texts in DN and in 4 texts in VG.

The problem side of the “wake-up” story is found in all the three newspapers, where melting ice, flooding water and lost polar bears figure as important symbols of what is happening with climate, industrialization and urbanization. This “scientific thriller” and the human ignorance of the risks involved is framed in a hopeful, you-can-do-it tune, most of all in VG, where such stories often are connected to possible ways of overcoming these challenges. This is not surprising, as VG’s rather tabloid-esque character fits well with making *you* the hero.

The solution side of the “wake-up” story is echoed in some texts – such as one article called “*The Norwegian climate fear*” (VG 29/12/07). The reporter of this article confirms 2007 to be the year of “global awakening” as much as of global warming, and the reporter argues that we Norwegians have also opened our eyes to the climate challenges (ibid.). But other writers find it difficult to portray such an awakening in optimistic terms. For example, Alstadheim in DN writes under the heading “*Responsibility and powerlessness*”:

Even if the climate problem is global in nature, the cause of the problem is no further away than the next exhaust pipe. Few things make the powerless feeling more eminent than a melting ice of Greenland. The discomfort becomes, after all, not particularly less when we realize that each and every one of us can actually do something about it (DN 01/09/07).

On the other hand, there are some decent attempts – especially in VG – to capture the imagination of climate change ignorant Norwegians. In *Klimapanelet*, Kvalvig is sometimes writing like a charismatic Gore: When Kvalvig is not writing about the scientific processes behind climate change, she is writing about what you and I can do and how global warming might affect the Norwegian climate as such. In one article we are told to teach children to “*recycle the garbage, walk to school, turn off the light and turn off the PC when it is not in*

use” (VG 27/10/07) – as a reformatory strategy to foster better environmental values. Kvalvig tries also to balance scientific integrity with a wish to communicate hope and future optimism, by focusing on possible solutions and individual contributions to the climate challenge (VG 12/04/08). This seems like a difficult balancing act, as Kvalvig wants to be neither overtly party-political nor moralistic in her messages. Her diplomatic, appealing tone shines through when she in one article is predicting the future weather forecasts of Norway and the way they might have an effect on the Norwegian lifestyle. To put it simply, this article describes climate change as a matter of building higher quays on your summer cottage and not feeling sad because you have snow-less winters at your winter cottage:

Neither the area of cottages in *Sirdalen* is the same as when we bought a cottage [*hytte*] there in 2005. Believe it. The country house at *Sletten* with a shoreline in *Ryfylke* has by comparison been a much better investment. We were foresighted in 2007. Already at that time we applied for an elevation of both the boathouse and the quay, and it was indeed a good choice (VG 19/01/08).

The crisis of climate change is in some articles presented as an opportunity as well as a danger; these articles bear resemblance to the awareness Gore gives to his understanding of the Chinese symbol for “crisis”. Such an approach is especially prevalent in the different columns of, interviews with- and references to, Hauge from Bellona. Hauge argues that “*we should not at all talk about climate measures as expenses, but as investments*” (VG 15/12/07), and pays attention to a lot of different technological- and business opportunities. In a similarly optimistic manner, the captivating “wake-up” story of how the Norwegians can make a brighter world come through is depicted in a future forecast presented in VG. The scenario in this article – interpreted from different research and reports on the matter – tells that Norway during the next forty years has managed to:

[L]ower the consumption, lower the need for transport, lower the energy use. These efforts demanded rather drastic remedies, but Norwegians understood that it was not only necessary for the environment, but that it was also an exceptional economic opportunity – to be in the lead when the climate changed (VG 05/01/08).

Mathismoen in AF predicts also the future in a hopeful way, where he, in one article, envisions how the Norwegian public awakens when:

[When we all] understood that an enormous market for energy efficiency and all kinds of CO₂-free solutions would emerge [...] It turned into a running race to win, to earn as much money as possible on the upcoming eco-revolution – which both became a technological revolution and a moral revolution that changed people's perception on nature as an inexhaustible resource (AF19/03/08).

The message of the “wake-up” story is present in the selected Norwegian texts in a slightly transformed version, as the nostalgia for nature and the moral message advanced by Gore are generally missing. Although a couple of texts – like the above quoted article – suggest that an imaginative revolution will contribute to a moral awakening of the masses and the embracing of nature-friendly values, most of the texts describe the changes you and I can make in economic terms. Saving the world should be profitable; the climate challenge is discussed mainly with regard to technological, political and economic solutions and opportunities. There is, in other words, an interesting lack of emotional or moral arguments that spring from the devastating drama that our environment is undergoing.

4.2.3 The “Doomsday” Story in the Norwegian Media

The fate of the earth will be decided in the next decades. Never before in the history of humanity has the ecological system which keep life going been as challenged as it is now (DN 16/11/07).

Although James Lovelock is explicitly referred to in only *one* of the selected texts, doomsday is described in many of these.⁴⁴ Such texts use the tropes of “alarms”, “crisis”, “tipping points”, “run away mechanisms” and the revenge of natural forces – like the pessimistic story told by Lovelock. The three different climate-profiles in my respective newspapers all use rather gloomy and dramatic language, at least in their headings: “*Apocalypse in Amazon*” (DN 12/10/07), “*Ticking bomb*” (DN 19/10/07), “*The end is near*” (AF 21/09/07)!

The use of war-metaphors is significant – especially in *Klimapanelet*, where we are to be “climate warriors” and use all our “climate weapons” in the “climate battle”.⁴⁵ In one of these columns, Alfsen states that:

We do not want to end up in a world where the climate runs wild and thus provides a breeding ground for an infinity of conflicts between the people inhabiting this planet (VG 26/01/07).

Articles from *Klode i Krise* also point to aspects of war and misery. For instance, the article “*The life disappeared with the drought*”, where the conflict in Darfur is presented as a “*terrible reminder that the danger of struggles and wars will increase with the global temperature rise*” (DN 07/09/07). Another of these articles refers to a re-emerging of the Cold War in a warmer world, where “*fight for resources, destruction in coastal areas, loss of land, climate refugees and fight for energy*” results in global crisis and exacerbates border conflicts for reasons of security policy (DN 12/03/08).

On the problem side of the doomsday story, there are a few voices in the Norwegian texts that point to the insufficiency of the scientific models from the

⁴⁴ James Lovelock is referred to in DN, 08/10/07

⁴⁵ I.e. VG 27/10/07a, 20/10/07, 15/12/07

IPCC and see the need for other scientific views. A couple of articles quote some scientific dissidents with less sympathy for linear models and conservative estimates such as the IPCC consensus. One well covered voice is the NASA-scientist James Hansen – the man who talked against and criticized the G.W. Bush administration’s handling of climate change information (some) years ago. In VG, Hansen is quoted in a news report presenting skepticism towards the IPCC consensus and claiming that “‘moderate’ climate scientists get millions to conduct research – while the more ‘radical’ often are left empty-handed” (VG 21/10/07). Mathismoen in AF also refers to Hansen, and in the various *Het Klode* articles Mathismoen uses analogous language to both the doomsday story advanced by Lovelock and the tipping point forewarnings given by Hansen. One example is an article where Mathismoen declares his understanding of our climatic situation: “*The world is facing huge, irreversible climate changes. We are approaching a tipping point, the climate threat is not an environmental problem, it is an existential threat*” (AF 17/09/07).

The radical voices of Lovelock, Hansen and others are especially prominent in the articles from *Klode i Krise*. In one of these, Hansen talks about sea levels rising six to seven meters and is convinced that the melting of ice on the poles can happen at an shocking rate. In this ecological collapse, we humans will be nothing more than a helpless audience (DN 01/09/07b). The texts from *Klode i Krise* focus additionally on climatic issues and problems in Asia. This focus is mainly due to Asia’s huge population expansion. In one of the very few articles that dare to talk about population growth, Frøyland argues:

There might be more than nine billion people on the planet in 2050, which is almost seven billion more than in 1950 and constitutes in itself a formidable climate problem (DN 22/10/07).

A suggested response to this challenge is that “*instead of taking as a starting point what one presumes is politically possible, politicians should focus on nature’s limit of tolerance*” (ibid.) – with a kind of “nature first” mentality. But there are no clear uses of the Gaia-metaphor given by Lovelock, or any evident calls for the promotion of a so called “green consciousness”. These aspects of the doomsday story are also missing in the other part of my sample; although some texts describe the Earth in symbolic terms as a planet with a fever and as a sick patient, we humans are presented as masters of this situation. Alfsen in *Klimapanelet* is one of those that seem influenced by the thoughts from Lovelock, as he writes that “the earth has fever”. But Alfsen does not refer to this radical scientist:

The earth has a fever. We cannot dream of miracles that are reducing fever. We need to make them ourselves. But what can we do? Can we capture CO₂ from the air and subsequently store it in a secure way? What about blocking the sun? Cultivate algae? Something else? [...] An obvious solution would be to live in line with the sustainable capacities of nature, to develop non-polluting and safe energy, and strongly reduce the pollution from coal, oil and gas. In the absence of such a utopia, it is often technological propositions that reign (VG 05/01/08).

The solution side of the doomsday story is reflected in the Norwegian texts most of all with respect to technological innovations, where some articles bring about issues of geo-engineering. Such attempts are not presented as a preliminary strategy of “sustainable retreat”, but rather seen as sufficient and pragmatic measures to combat climate change. There are some references to nuclear energy, and although the public at large is described as being against such sources of energy, “[will] climate changes and increased oil prices necessitate more nuclear power plants” – according to a news report in AF (26/06/08). Other voices in the sample discuss energy in the same manner – without the environmental, holistic tone characteristic of Lovelock. One example is Mathismoen in AF, where he asks what is needed to be a “world champion of

climate” [sic]: An unused desert in the outskirts of Abu Dhabi (AF 21/01/08). In this lifeless landscape of sand and stones, the oil-wealthy Arabs are building the utopia – a technologically advanced, modern and efficient city; a mechanical version of the self-regulating Gaia.

The most techno-friendly and creative voice in my sample is found in the different statements from Hauge. Hauge writes that we can combat climate change if we want to – we just have to make use of suitable and already available technology (VG 07/06/08). In Hauge’s various statements, there seems to be no need for radical changes in human values and Hauge focuses less on nature as such, although he often speaks of the unknown potential in nature. In the piece “*The algae can save us*” in AF, Hauge is a “technological dissident” and argues for the cultivation of algae that will both produce energy and consume CO₂. This so called “Bellona scenario” is confronted as a crazy idea, but Hauge retaliates:

[I am] aware that many will laugh at us. They did it also when we 15 years back suggested CO₂ capture from gas works. Just wait, cultivation of algae will mark the climate debate to come (AF 03/06/08).

The message of the doomsday story is in the selected Norwegian texts translated into technological concerns. The challenges posed – by a deteriorating environment, combined with increasing needs for energy and a growing human population – are met with solutions of technological innovation and strengthening security policy. Climate change and geo-engineering are discussed without concern for ecological holism or the uncertain fate of human civilization; there are no evident calls for an alternative kind of ecological subjectivity.

4.2.4 The “Skeptical” Story in the Norwegian media

Even though *Aftenposten* has introduced a thematic profile with the rather tendentious title “*Het Klode*”, we as readers should manage to keep our minds cool also when climate issues are discussed (AF 16/02/08).

Bjørn Lomborg is explicitly referred to in 4 of my texts, where 2 of these are from the debate section in AF.⁴⁶ Accordingly, the skeptical story of Lomborg – who is questioning both the public debate around climate challenges and the suggested policy responses of CO₂-quotas – is voiced mainly in the various readers’ contributions. The debate section of AF is the most vibrant. In this section, skepticism towards our understanding of the climate problems becomes especially prevalent during the last five months of my time frame – from January to June 2008. The various texts written by journalists or associated columnists show less skepticism towards the problems of climate change. But there is some skepticism towards the Norwegian policy responses, in which the effects and costs of official engagement in the carbon market are critically addressed.⁴⁷

On the problem side of the skeptical story, there are various texts that reflect the scientific distrust expressed by Lomborg. Some of the selected readers’ contributions are questioning the scientific basis of the IPCC and the Norwegian news coverage of climate change in general – which allegedly has an inflated and pessimistic focus. In one readers’ contribution in AF, the chairman of *Norsk Biologforening*, Morten Jødal, claims:

The climate debate has unfortunately entered a track in which an unfortunate amount of representatives of such parties compete over describing the road to the end of the world and our civilization. It is not that awful, and there are reasons to raise a warning finger

⁴⁶ Lomborg is referred to in 2 texts in AF and in 2 texts in DN.

⁴⁷ The critical voices towards the official Norwegian climate agenda are examined in Chapter 6.

towards those that create such pessimistic and negative pictures of the future (AF 01/02/08).

Like a couple of other contributors, Jøndal attacks the well used “wake-up” symbol of a desperate polar bear. The polar bears – according to the author – are increasing in numbers. Other contributors are similarly questioning the Norwegian climate debate, which they argue is exaggerating the negative consequences of climate change. Some of these so-called partial climate change deniers are rather focusing on what they see to be the positive effects from climate change; these texts are pointing to wrong “facts” related to the quantity of melting ice, temperature rise and the like. In a similar manner, VG states in one news report that “*global warming has stopped*” according to a professor in geosciences (VG 26/01/08).

The skeptical story from Lomborg is usually reflected in my sample in a quite transformed version, as many of the readers’ contributions are skeptical towards climate change as such. These voices are questioning the “anthropogenic cause” behind global warming and occasionally denying the whole climate challenge. There are lively debates between the so-called climate change deniers and climate change believers. Although some of the climate change deniers in the selected readers’ contributions are experienced scientists, the majority appear to have a limited understanding of science. Many of these are total climate change deniers, and these people are often attacked and referred to as “populist dissidents” by scientific authorities in the same selection of contributions. And even though the ongoing debates seem to be about scientific disputes, these discussions have a strongly political flavor. People with sympathies for the Progressive party (*FrP*) figure as the most skeptical, and in one news report their chairman Siv Jensen is attacked by Hauge of Bellona as a front for “ignorant populism” (VG 05/04/08). However, ignorance and lack of scientific knowledge are not only evident in the statements of populist dissidents from *FrP*. In one

readers' contribution in AF called "*Can we trust anyone*", written by the two scientists Reidar Müller (ph.D.) and Olav Orheim (ph.D.), these writers argue that several others than people from *FrP* "*commit a sin in the climate issue*" – also climate journalists, scientists and the environmental movement "*should repent*" (AF 12/04/08). Müller and Orheim ask for higher quality climate coverage in the Norwegian press, as well as a more united dialogue between the two climate change factions (ibid.).

Many of the contributions in AF criticize the profile *Het Klode* and attack the writings by Mathismoen. In January 2008, the tense mood in AF's debate section influenced an editorial choice, following significant pressure from readers. These readers expressed grave concern about how the Norwegian media – and especially AF – gave so much undeserved attention to the rather apocalyptic climate stories. Mathismoen himself reflects on these climate skeptics in his imaginary retrospective glance and he is also trying to confront these skeptics:

I remember that the mail box was filled with angry voices who argued that I did campaign journalism when we communicated what the scientists had discovered. The newspapers were overflowed with accusations of a conspiracy to stop the growth, to promote individual scientists and to spread fear (AF 19/03/08).

[These skeptics are] a strange alliance [...] they are populists, committed private persons with self-made theories, dark blue, reactionary political circles and various academics with very vague formal climate competence [...] The problem and the sad part in this, is that it looks like a scientific debate, but actually it is not. The debate is based upon myths, untruths and twisted facts (AF 07/04/08).

While the debate between climate change deniers and believers is apparent in VG and AF, DN provides no articles or readers' contributions which express skepticism towards anthropogenic climate change. Alstadheim sums up this "suppressed" skepticism in the following way:

Are you a bit uncertain about all this talk of climate change? You have all the reasons. The climate scientists are also uncertain. The problem is that the debate over climate research among scientists is different from the debate over climate research that takes place in the public. The public debate is characterized by so-called climate skeptics who introduce a doubt about facts that most climate scientists are agreed upon, namely that the earth is getting warmer and that one cannot explain this temperature increase without involving anthropogenic emissions of CO₂ and other gases. The debate among climate scientists concerns the next steps in the climate research [that is, the probable consequences and how to fight these] (DN 04/06/08).

There are fewer storytellers of the solution side of Lomborg's story in the selected texts, though some voices are questioning the so called CO₂-hysteria and claim that we have to focus on other challenges and policies when responding to climate change. As global warming has become a highly disputed issue, one commentator in AF asks for "*more rationality, and less faith and feelings*" when debating climate actions (AF 05/01/08). In the same manner, people from the youth faction of the Conservative Party (*UngeHøyre*) request a more matter-of-fact tone in the climate debate. In March 2008, *UngeHøyre* published the book *Klimautfordringen kan mestres* ("The Climate Challenge is Manageable") and some of the authors of this book were interviewed by Mathismoen under the headline "*The climate debate needs opponents*" (AF 13/04/08). In this piece, people from *UngeHøyre* argue that the climate challenge is controllable and that we ought to think about both the environment and poverty abatement when discussing climate actions. These people claim also that climate change represents a moral challenge to the West – as a matter of *doing* good, in which their suggested "moral solutions" refer to economics and technology:

Future generations will most likely be wealthier than us, and better prepared to bear the costs. The most important thing right now is that we must not put ourselves in a position

that will kill the economic growth or that the climate consequences will get so huge that they become a threat for the growth (ibid.).⁴⁸

Questions of how to sustain economic growth and thus contribute to better living standards in the developing countries are, in various texts, cast as the real challenges of climate change. In addition, the pollution from energy use in the poor parts of the world is portrayed as the biggest threat to the global environment. In this way, our national climate policies are seen as trivial compared to the need to focus on the challenges abroad. Such a message is for instance exposed in an article in AF which presents a research with some “surprising conclusions” [sic] as to where to cut emissions:

Drastic cuts of emissions in the wealthiest countries in the world will hardly reduce the temperature rise of the earth if the emissions in the developing countries continue to increase. The only thing that helps is that the world’s poorest use even less coal and gasoline (AF 29/05/08).

The message of the skeptical story is reflected in the selected Norwegian texts in a rather “backward” version, especially in readers’ letters. These voices still proclaim skepticism towards the anthropogenic causes behind climate change and occasionally deny the whole challenge. Such total climate change deniers are by and large seen in relation to the political profile of *FrP*, and I will discuss the extended media coverage of this climate agenda in chapter 6.

There are also reflections in my sample from the arguments advanced by Lomborg, where a couple of voices try to talk on behalf of calculated numbers and argue that action must be taken against climate change in the developing

⁴⁸ The same arguments, from some of the other authors behind the same book, are to be found in the readers’ contribution “*Miljø må bli business*” in VG 17/04/08.

world. The “do good” message is communicated in these texts, emphasizing more rationality in our climate responses.

4.2.5 Concluding remarks

As illustrated through my media analysis, the four global climate change stories are all explicitly and implicitly present in the selected sample in which different texts reveal and emphasize different aspects of these global stories. The problems of climate change are often described in rather apocalyptic terms. But on the solution side to this environmental challenge, the “scientific” story of the IPCC – with its technical approximations – appears to be the most powerful. There are texts that stress the need for a more sensible and rational dialogue when discussing our responses to climate change – as argued by Lomborg. But there is relatively little space devoted to the need for attitude change required by the climate challenge, as advanced by Gore and Lovelock. Thus, the elaborated texts on climate change in the Norwegian media do not present global warming as a cultural challenge. At the same time, however, the portrayal of this environmental crisis is culturally mediated and alludes to Norwegian narratives, values and symbols. I will therefore turn attention to the Norwegian cultural context in the next chapter to see to what extent the native tradition influences the media’s climate debate.

5. CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL CONTEXT

The presented media coverage of climate change in Norway should not only be seen as reflecting the four elaborated global stories. The intertextual perspective adopted in this thesis implies that these Norwegian texts on the climate issue – and the climate change phenomenon as such – also are to be understood in the Norwegian context and in relation to broader narratives of the Norwegian identity. As already argued, we humans experience stories as a way of comprehending the world and making meaning in our lives. Our national identity can also be understood as constituted through some significant stories. In these stories we tell ourselves – and the world – who we think we *are* and, even more so, what we *want* to be. Such national narratives are contributing to making sense of the new happenings and actions that are confronting our “reality”. In this way, the stories of global warming merge with the pre-established Norwegian stories, as a necessary basis for new information.

In this chapter, I will first provide a presentation of the Norwegian cultural context and describe two Norwegian narratives. In the second part of this chapter, I continue my media analysis and illustrate how these national stories are reflected in the media sample. In the last part of this chapter, I present my overall interpretation of the major portrayals of climate change in the Norwegian media – understood as the intertextual merging between the elaborated global climate stories and Norwegian cultural narratives.

5.1 THE NORWEGIAN CULTURAL NARRATIVES

I will in this chapter build on two prominent Norwegian narratives which are the modern basis of the Norwegian identity – *the environmental story* and *the humanitarian story*. These two national narratives are understood as dialogically woven into the past, and therefore part of Norwegian collective historical

memory, which influences the present (Witoszek, 1998; Leonard and Small, 2003; NUPI, 2007). Such national conceptions can thus be found in the beliefs, practices and interactions between “everyday-people” (Gullestad, 1996). But at the same time, any national narrative or image is dependent upon being sustained and managed, which connects such cultural meaning systems to the fields of politics and power. Hence, these stories also have a strong presence in the ideological debates of the elite, who are trying to legitimize and “naturalize” such collective beliefs. The investigation of a nation’s stories and semiotic systems will, of course, never be complete; the history of the Norwegian identity is multifaceted, contested and dynamic. But identifying some of the most prominent stories circulating can give a better understanding of a nation’s opposition to or preference for a particular vision – be it in politics, business or private life.

I will, in this part of the chapter, first give a short introduction to the historical roots and political status of the two narratives, before I elaborate on their present day significance. Finally, in this elaboration, I will show how these national narratives are closely connected to the current Norwegian affluence – telling the story of a Norwegian “fairy tale”.

The environmental story and the humanitarian story can be understood historically by tracing the last two hundred years of national literature, which reveals much about Norwegians’ attitudes towards themselves, the environment and the world as such. The period of Norwegian “National Romanticism” is analyzed to reveal a homage and cultivation of the rational “*bonde*”(peasant), rather than the romantic “noble savage” at one with Nature (Witoszek, 1997). In this context, Norway is said to have a national identity and patriotism whose referents are rooted in nature imagery and idealized peasant values (Witoszek, 1998). These national narratives have been informed by what Witoszek calls the “tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment”. This tradition displays two prominent

characteristics. On the one hand, it refers to a Norwegian idealization of pastoral livelihood – praising the values of moderation and respect for the natural elements. On the other hand, it refers to the Norwegian priests and pastors who had a central part in codifying and disseminating “native” values, as an important part of the construction of the Norwegian nation. The “tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment” created a discourse characterized by pragmatism and a rational approach towards rural livelihood. And most significantly, this tradition created a narrative of Norway as an outpost of humanist culture, natural living and humanitarian values (ibid.).

The two topical Norwegian stories are presently revealed in some of the recent publications on and investigations of Norwegian identity. Such national narratives are, for instance, exposed by the official workings of the Norwegian Foreign Department, through their engagement in “nation branding” and “public diplomacy”. These efforts deal with the Norwegian image – with what we Norwegians think Norway is and what we want the rest of the world to think of us. In the report *Public Diplomacy – a strategy* (Leonard and Small, 2003), initiated by the Foreign Department as an attempt to sustain and strengthen some powerful and important Norwegian narratives, one can read about four primary stories that seem significant. This report argues that any national identity project has to start with a rational debate among its inhabitants about which values and narratives they can relate to. In other words, which stories are rooted in the Norwegian collective memory? The four value-based narratives are defined as “living with nature”, “humanitarian superpower”, “equality” and “adventurousness” (ibid.), and confirm the status of Norway as a nature-friendly, humanitarian outpost.⁴⁹ In the same manner, the final report from *Makt- og*

⁴⁹ These four stories were drawn out through research where the researchers conducted interviews with many of the current “storytellers” in Norway, including politicians from the main political parties, journalists, academics, cultural figures, popular culture entrepreneurs, businessmen, NGO directors, and representatives from the main public sector. Although this report was not fully adopted and followed by the UD (see *Omdømmeutvalgets sluttrapport, 2006*), I believe it still says a lot about our collective national identity, and I will thus draw on its insights in my analysis.

demokrati utredningen ("Power- and Democracy Report") declares that "the picture of Norway as a moral and humanitarian superpower has become a new national symbol, on the same level as other symbols that shape the national identity of Norwegians" (NOU, 2003/19:51).

5.1.1 The Environmental Story

Norway is often understood to be a country where nature, rather than human settlement, dominates the landscape. For centuries, Norwegians have lived in small communities in harsh conditions – dependent on sensible use of their natural surroundings. Today, industrialization and centralization have turned Norway into a modern, high-tech country. Although Norway is one of the world's largest exporters of oil and gas, Norway itself is less polluted because most of the country's electric needs come from hydro power. The Norwegian wilderness is still famous for its striking beauty, as well as its strict environmental standards, compared to many other industrialized Western countries.

As the previously cited strategy report puts it, Norway boasts a unique relationship with nature – exploiting its potential whilst pioneering ways of protecting the environment with carbon taxes, recycling and anti-pollution technology (Leonard and Small, 2003). This special relationship with nature can still be defined through the "tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment", referring to a pragmatic approach to natural capital. Norwegians are today known as conserving and living with nature alongside responsible economic development and seemingly sensible resource use.

The Norwegian environmental story is not only characterized by pragmatism. The story also represents an adventurous approach to the natural surroundings. Norwegians share a history full of explorers and adventurers who have braved and conquered nature – from the Arctic, via Easter Island, to the Antarctic. The

attraction to the wilderness is still prevalent in Norwegian society, and Norwegians are considered to be healthy and active people – known to prefer holidays in the mountains and weekend walks in the woods (Reed and Rothenberg, 1993).

In recent history, Norway has produced some prominent environmentalists and political leaders, reinforcing and symbolizing the environmental story – both domestically and internationally. Gro Harlem Brundtland is known as “the green goddess” for her work on sustainable development and strong presence in international environmental policy debates (*ibid.*) and the previously mentioned Frederic Hauge is famous for his radical environmental activism. At the same time, Norway is known to be the homeland of the founding father of the environmental philosophical movement “deep ecology”, Arne Naess. Deep ecology is – to put it simply – questioning industrial development and the use of technology while alluding to the idea of the intrinsic value of nature. How “deeply” this philosophical position has influenced Norwegian society today, is another question. The present environmental profile of living with nature is maybe more in line with Brundtland’s sustainable development than a Naessian kind of green radicalism – to use Dryzek’s terms (2005). The Norwegian environmental story seems thus not to be going back to nature and simple living. Rather, Norway is becoming a cutting-edge player in international environmental policies and technologies – or as the “green goddess” puts it:

The Environmental Profile is part of the balancing of things: that we are not going to be a polluting country, but a modern, forward-looking, environmentally friendly explorer of oil.⁵⁰

⁵⁰

Gro Harlem Brundtland, in Leonard and Small, 2003:47

5.1.2 The Humanitarian Story

Norway is known to be a “small country with a big heart”, which shares its economic profit with the poor and the needy. The idea of Norway as a nation of peace and aid can be seen as an important part of the humanitarian story, where Norwegians are meant to spread their values and morals in the world.

Norway has a considerable state budget for aid, is active in peace-keeping and appears to be a strong contributor to the international community through the UN-system (NUPI, 2007). Norway is, furthermore, marketing its image as a “peaceful nation” through the annual Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony.

Like the elaborated environmental profile, the current humanitarian agenda can also be understood as stemming from the “tradition of Pastoral Enlightenment” (Witoszek, 2009), and from the Norwegian roots of altruism and solidarity (NUPI, 2007). Today, the humanitarian profile is often related to the concept of a Norwegian “goodness regime”. This concept has recently been elaborated by many scholars, and can be understood as a story with significant normative power (Tvedt, 2003; NUPI, 2007; Witoszek, 2009). Tvedt defines the “goodness regime” in relation to recent decades of Norwegian aid policies, which are understood to be motivated and legitimized by conceptions and rhetoric about the outstanding morals and goodness Norwegians can use to “save the world” (Tvedt, 2003). The Norwegian duty is to do good in the world. This morally grounded aid-mission is further explained to provide important guidelines for what kinds of debate and critique are possible in the field of Norwegian foreign policies. The “goodness regime” is, moreover, described and criticized as characterized by virtuous ethics, the belief that what makes an action good is above all else its intentions (NUPI, 2007). In this way, debates over the Norwegian aid policies have been characterized as being preoccupied with the monetary size of the aid budget, while debates over the actual effects from these aid programs are silenced (*ibid.*; Witoszek, 2009).

5.1.3 The Norwegian Fairy Tale

The two elaborated stories – the environmental one and the humanitarian one – are thus understood to be important features of the present Norwegian identity, adapted to current affairs, while containing essential elements from the cultural repository. Norway has, in recent years, turned out to be a kind of fairy tale country and hence created a new identity: from a poor peasant country to an international economic power, made possible by the enormous wealth of the oil fund *Statens Pensjonsfond - Utland* (SPU). Norway is often understood as the country of its folk-hero Askeladden – companionable and original, lazy but good – who gets the princess and half of the kingdom through kindness as well as cooperation with nature and the needy. A strong element of this fairy tale is, of course, *the Oil*, which by Norwegian luck and pragmatism has contributed to great national welfare. The Norwegian oil fund is now a very important part of the Norwegian political economy, but it is probably even more significant in Norwegian culture (Frønes, 2006:13). It influences how ideas and values are communicated, and how the world is envisioned.

Within this modern fairy tale, both the environmental story and the humanitarian story play important parts and should be seen as closely connected. Today, Norwegians communicate visions and values of Norway as a green and good country by international standards. Norwegian environmentalism and humanitarianism are combined and exported in governmental aid programs called “Oil for Development”⁵¹, while Norwegians themselves are shareholders in the SPU and some of the “best developed” humans according to the United Nations’ Human Development Index.⁵² Norwegians are living with great governmental welfare, and Norway is known for its democratic, corporatist state model – irrespective of political powers. The Norwegian Labour party

⁵¹ See for instance St.mld.nr.13 (2008-2009)

⁵² http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries/country_fact_sheets/cty_fs_NOR.html (HDI - UN 2007/08)

(*Arbeiderpartiet*) in office⁵³ has a strong identity based on being an industrial master and a humanitarian force.

Norway's current situation looks somewhat like a “resource utopia” – regarding both production and its consumption levels. Norwegians live on “black gold” and take this wealth for granted (Frønes, 2006). And the oil-wealthy government shares its surplus with its people and the world, through the Norwegian “missionary welfare state” (Witoszek, 2009).

When Norwegians are confronting the stories of global warming, it is important to ask how the status of an oil power and the already established national narratives are related to the climate issue. I have, in this part, presented the environmental story and the humanitarian story as two important Norwegian narratives that contribute to the construction of the Norwegian concept of “reality”, and I will in the next part of this chapter examine how these two stories are reflected in the selected media texts on climate change.

5.2 NORWAY TALKING TO THE WORLD

In this part, I will analyze how the media sample reflects the two cultural narratives recognized as prominent in the Norwegian context: The environmental story and the humanitarian story. As with the examination of the global stories in the Norwegian media, these national stories will also be analyzed separately – though only in relation to their general value dimension and not explicitly in relation to a formulation of the problems and solutions to climate change. My overall interpretation of the intertextual merging between the global climate change stories and the Norwegian narratives in the media texts is presented in the last section of this chapter, part 5.3.

⁵³ *Arbeiderpartiet* is in a coalition government together with *Sosialistisk Venstreparti* and *Senterpartiet*. I will mainly refer to Prime Minister Stoltenberg and *Arbeiderpartiet* – which will be understood as the most influential political party in this coalition.

5.2.1 The Environmental Story in the Norwegian Media

All and sundry would we feel well if we got out of the car and closer to nature, to sense the weather and feel the interdependence (VG 24/11/07).

In the selected climate change articles, there are very few focusing on nature in Norway. Symbols of the natural world and “nature living” are used mostly with reference to remote or exotic places and allude to indigenous people – like the Inuit and other distant indigenous people. In Norway, climate change and its natural consequences are portrayed to be a matter of building higher quays – both at your private cottage and in communal development projects (VG 19/01/08, AF 17/12/07). Climate change will also affect the Norwegian population of elks and hence the elk-hunting, according to a national research program on Norwegian climate change consequences – with an annual budget of between 75 and 90 million NOK (AF 15/05/08).

The pragmatic, rational approach to the environment as figuring in the Enlightenment tradition is found in many texts, where nature is defined in terms of resources, economic capital and technological opportunities. Statements about the inherent value of nature are almost absent; references towards such aspects of the environment are commented upon through statements of irony more than of any nature romanticism. This ironic attitude is, for instance, revealed in an article by Alstadheim in DN, where Alstadheim comments on the prospects of snow-less winters in the future and asks if some future generations of Norwegians would miss the snow if they had never have experienced snow (DN 09/02/09). The debate on polar bears and the possible extinction of this species is discussed in a similarly practical manner: the director of CICERO, Pål Prestrud, painfully

“admits” that most people will manage to survive without the existence of polar bears (AF 18/09/07).⁵⁴

As the newspapers discuss environmental crisis and their harmful consequences all over the world, they are also talking about what “we Norwegians” do: Grant money to research. An example of such presentations, is an article about the crisis of melting ice in the mountainous Nepal, where “*1, 3 billion can lose their water*” (AF 09/02/08). This article focuses on the need for additional investigation of these melting processes, as we need to understand such ecological developments. Prestrud from CICERO is an outstanding spokesman for the Norwegian research agenda. In one news report, Prestrud says that the mapping of climatic processes which Norway is initiating is very important. He emphasizes, moreover, that the consequences of climate change will be much more striking in poor areas – such as the Himalayas – than in rich countries, because:

In these countries people are extremely dependent upon their primary resources and the surrounding natural environment to survive. In our part of the world, we will survive anyway. We can afford to be part of the globalized economy and to get hold of the products we need (AF 03/04/08).

Like Presterud, Prime Minister Stoltenberg emphasizes the Norwegian research agenda in the climate case. In many articles, the traditional Norwegian spirit of pragmatism and adventurousness is symbolized through the efforts of Stoltenberg. Stoltenberg travels all over the world – to South-Africa, Antarctic, India, Nepal and back to Africa again – and explains his extensive “climate traveling” [sic] in the following terms:

⁵⁴ Under the headline “*Trenger vi drivisen*”, Pål Presterud states: “*Dersom jeg skal være helt ærlig og en smule kynisk – selv om det er smertefullt: Folk flest vil bli lite påvirket av at isbjørnen og noen arter hoppekreps i drivisen forsvinner, bortsett fra at kloden vil få et fattigere arts mangfold og at urfolk i disse områdene får problemer med å opprettholde sitt tradisjonelle levesett.*”

Many people believe climate change is something that will happen in a distant future. This is false, climate change happens now. I travel around to learn and increase my own understanding, but also to direct attention to what is going on (AF 09/02/08).

In the majority of texts, nature is presented in traditional, Norwegian utilitarian terms as a resource to be studied, understood and used. The environment appears to be something “out there” to describe and – mostly – to use for human purposes. For instance, Drange in *Klimapanelet* writes about the nature of Arctic:

An ice-free Arctic in the summer time is good news for long haul by boat between Europe and Asia. Access to large oil- and gas reserves along the Siberian coastline and mineral deposits in the Arctic Ocean will also become easier when the summer ice is gone. The situation is of course serious for seals, polar bears, birds, algae and fish that live on, inside or under the ocean ice (VG 01/03/08).

The quoted presentation is representative of how the cultural attitudes towards nature dominate in the media sample. These texts reveal an attitude toward the environment as a scientific research area or as a pool of natural resources to be exploited. The environmental story of nature management and sensible resource use is reflected in many texts, especially in relation to the Norwegian oil industry. This industry is not seen as the primary reason behind global warming but rather described as the greenest and cleanest alternative in the world of dirty oil extractions. Norwegians still want to conquer nature and continue oil production through pioneering technology, though this might be more challenging in the future. Kvalvig in *Klimapanelet* supports such a vision, as she comments on the need for – and difficult task of – weather forecasts in thirty years, where “*the oil extraction outside Lofoten in Vestfjorden [will demand] very qualified weather- and current forecasts*” (VG 19/01/08).

To sum up: The environmental story as reflected in the selected Norwegian texts is filtered through the native “nature tradition”. This tradition is based on rational, pragmatic rather than “romantic attitudes” to nature, as well as trust in science and progress.

5.2.2 The Humanitarian Story in the Norwegian Media

[It is] decisive that we living in the well-established and wealthy part of the world give all kinds of support to developing countries (VG 22/03/08).

Norwegians still have a heart for the vulnerable and the needy, as one can read from many of the selected texts. The “*tour de climate*” of Prime Minister Stoltenberg is also described in this manner – as an attempt to find climate projects in the poor world that Norway can support (VG 28/12/07).

Numerous articles portray climate change as affecting the environment and people “out there”, demanding that Norwegians focus on issues taking place abroad. The environmental story of nature management is combined with climate mitigation and missionary goodness, as the Norwegian government decides to invest a lot of money in protecting the Amazonian rainforest. This policy is extensively commented upon by Alstadheim in DN, and Alstadheim is seen by some as one of the prime movers behind this governmental action.⁵⁵ In one of his commentaries, it is clear that:

The chopping down of the rainforest is one of the world’s biggest climate problems [...] One of the advantages of climate measures in the rainforest is that such measures most probably are cheaper than most other climate measures. Another advantage is that this is a climate measure which does not demand development of new and expensive technologies. A third advantage is that there are positive additional effects, for instance preservation of the biodiversity (DN 12/11/07).

⁵⁵

Ref Lars Haltebrekken (leader of *Naturvernforbundet*), *Natur og Ungdom*’s climate seminar October 2008 (I attended).

Alstadheim therefore supports the suggestion of granting 15 billion NOK to a rainforest initiative. He is also aware of the positive “additional effects” of nature conservation. But saving the rainforest seems to include a touch of the previously introduced Norwegian virtuous ethics, as *“the problem is that no one really knows where to spend those 15 billion to save the rainforest”* (ibid.).

Norway has a lot of money and goodness to give to the world, and there are many spokesmen of this agenda in the different texts. The Norwegian humanitarian mission is especially supported by different international climate-celebrities, for instance the previously mentioned economist Stern. Stern tells us that the developing world really would like to stop deforestation of their rainforests, but that “we” have to help “them” – by making this cost-effective (AF 06/06/08). In another article, Stern is quoted on the Norwegian climate agenda:

We need global solutions to solve these global problems. And in this we need Norway to be a guide, which we also expect that the country is willing to do. Norway can play a decisive part, in the same way as it did in the peacekeeping processes. Norway is already a prominent donator and leads on in the work on CO₂ cleaning (DN 03/09/07).

Some of the texts describe the humanitarian Norway as having more than just goodness and money to give to the world. Norway is also portrayed as a world leading country when it comes to technology. And although the Norwegian oil technology – as superior as it may seem – is hardly an “environmental” business or a fundamentally “compassionate” enterprise, this technological expertise is presented as a one more “humanitarian” quality. Norway is, most of all, described as having a wealth of technological potentials, which are to be exported. Norway should, in other words, add its clean-tech expertise to the rest

of its so-called humanitarian projects. This story is confirmed by one commentator in AF, who states:

Norway is on the world's top level when it comes to oil technology. As a nation we should be a mentor in solving the energy challenges that the world faces. We need not less, but even more moon landings. The future lies in prioritizing different forms of technology beyond oil and gas (AF 11/01/08).

The humanitarian story is reflected in the selected Norwegian texts mainly in relation to Norwegian wealth and technology. Many articles inform us that Norway, as an affluent and advanced country, has a lot of money and expertise, and its mission is therefore to “do good” in the world. Norwegians think they know how to deal with the environment and, although some texts reveal disbelief about the future of fossil energy, Norway can anyway put its efforts into nature resources and technological advancements abroad.

5.3 THE MAJOR STORY: NORWEGIAN GLORY

As illustrated hitherto, many stories and voices are reflected in the selected Norwegian media texts; this give way to a complex picture of the climate challenge. As shown in chapter 4, strong elements from the four elaborated global climate stories are present; in addition to significant aspects of the two cultural Norwegian narratives. In this emerging plurality of voices, stories and worldviews, it would be too simplistic to argue that the Norwegian climate change approach can be reduced to *one* story. I will nevertheless point to a couple of noteworthy discursive tendencies, which together constitute the basis for the majority of Norwegian stories of climate change as interpreted from my selected media texts. These stories can be understood as the intertextual merger between the elaborated global climate stories and Norwegian cultural narratives.

As discussed in chapter 4, the media texts reveal on the one hand divergent and conflicting messages advanced, respectively, by the so-called climate change deniers and the climate change believers. This debate shows up mainly in the different readers' letters. The deniers find support in the skeptical story of Lomborg, while the believers advocate the scientific consensus from the IPCC, and the two factions seem to talk *past* one another – not *with* each other.

According to the voices from the total climate change deniers, climate change is an exaggerated or fictitious challenge. In this way, the skeptical story which Lomborg represents is, in the Norwegian context, transformed into a rather “insulating” version. This Norwegian version denies climate change and hence merges minimally with the other elaborated stories, as it tells of something that is *not* and this perspective is accordingly not connected to any concept of reality – neither the climate change stories nor the Norwegian identity.

On the other hand, climate change appears to be a very serious and urgent issue according to most of the articles written by journalists, associated columnists and paid climate experts. As illustrated in chapter 4, the different scientific scenarios from the IPCC build the basis for drawing a trustworthy picture of the ongoing climate problem and the future environmental challenges. These circumstances are also explained with reference to the apocalyptic climate stories of Gore and Lovelock. In effect, different degrees of gloominess in climate stories are emerging – from the devastating “doomsday” version to the more motivating “wake-up” one. But an absent element in all these stories is the message of how climate change might challenge the Norwegian environment and its people. The stories about the negative consequences for Norway are blatantly absent. In this way, the climate challenge stories advanced by both Gore and Lovelock are transformed significantly, as the “crisis” to which we have to wake-up and respond does not concern the Norwegian context as such.

According to my media analysis, the problems of climate change seem to be displaced in the natural- and developing world “out there”; the challenge is explained through an intricate mixture of scientific and technical claims. There are many comments about the relative uncertainty behind the established climatic “facts”, but less attention to the driving forces behind these environmental processes – as to *why* climate change is happening and hence its further ethical dimensions. The texts reveal a rational and enlightening mission, where climate change is explained and counteracted by Norwegian research and technology. Nature and environmental problems are symbolized with graphs and models, and graphically through pictures of melting ice and hopeless polar bears. The problems of climate change appear to be in the Arctic and other remote, exotic areas – and can only be understood through extended scientific research and examination. We are told that the climate crisis threatens the diversity of arctic plants, and that *“this is depressing, worrying – yes even frightening information for everybody concerned about a balanced Arctic”* (VG 08/06/08). Sure it is, but where is the story of a world in balance? The problems and challenges of climate change are of course to be found in the Arctic, but these areas are far away from our lives and often described as totally isolated from human civilization as such. In the selected media texts, climate change appears to be going on in nature without humans, or at least without the Norwegians.

The solutions to climate change are portrayed in the media through pictures of prominent men in suits and high-tech oil platforms. Many texts emphasize the magic words of “mitigation” and “adaptation”. Global warming is, most of all, to be controlled and mitigated by technological means. The Norwegian solutions are to be found in industrial “moon landings” and other missions abroad – where Norway can contribute with money and technology. The national narratives of environmentalism and humanitarianism are disseminated in these texts, reinforcing the characteristic Norwegian missionary approach. Norway is presented through the voices of international authorities as a fantastic,

environmentally cutting edge country with a lot of scientific expertise and technology – which should be transferred to the rest of the world. The chairman of the IPCC assures us that *“I know about the debate on whether you should cut emissions at home or abroad. I see no problems with going after projects abroad”* (AF 09/12/07).

The different media texts of adaptation are portrayed as if they only concern those vulnerable, “primitive” people out there – who Norwegians have to save. Norway is understood as a beautiful place while the world is understood as an unfair place, and the description of climate change follows this pattern. We are told that Norway will have marginal consequences from climate change while *“Africa dries up”* (AF 21/06/08); Africa is also described as *“the innocent victim”* (DN 11/09/07). In addition, many texts relate problems of scarce resources and displaced people in different parts of the world, while future scenarios about Norway are quite attractive. In the already quoted article in VG, which predicted how life would be in Norway in 40 years, we are told:

Norway will be in the lead when the climate changes – because we understood the exceptional economic opportunity [...] the sparsely populated rural districts have now become effective carbon farms using environmental refugees as cheap labour (VG 05/01/08).

According to this future vision, Norwegians are still managing nature in an effective and inventive way, and additionally including some climate victims in this agenda. Although the article also points to the need for a different economic system, with taxes on consumption and more co-ownership, Norway still has an advantageous position in the world economy. More tourism, as well as climate-refugee workers and leading technology, are seen to be the “economic” keys to this situation. Climate change and economic development go hand in hand in the majority of the texts; many voices point to the future optimistically with respect

to Norway's situation. In one article quoting Hauge from Bellona, he is interviewed about the mentioned “Bellona-scenario”⁵⁶ and states:

[It was] surprising to discover that we can become carbon negative without eliminating our economic growth. It was also surprising to discover how small a change in lifestyle can actually affect the emissions. The big choices must be taken by politicians and businesses (AF 03/06/08).

The above quoted statement resonates with the conclusion which stems from a majority of the presented texts: Climate change has not – and will not really – affect the Norwegians. This environmental challenge can be met through technological developments and interventions in policy and business, mainly by international agreements. Such an approach is also confirmed by Alfsen in *Klimapanelet*. In his article “*Human or machine*” (VG 22/03/08), we are told that “we” have to give support to the developing countries when combating climate change – though with no clear references to actual actions and regions. But the issues at stake do not seem to concern the values and visions of ordinary Norwegians. Like many articles in the sample, Alfsen points to what the Norwegians need most: Strong and brave politicians to lead us (ibid.). In the Norwegian context, climate change is – if anything – an issue of “greener” taxes.

The responses to climate change appear to happen in a technical world of politics and business, where there is no nature. The environment is discussed most of all as a resource with economic potentials, which belong to independent states. The underlying values of the selected media coverage reflect a dominant discourse emphasizing technological “fixes” for the climate challenge over human behavior change. The conflicts between nature and economic progress are cast in practical terms, and there is a significant tendency to leave the fundamental challenge of

⁵⁶

A report from Bellona on climate change and new technologies, where Bellona suggest algae-cultivation as one strategy.

the growing domestic oil economy untouched. These texts reveal no urgent calls for change in the Norwegian patterns of production and consumption. Cost-effectiveness and technological pragmatism, combined with a strong political leadership, seem to be part of an important discourse in these Norwegian climate stories. The major climate stories told in the media sample are thus to be found in the discursive landscapes of the optimistic “sustainable development” and the more pragmatic “problem solving” one – to use Dryzek's terms (2005). Norway wants to make the world “sustainable”, and the quest for sustainability seems to represent its institutionalized version of “ecological modernization” (ibid.). This version of the sustainability discourse addresses the restructuring of the capitalist political economy along more environmentally defensible lines, where governments, businesses, reform-oriented environmentalists and scientists together collaborate in setting standards and providing incentives to make industry “greener” (ibid: 167-171). The selected texts are to a high degree conveying the interests of these agents and the “techno-corporatist” approach to the climate challenge. This public discourse manifested in the media – characterized by scientific expertise and technological fixes addressing a global stage – thus diverts attention from issues related to value judgments and the way we live our lives. In the sample, climate change is most of all defined as a global challenge which needs global solutions. Within this perspective, Norway can play an important part – described through the distinctively Norwegian rational and missionary attributes. In accordance with the presented texts, the environmental problems emerge in the Arctic while the political problems are played out on a global stage. The international climate scenario is clear, with the US as the villain, China as the joker in the pack, Africa and indigenous peoples as the victims. Norway, along with, and often superior to, the EU is seen as the hero. In these stories, Norway figures as an environmental and humanitarian champion in a world of apocalyptic climate change.

The major climate stories interpreted from the selected Norwegian media coverage give the impression of a nation characterized by strong elements of cognitive dissonance. To support my claim, I refer to the most recent media study on climate change done in Norway, conducted by *CERES21*: This media study argues that the Norwegian media – representing Norway as such – are plagued by a collective psychological denial called “escapism” (Coulter and Midttun, 2009). According to my analysis, Norwegians escape from the climate challenge in two ways: On the one hand, there are the climate change deniers who argue that global warming is of minimal importance. According to these voices, the stories of climate change are exaggerated or fictitious and there is no “crisis”. On the other hand, there are the climate change believers speaking of serious environmental problems. But these challenges concern the rest of the world and any measures are thereby argued to be needed abroad.

There are no stories in my media sample that are obviously or radically questioning the Norwegian political economy or our high-consumption lifestyle. Neither are there any clear stories about the intrinsic value of nature or ecological holism. According to the presented texts, we Norwegians can sustain our privileged lifestyle and we can do this with good conscience, as we already are concerned about the environment and the misery of the rest of world. Our national narratives, retold in the media, reassure us that we have a harmonious relationship with nature and that our mission is to do well in the world. Doing something for the climate is accordingly mainly for export, and Norwegians can enjoy “*hyttekos*” in the future as well. The clashing stories of climate change are thus “tamed” and mastered by the Norwegian narrative knowledge – by the stories of living with nature and the regime of goodness. There are few texts that reveal alternative perspectives on nature and development; moral reflections on how values, beliefs and lifestyles are connected to the environmental crisis are an area significantly absent. The major stories found in the media texts give less

food for thought about how Norwegians – you and me – are connected to the worldwide climate challenge.

I have in this part of the chapter presented my overall findings and interpretations from the selected media texts, where I have identified the intertextual merging between the four global climate stories and the two Norwegian cultural narratives. Through these interpretations, I have drawn out a number of prominent discursive tendencies that together constitute the major climate stories in the Norwegian media. These stories are understood as culturally significant, providing legitimate knowledge about the climate challenge. The presented media analysis is done with less attention to the actual political agendas and interests at work. But the definition and dissemination of legitimate knowledge are also seen as a political activity, where the politicians elected by the people have the authority to define what the world is about. I will therefore turn to the Norwegian political angle and the presentations from the media on these matters in the next chapter.

6. MEDIA STORIES ABOUT NORWEGIAN CLIMATE POLICIES

In this chapter, I will review and conduct a critical analysis of the way in which the selected texts relate to the various political climate agendas in Norway. The political voices broadcasted in the media are seen as authoritative and influential, and this part of my media analysis is done as an attempt to contextualize the major climate stories recognized in the media sample. In line with the intertextual approach adapted in this thesis, these elaborations will also be seen in relation to the four different global climate stories as well as to the two Norwegian cultural narratives.

6.1 THE POLITICAL VOICES

In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on how the media sample transmits the Norwegian opposition's approach to the climate issue. As illustrated in chapter 4, the so-called total climate change deniers in Norway are often adherents to the political agenda of *FrP*. I will therefore discuss how the media communicate and confront these “nay-sayer voices”. In the second part of this chapter, I turn to the climate policies of the Stoltenberg-administration and illustrate how the media give space to these “honorable voices”. In the third part of this chapter, I will focus on the extent to which the media transmit “critical voices” towards the Norwegian climate policies, as well as to the Norwegian political economy and (ab)use of nature. Finally, I will investigate where the official Norwegian climate story is to be found in the intertextual landscape of the stories presented, and discuss whether this hegemonic political story provides an engaging vision for the Norwegian public.

6.1.1 The Nay-Sayer Voices

As elaborated in the last two chapters, the “scientific truth” behind climate change is sharply contested in Norway's two largest newspapers – *AF* and *VG*.

These heated discussions are consistent with the dividing lines between political parties, where voices from respectively the left and the right provide contrasting stories of both the challenges and responses to the climate issue.

Skepticism towards climate change expressed in the selected texts, is particularly seen in relation to spokesmen of *FrP*. This tendency got its most striking expression in April 2008, when *FrP* invited an apparently unqualified climate scientist – a welder engineer – to the party’s climate seminar. This event was commented in various newspapers, and *FrP* was accused of being an outcast (“*alenegjenger*”) in the debate between political parties on climate change in Norway (AF 01/04/08). The “outcast position” of *FrP* in the climate case is well illustrated in my media sample; various articles written by journalists or associated columnists refer to *FrP* as an irresponsible actor in the climate debate. (Seeing that *FrP* is the second largest political party according to many recent polls, this “outcast position” can be considered as rather extensive.) People doubtful of the scientific basis for climate change, are often attacked as *Frp*-sympathizers – especially in the debate sections. The climate change deniers in the selected texts seem to implicitly take the skeptical story of Lomborg in defense of their claims. Through a couple of these voices, Lomborg is explicitly referred to as a rational person who manages to think clearly and balance the exaggerated climate picture – especially with reference to the anthropogenic causes to climate change. The scientific basis of climate change, these total climate change deniers say, is fabricated. Seeing that Lomborg himself accept anthropogenic climate change, Lomborg is a straw man in the heated and polarized debate in Norway over the “scientific truth” behind climate change.

Voices from the political right conveyed in the selected texts seem, in general, skeptical to the official responses to the climate challenge, and especially to the humanitarian agenda of the Norwegian “missionary welfare state”. As illustrated in chapter 4, some voices from *UngeHøyre* ask for more rationality in the climate

debate, as if climate change were a religious “feel-good” vision. The rhetoric behind Norwegian climate policies is often based on moral arguments – about the outstanding international position of Norwegian technology and riches, where a “climatic goodness regime” provides important guidelines for what kinds of debate and critique are possible in the Norwegian climate debates. Arguments about freedom of speech are advanced in the heated debate on the climate challenge in the selected texts, where politicians from the right proclaim climate change to represent an “authoritarian vision”. The arguments advanced by Lomborg are also referred to when such voices criticize the alleged “totalitarian” presentation of the climate case in the Norwegian media. One commentator in AF describes the situation of a “climatic consensus” in this way:

What are the Norwegian press doing when someone questions the biggest and most important issue of the world, are they confronting those with an open mind? [...] The Norwegian press has collectively adopted an almost activist approach on the climate issue (AF 13/12/07c).

The need for an open debate – also in the press – is very important, as it might be the provocations from the dissenters that stimulate action. The reasons why the Norwegian media coverage of the climate case is criticized as biased and unbalanced are surely manifold. Climate change is complicated, both scientifically and political – not to mention morally. The chosen media institutions seem engaged in giving the public qualified coverage of the “scientific facts” behind global warming – as indicated in part 4.1. Within this perspective, both the partial and the total climate change deniers are criticized in my sample. Their voices are also to some extent silenced, though VG and also AF – due to pressure from their readers – devote space to these voices in their debate sections.⁵⁷ The conflict between the total climate change deniers and

⁵⁷ During the first month when AF had introduced its climate profile *Het Klode* – in December 2007 – AF refused to publish articles or readers’ contributions that expressed skepticism towards the challenges of climate change. See <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/kultur/1.4267814>

believers in the presented texts seems to have reached an impasse. As the nay-sayer voices are seen related to the agenda of *FrP*, the basic storyline of the science behind climate change is reduced to a merely political issue. These “nay-sayers” are portrayed as the heretics of our time, but the exclusion of these voices from the public debate will not foster consensus on the “scientific truth” behind global warming. Clashes of different and dissident – though fact based – climate change views might bridge this gap, and hopefully transform the nay-sayer voices into supporters of a more environmentally sensitive agenda.

6.1.2 The Honorable Voices

A substantial part of the media sample disseminates the official Norwegian climate agenda; according to these texts, global warming is an urgent challenge. In one text, the Minister of Development and Environment, Erik Solheim, declares the last report from the IPCC (AR4) to be “*the climate bible of the world*” (AF 18/11/07). In another article, Solheim emphasizes the seriousness of the climate challenge:

The IPCC has by now established a scientific consensus not present before. Environmental preachers like Al Gore, Lars Haltebrekken and Frederic Hauge can be ignored. But scientific evidence can not. By now we know that the drought in Australia and the cyclone in Bangladesh are connected with the climate (AF 13/12/07).

To some extent, various journalists are working as mouthpieces for the Norwegian governmental agenda, as different cabinet ministers are followed and quoted in their personal stories of “awakening” to the climate challenge – as seen in the “climate pilgrim” such as Prime Minister Stoltenberg. According to these news sources, and stated in rough terms, the Norwegian government appears to have three answers to the climate challenge: Technology, quota trade and “*dugnadsånd*”⁵⁸.

⁵⁸

I.e. positive attitude to voluntary communal work.

The governmental agenda of climate technology seems to be focused on the “moon landings” that were previously mentioned (CO₂-cleaning of gas works). Many articles in the media sample comment on this mission, especially Mathismoen in AF. Mathismoen follows Prime Minister Stoltenberg to South-Africa where they are visiting huge factories with CO₂-emissions as large as the total emissions of Norway. Stoltenberg is quoted: *“It is tough to see this. And it illustrates that it is impossible to succeed in the climate battle if we do not manage to capture CO₂ from these huge sources of emissions”* (AF 18/04/08). In this way Stoltenberg defends both his domestic and his foreign “moon landings”.

A considerable part of the selected texts inform readers that Norwegian politics should make a global example and lead in the worldwide work against climate change. These texts focus on international treaties and technological solutions, supporting the narratives of Norway as an environmental and humanitarian cutting edge. Although Stoltenberg talks about “moon landings” at home, the mission that he finds to be truly honorable for the Norwegian government is the international quota trade and technological reforms abroad. Stoltenberg talks about this mission in an interview:

The wealthy part of the world has the moral responsibility for the climate threat. It is us, with our emissions, that have created the problem. [But] (w)e will not manage to cut the world’s emissions 50-80 percent like the IPCC claims we have to, without cutting emissions also in the third world. Not everything, but a large part of that bill, we have to pay. That is why climate measures abroad are important. It is not a matter of sneaking away, or to let the wealthy world be excused from doing something at home (AF 02/11/07).

The complex challenges of climate change are presented in moral terms: the industrial world is full of sins! But instead of providing a “Norwegian dream” – like the motivating story advanced by Gore – and focusing on domestic affairs and potential innovations within the Norwegian context, the solution of the

Government seems to lie in “indulgence mechanisms” abroad – like buying quotas and implementing technological projects. Norway’s mission is to be found in other nation’s affairs. Minister Solheim is also quoted, focusing on this global agenda:

Norway will be important at two arenas. As one of the world’s leading oil producers, we can manage to influence other countries with a large oil production, not the least when it comes to taking part in CO₂-capture. And we play an important part in building confidence to the developing countries, the rainforest billions is one example (AF 13/12/07).

The most moral thing to do at home is to demonstrate *dugnadsånd*. But it is difficult to understand what this national *dugnad* is about, apart from accepting an increase in gasoline tax and implementing energy efficiency in your house (VG 23/02/08, 21/06/08). The Norwegian *dugnadsånd* seems most of all to be a governmental agenda in an international context, and the mentioned “green goddess” Gro Harlem Brundland is interviewed about this mission: According to her, we still need to raise awareness about the global environmental challenges and their global solutions, where “everybody” has to join this international *dugnad* (AF 12/12/07).

According to numerous texts, the Norwegian government is doing a lot – researching in the Arctic, saving the Amazon, carrying out “moon landings” and developing big projects around the world. In short, the noble mission is that of the Government, and we – the public – are left to understand and support such huge ventures. It seems difficult for the public to feel included in the official Norwegian climate agenda: We most of all have to follow the environmental and humanitarian gambols of our Government abroad.

6.1.3 The Critical Voices

On the other hand, the Norwegian media are also working as watchdogs. There are clearly some investigative journalists and contributors in the selected texts

that express grave concern about the Norwegian climate politics. The critical voice is most striking in DN: This newspaper has several articles that show skepticism towards the technological missions of the Norwegian government and the co-operating business sector. For instance the article “*Dirty bomb in green wood*”, where Frøyland writes about the oil sand project of the governmental-owned Statoil(Hydro) in Canada (DN 05/09/07b). This article critically discusses the environmental standards of Norwegian petroleum projects abroad. Yet the oil sand project and its negative environmental consequences are described in a rather formal way. The issues at stake are expressed with technological and economic tropes – not through any ecologically informed claims. According to the article, the morality of the Norwegian oil industry and its foreign undertakings appear to be a matter of sufficient technology, and the article contains a metaphorical association to the Norwegian “moon landings”:

Since the oil sand of Statoil is located 500 meters underground, it is not possible to dig down to it. The company is therefore drilling wells and makes use of a steam injection technique [...] from the green forests around, they are producing 200.000 barrels of oil, which corresponds to one sixth of the present Statoil production. Investments of almost NOK 90 billion in production and upgraded installations are needed to reach that aim [...] White smoke and a juicy CO₂-bill rise from the factory chimneys set in the moon landscape (ibid.).

The Norwegian politics of quota trade, especially the investments in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), is also systematically investigated in DN. In the article “*Quotas in a green grey area*”, the first CDM-project of Norway – a hydroelectric power plant in China – is criticized (DN 15/03/08). This article argues how “Norway”, more or less meaning “Stoltenberg”, has strategically launched emission projects abroad, to avoid domestic cuts. Such foreign projects have uncertain outcomes; the Norwegian project in China is said to have no real CO₂-effect (ibid.). The journalists claim in this article that the policies of the Norwegian government should be thoroughly reevaluated. The journalists argue

moreover that there is a pressing lack of opposition to the official Norwegian climate agenda, and that these issues really need to be discussed in an open, public debate.⁵⁹ These journalists dared to raise a skeptical voice towards Norwegian CO₂ policies, and were awarded with the Norwegian Scoop-prize.⁶⁰

The above mentioned article reflects the skeptical story of “CO₂-hysteria”, and attempts to critically examine the governmental “feel-good version” of environmentalism and humanitarianism. This mirrors the skepticism advanced by the voices from the opposition in general (see section 6.1.1). But there are few critical voices in the sample that stress the rising internal CO₂-emissions of Norway, and hence question the Norwegian lifestyle and political economy. Stories of ignorance or demand of the change of consciousness – in line with respectively Gore’s and Lovelock’s visions – are *not* brought up and discussed thoroughly at the political level in the media. There are some scattered attempts to find in papers such as DN, which launches critical analyses of the Norwegian climate policies. However, on the whole global warming does not seem to be a radical challenge to the Norwegian industry or society. AF and VG reflect fragments of a more visionary ecological story, where a few voices fundamentally confronting the Norwegian political reality are given a platform for expression. One example is a reader's contribution from the philosopher Arne Johan Vetlesen:

If we use nature’s sustainable limit as a condition, we have to say: We cannot afford growth. But as a society we have displayed no will to see the earth’s limits as a condition, they are unknown to most of us, just like nature is, reduced to exploitation for our purposes. Criticism of growth is politically incorrect far into the present
[*Sosialistisk Venstreparti*] (AF 10/09/07).

⁵⁹ <http://www.skup.no/Metoderapporter/2008>

⁶⁰ The Scoop-prize is a prize for investigative journalism

In the wake of this comment – though seemingly coincidentally – the secretary of *Arbeiderpartiet*, Martin Kolberg, stated that there were limits to growth – even in the Norwegian economy. VG reports that Kolberg’s conclusion is an obvious break with the ideology of the Western world, namely unlimited economic growth. The article further states that Kolberg urges Norway, as a small but wealthy country, to lead in the search for new societal values. Kolberg suggests no plan of action for his proposed green revolution, but argues nevertheless that such a large-scale transformation has to happen through democratic means (VG 17/09/07). This initiative was embraced by some of the Norwegian environmental organizations, and Steinar Lem, of FIVH⁶¹, wanted to lift Kolberg’s ideas (ibid.). But Kolberg’s propositions were reduced to a puff of wind, and critical questions towards the Norwegian levels of production and consumption have not been pursued – in the media or in Norwegian climate policies.

In January 2008, the national *Klimaforliket* was implemented. This was an agreement between all of the large political parties, except *FrP*, about the Norwegian climate policies. The aim of this compromise was to generate a broad political consensus on long-term climate policies. These suggested climate endeavors are commented upon in various articles. *Klimaforliket* proclaims that Norway should be “carbon-neutral” by 2030, and Mathismoen stated that this compromise would serve “*to again bring Norway in the international frontline in certain respects*” (AF 18/01/08). But *Klimaforliket* is as well understood as a rather spineless manifesto when it comes to questions of radical changes within the Norwegian political economy.⁶² Many commentators find it difficult to understand exactly how Norway can fulfill its goal of reduced GHG emissions.

⁶¹ Future In Our Hands – a radical environmental organization that works for fair distribution of resources globally.

⁶² In *Klimaforliket*, the question of more technology vs. reduced living standard and lower economic activity as a national climate action is not treated, and most of the national undertakings in this compromise are evaluated as “*tiltak som ikke kommer i direkte konflikt med andre politiske mål og som er lite egnet til å vekke motstand i befolkningen*” (CICERO 2009:03).

One commentator in VG writes under the heading “*Bad climate for good moral*” that the only visible political answer to the suggested cut of emissions seems to be investments in international quotas:

We have so much money from climate destructive oil that we can afford to buy ourselves out from the *klimadugnad* the rest of the world has to join (VG 12/03/08).

Climate change is about money, according to the majority of texts. The cost of the national compromise is told to be almost nothing. Shared among all the households in Norway, *Klimaforliket* results in an increased expenditure of approximately 3500 NOK/year (AF 18/01/08). Although such statements give the impression that every Norwegian has to contribute in combating climate change, the contribution at stake is put only in economic terms. This cost-attitude is challenged sometimes, as in an editor’s piece in AF. Under the headline “*Sacrifice from everyone*”, one can read that “*In Norway it is easy to get the illusion that it is possible to buy oneself out from the problems. Unfortunately, it is not that easy*” (AF 11/12/07). However, this statement concerns the responsibility of Norway as a nation which is engaged in international relations. There are very few articles that are critical of the Norwegian public and its engagement in the climate issue. So far the Norwegians have rebelled against an increased gasoline tax of 0, 10 NOK/liter (VG 01/07/08).

According to many of the texts, the world seems to be going astray. But almost none of the texts are concerned with if, how, and why Norwegians as a nation should feel responsible for doing something domestically about the impending environmental collapse. This is maybe because such questions are very sensitive and difficult to comment “soundly” on – as they concern rather intricate political and moral issues in a modern, democratic context. The following experience of Kvalvig in *Klimapanelet* leads to such a justification: Although Kvalvig first of all was trying to communicate the problems of climate change in a scientific,

somehow objective way, she discovered quickly that it became trickier than expected to comment about the solution to the climate challenge without getting politically controversial. In one column, she writes:

To carry out the changes for a more climate friendly society we need great structural changes, and probably force. The solutions to the climate crisis are full of conflicts. Fortunately we do have committed politicians in this country, but are they brave enough? (VG 12/04/08)

Once again, the Norwegian public is left to the relative “braveness” of our politicians; how can we relate to this? The Norwegian government asks for *dugnadsånd* and avoids the dirty stuff related to oil extraction.⁶³ While we are asked to recycle our garbage and encouraged to shift to economy bulbs at home, our government is implementing dubious projects in China and supporting polluting oil and gas extractions. It is difficult to encourage a critical response to the official climate agenda when public-minded media are not providing many investigative stories on these issues.

6.2 THE HEGEMONIC STORY: NORWAY AS AN ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMANITARIAN CUTTING EDGE

I have reviewed and discussed political attitude on climate change in Norway as represented in my sample. The press is seen as an important source of information for the public on the climate case, and the Norwegian media are considered to have a significant influence on the political decision-making process, including climate policies (Bratland, 2008). Climate policies are a crucial field, as these efforts involve rather decisive conditions and collective concerns. As argued in my thesis, we *also* need to raise public engagement if we are to meet the climate challenge in a sufficient way. Our energy use is the main

⁶³ In the information magazine *Klimaløftet* distributed by the Norwegian Environmental Department, one can read about climate actions directed at ordinary citizens – mainly understood as consumers. Reading through its 40 pages, there is not a word about the Norwegian oil- and gas economy. <http://www.klimalofet.no/Klimalofet/>

menace in this challenge, and both private lifestyles and cooperative enterprises have to become more environmentally friendly. With this in mind, it is interesting to see that in my media analysis, the most critical voices towards the official Norwegian climate policies are to be found in the business-oriented DN. However, this newspaper describes the climate challenge mostly as an economic opportunity for the business sector. Seen in general, there are few strong voices in the overall media picture that ask for radical changes with respect to the Norwegian political economy and lifestyles. In this landscape, the influential storytellers give way some prominent political stories which more or less legitimize the Norwegian status quo.

On the whole, the Norwegian government's position, as disseminated by the media, acknowledge the necessity of a climate policy, but the climate change will mainly affect the "world out there". Political leaders and the business sector agree on the fact that climate change is happening, but seem to disagree when it comes to solutions which would threaten the national oil industry. These powerful voices are well reflected in the media, reinforcing the mission of the industry-friendly *Arbeiderpartiet*. The very focus on and "belief" in technological solutions distract attention from discussions related to the extensive changes that are needed in our energy use habits. In addition, the Norwegian climate policies appear to have shifted towards global solutions. This agenda is sustained and legitimized by stories of Norway as an environmental and humanitarian cutting edge. Such presentations, characterized by a pragmatic approach to nature and the missionary aspect of Norwegian "goodness", allow Norway to escape at home and focus on the rest of the world. The two cultural narratives "derail" in a paradoxical way the Norwegian climate agenda. Norwegian rationalism and pragmatism lead to an overoptimistic belief in the effects from technological solutions, and underestimate the force of cultural habits. Though, some are "blaming" other cultural traits of the Norwegian society: Jens Ulteit-Moe, businessman and recently dedicated environmentalist,

writes that Norwegian *puritanism* is the Government's biggest problem when discussing climate policies:

The Stoltenberg Government follows the international tendency of avoiding considerable increased energy taxes and other unpopular measures, but rather focusing on quota trade and afforestation abroad. Politics is the art of possibilities, hence Stoltenberg's assessments are in this regard totally correct, even though Norwegian puritansim demands domestic sacrifices in order to save the environment (AF 27/06/08).

Politics are surely the art of possibilities, but in the climate case, politics can as well be seen as the art of responsibility and creativity. Global warming is a matter that concerns our fundamental morality – not only our conventional politics and economics. The current climate policies communicated in the media challenge neither the Norwegian utilitarian approach to nature nor the expanding Norwegian oil economy. Rather, these policies allow Norway to continue extracting and living high on “black gold”. This might, of course, be in the interest of the public, as oil contributes to the Norwegian welfare system. But at the same time, such undertakings contribute to increased global environmental risks – both in the present and the future. The elaborated national narratives somehow “green wash” the ultimate polluting reality of Norwegian oil and wealth.

The official climate change stories interpreted from the media are complicated and the most important questions are about scientific inquiries, technical devices and international trade regimes. Although some of the presented texts show skepticism towards the government's action, these statements do not appear to stimulate a green public sphere on the climate matter. The most critical articles are found in the business-paper DN, and these presentations relate to the workings of industry. The climate challenge is mostly communicated through scientific and technological arguments; not through an ecologically informed

discourse that might challenge the monological administrative mentality and the prevailing discourse of industrialism with a new set of presuppositions and cultural images (Torgerson, 1999). The issues at stake do not seem to be easily understood by “ordinary” citizens. Moreover, the portrayals of the outstanding position of Norwegian technology and global engagement silence moral, social and, accordingly, political dimensions of the environmental challenge.

Different researchers have pointed to Norwegian environmental politics and the challenges of public deliberation and involvement in these matters. One study criticizes how the previous environmental discourse in Norway of thinking globally, while acting locally – stemmed from the beginnings of international environmental efforts in the 1980s – in the Norwegian context became a burden for the private consumer (Straume, 2005). This study examines the depoliticization of environmental politics in Norway, which allegedly represents pseudo democracy and technocratic paternalism. The power of this system is reinforced through discursive and managerial techniques that disempower political subjects, where the result for the *demos* is guilt and loss of creative power (ibid: 203). Another study focuses on how the earlier environmental discourse of thinking globally, while acting locally, has recently transformed into a discourse of thinking globally *and* acting globally (Lindseth, 2006). This study states that from the perspective of democratic governance it seems evident that: The idea, that the public has a *democratic* responsibility to take on climate commitments at the local and national level, appears to have lost resonance relative to the idea that climate change is a global challenge that requires global solutions (ibid:48).

The globally oriented discourse is also established in the selected texts, where that picture is sustained by stories of Norway as an environmental and humanitarian cutting edge. In the Norwegian context, people are encouraged to demonstrate *dugnadsånd* and behave as environmentally friendly consumers.

Within these presentations, the discourses of sustainable development and environmental problem solving (Dryzek, 2005) are prevalent. As illustrated through my analysis, many texts enhance the agenda of sustainable development by promising economic growth in association with environmental protection, and with an emphasis on the role of “strong and brave politicians” in solving the climate challenge. As indicated in last chapter, the major representation of sustainability found in the media falls into the category of “techno-corporatist ecological modernization” – whereby the process of policy making is monopolized by scientific, economic and political elites (ibid.). The corporatist Norwegian government manages ostensibly to reconcile economic growth with environmental interests while helping the developing world to prosper. This might just be a case of a *rhetorical* rescue operation for its capitalist economy confronted by ecological crisis (ibid: 174). However, this version of the climate “reality” is also reflected in my sample; the climate challenge seems neither to involve “the public” nor to represent a “cultural confrontation”. The hegemonic stories in the media provide no sustained critique of the possibility of constant economic growth and increasing consumption. These presentations avoid talking about the taboos concerning limits to growth and the Norwegian lifestyle. Climate change does not need to challenge the “Norwegian mind”. Rather, this environmental problem is an issue for the *administrative mind*, where the state exercises unquestioned authority for universal well-being and legitimate knowledge (ibid: 88). The global climate challenge is the story of the IPCC – calculable and controllable, and a problem for elite scientific and political institutions.

The selected Norwegian texts, in other words, do *not offer* a politically informed story about green consciousness – required by Gore and Lovelock. Some voices criticize the efforts of the Norwegian government and challenge their powerful stories about climate change. But, in the end, these critical voices are few and their visions are overpowered by the widely transmitted hegemonic agenda.

Many texts in the sample present the honorable voices of the Norwegian Ministers who want to save the world, but the motivating, mobilizing story concerning the Norwegian public at large is still missing. The Norwegian government communicates lofty visions for the global good, but provides few creative – or responsible – visions of Norway beyond the age of fossil fuels. The stories of the inherent worth of nature and the moral will to change our *own* future are not told – in the texts or in the nation at large.

7. CONCLUSION: MYTHS AND FUTURES

My aim in this thesis has been to use the Norwegian press as a proxy for global communication and dialogue on the climate issues. Climate change – as a global environmental problem – is dependent on media attention to move from just being a “condition” to be an issue that can generate social awareness (Hannigan, 2006). The issues at stake are – as illustrated – highly complex and hotly contested, and translating and interpreting such issues into marketable stories essentially involves surprising considerations. Therefore, the media coverage of climate change often has a vivid style to it, in which climate change is framed as novel and important – dramatized in symbolic and visual terms (Trumbo and Shanahan, 2000). A recent study conducted on climate change coverage in the Norwegian press documents that many Norwegian journalists who write about subjects related to climate change make use of dramatization as a central strategy on these issues (Ryghaug, 2006). However, I have not focused on the internal logic of the “media culture”, but rather used media as a source of cultural production of climate change stories. The interpreted meanings of these stories have been discussed in relation to the presented global climate stories, as well as to the cultural and political context of Norway.

The articles in my sample convey an interesting variety of opinions and perspectives on climate change – from the scientific gaze on the hard facts to the skeptical denial of the whole matter. As illustrated, the dominant stories are grounded in a globally centered discourse of sustainable development as ecological modernization – to use Dryzek's terms (2005). The aforementioned Norwegian narratives tell a story about Norway as environmentally friendly and humanitarian “cutting edge”. As demonstrated in my analysis, climate problems seem to appear as affecting nature without the Norwegians, while the climate solutions are to be found in policies without nature. The major stories interpreted

from the media question neither industrialism, nor the prevailing instrumentalist approach towards the environment. The critique of Norway's energy use is downplayed by accepting export of the climate measures abroad, and there are no clear calls for fundamental social change.

The Norwegian case, as presented here, certainly provides food for thought with respect to the link between discourses and civil mobilization. The “wake-up” calls advanced by the media only seem to regard the world out there; there are few appeals for collective Norwegian action. The perceptions of risk and danger are constructed around geographically and temporally distant people and non-human nature; these perceptions are not stimulating awareness about the risks connected to the imperatives of economic growth and technological rationality. We are still told to be living in a “risk-society” (Beck, 1992), but the definitions of risk and responsibility seem to be generated on the drawing boards of the scientific and political elite. According to Beck, new possibilities for social and political transformation arise from people's growing awareness that they are living in a society in which the habits of production and consumption may be undermining the conditions for its very future existence (Bulkeley, 2001). Within this perspective, public participation is important in order to explore and create new perspectives on society (Dryzek, 2005). Environmental risk awareness can further result in a realization of *interconnectedness*, where a “human consciousness of nature” is both wounded and awakened (Allan, 2000: 57). This is not the story found in my Norwegian media analysis.

A recent study, done on Norwegians' awareness and perception of climate issues, shows that the general public considers the environmental risk to be non-important (Sørensen et al., 2008). The lack of public concern and engagement are explained by the scientific controversies and abstract policies that are presented in the media, in addition to the political inactivity that the government demonstrates (ibid.). Another new study has analyzed public engagement on the

climate issue in the Norwegian blogosphere. This study shows that although various voices in the blogosphere criticize the official climate agenda and the Norwegian oil economy, these people are not providing any visionary alternative (Ytterstad, 2008). The most engaged appear to be gloomy and desperate, and appeals about common actions are strikingly absent (*ibid.*).

These studies relate to the findings of my own analysis, which point to the problems of escapism and apathy within Norwegian society – as if Norwegians were living in a “reality” where climate change does not exist.

7.1 DEBUNKING MYTHS

7.1.1 Climate Change Myths

Actual scientific knowledge of climate change is, no doubt, contested and uncertain and we will never be able to learn the pure “truth” about our natural surroundings. But at the same time, the vast majority of climate scientists are convinced that the earth is facing rapid changes because of human energy use. The problems of climate change are in their basic sense the results of anthropogenic GHG emissions, and that is a reality we have to face. Therefore, the way media might “balance” the climate picture by giving as much attention to a handful of climate skeptics as to the vast majority of scientists who believe that global warming poses a real threat contributes to the construction of a “climate myth” (Schneider, 2005). Such media-propagated myths have little to do with reality, and should accordingly not guide us in our attempt to come to terms with our environmental challenges. The media surely have an obligation to give a fair presentation of competing points of view and build public trust on the climate issue. But any sensible public dialogue should deliberately outline the *consensus* before revealing the *contention* (*ibid.*). This is, however, a delicate task, since climate change is both a hotly contested issue and a subtle issue among scientists.

When communicating climate change, it is important to separate facts from

values – to the extent this is possible – to prevent the factual basis from being totally politicized. But at the same time, climate change is not a dogmatic opinion – it is the end of the world as we know it! Therefore, it is also important to incite engagement and open dialogue, so that the plurality of plausible problems and promising potentials are brought out. Current media stories frequently polarize the different viewpoints into one extreme or the other – and rarely convey the entire range of possible prospects (ibid.). These opposing presentations can also be considered “mythical”, as climate change is molded into either a devastating reality or an invented fiction. We are living in complex and confusing times, and the “climate reality” should accordingly be presented as a range of possible futures.

7.1.2 Norwegian Myths

As argued through my analysis, the Norwegian media contribute to the Norwegian myth of living in a cornucopia. Norway exports its dirty stuff to the rest of the world, and Norwegians themselves remain far from any sort of ecological awakening. This relates not only to the populist “anti-greenery” profile of *FrP*, but also to the official climate agenda – which is legitimized by Norwegian narratives of environmentalism and humanitarianism.

In May 2009, the Environmental Department held a press conference on climate change. Minister Solheim attended and pointed to the problems of escapism and fairy tale-living, as he urged “the world” to get out of the lethargy of Sleeping Beauty. Although the media are telling of gloomy future scenarios, Solheim saw the “need for a greater understanding of the climate crisis”. At the same time, he wanted journalists to adjust the focus from the climate problems to their solutions, and pay attention to the stories of success.⁶⁴ But as my media analysis

⁶⁴ I attended this seminar. Information is also found at: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/aktuelt/nyheter/2009/--verden-ma-ut-av-tornerosesovnen.html?id=560717>

illustrates, there are many storytellers in the Norwegian media who make Norway itself into a story of success – an environmental hero and a humanitarian world-saver. As long as the Norwegian resource utopia maintains the facade, we may only dream of a crisis.

Although I claim that the Norwegian narratives of environmentalism and humanitarianism contribute to the construction of a Norwegian national myth and therefore need to be demythologized, I do not argue that these narratives are to be totally dismissed. Such meaning making, collective narratives are “existential”, and constitute the Norwegian reality. Accordingly, it is not possible to eliminate this mythical dimension from Norwegian politics. To talk about “ideal” politics, disconnected from the Norwegian culture and our national identity, is thus a fantasy (NUPI, 2007). But in the climate case, the hegemonic Norwegian storytellers demonstrate self-delusion and escape from the imperatives of the current environmental reality. Care for the global environment and engagement in the international arena are, of course, “good” and respectable ideas. However, as I argue in this thesis, when responding to the climate challenge Norway must *also* “sweep before its own door”. For the time being, Norway’s GHG emissions will not be eliminated. They will be offset with rather speculative and complicated measures. The challenge of climate change, and Norway's role in it, require imaginative solutions at home as well as abroad.

My media analysis shows that there are critical storytellers who try to unmask the Norwegian discrepancy between affluence from an oil economy on the one hand, and maintaining a strong reputation on climate policy on the other. But the Norwegian myths of boundless abundance and “technological generosity” seem to be well established. Norwegians are accustomed to their “black gold”, and the Norwegian oil industry has managed to establish a respected reputation by appealing to our national goodness – as exporters of clean oil and good morality (Ihlen, 2007). *StatilHydro* markets its international investments as “the oil

adventure continues abroad” and the Norwegian state supports the government-owned oil companies through aid programs.

7.2 THE NEED FOR A NEW STORY?

As illustrated in this thesis, the struggles over the meaning of climate change are ubiquitous. The stories of climate change in the Norwegian media are revealed through discourse analysis, and inseparably connected with dominant power structures. The current Norwegian media coverage is, to a large extent, socially and politically counterproductive, because these stories distract people from an issue at the heart of the Norwegian society – the production and consumption of fossil fuels. A few voices in my sample encourage more radical responses to the climate challenge. They talk about the need to organize the world economy in fundamentally different ways, or to see nature with more sensitive eyes than our current, alienated view. Such speech is deeply thought, and some asks if climate has become religion. Lomborg is considered almost as evil⁶⁵; and with respect to the complexity of the issue of climate change, one should treat his statistical prognosis with some skepticism. But at the same time, Lomborg talks about a decisive condition in the climate challenge: If we are to succeed, we have to implement actions that actually work, not only actions that make us feel good.

What kind of constructive “do-good” vision does Norway need when responding to the climate challenge? The trick to the climate challenge will not be done by technology alone, but also in the emergence of relevant cultural issues that engage the general public in making the necessary social and political changes that are needed (Moser, 2007). A timely question is therefore if the present Norwegian passivity to the climate issue is as much due to the absence of an

⁶⁵ In 2004 the IPCC chairman, Rajendra Pachauri, compared Lomborg with the very Adolf Hitler, in which Lomborg was accused for having no respect for different human lifestyles and cultures. Pachauri’s statement is still referred to in the Norwegian climate debate. See i.e.: <http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081003/OBOKER/85220690>

imaginative vision that manages to mobilize the masses and that provides (political) agency, as to the lack of political will among people? Although the elaborated hegemonic climate stories in the Norwegian media are culturally significant – attested by two notable national narratives – they do not relate to the current context of Norwegian society. Moreover, these presentations do not advance any cultural *critique*. The environmental challenge is *not* presented in a way which relates it to our way of living, our social structure or our natural surroundings. The dialogues and stories of climate change found in the media are mostly about science and economics, and these current discourses seem not to encourage the development of a green public sphere. Neither do these presentations foster sufficient communication on the climate case, as these discourses may threaten our capacity to engage intelligently and creatively with the increasing signals of environmental stress and deterioration (Cox, 2007). In the Western industrialized world climate change is a problem of democracy; and democracy, if anything, is about authentic communication – also with the non-human world (Dryzek, 2005:235). My analysis of the Norwegian climate stories shows the need for new, influential voices and other discursive narratives which can actively engage and empower the public, and contribute to the ecological side of Norwegian democracy. As the stories of Gore and Lovelock propose, we have to fully understand the seriousness of our environmental challenge and reconnect to our own natural foundations. These messages are lacking in my presented texts.

What are, then, the stories that need to be communicated? Ultimately, we cannot totally erase our founding traditions and stories when adapting to a new “reality”. But at the same time, there is a lot of potential knowledge in the Norwegian narratives to advance a more environmentally benign future. For example, the Norwegian fairy tale of Askeladden – who succeed through his own resourcefulness and with nature’s support – need not to continuously be adapted to the scenario of the oil and the developing world out there. The values of

moderation and respect for the natural elements also belong to our narrative knowledge. These insights have to be revived and told, to build the base for a new Norwegian paradigm which takes into account the environmental stories as presented by Gore, Lovelock and others. As indicated by my intertextual approach in this thesis, we humans can learn from each other and develop new awarenesses by engaging in dialogues with others' thought. This means, moreover, learning to relate to those who hold different views about the direction our society is taking, and pay attention to the concert of voices and dissenting stories about our position on earth. Nothing kills communication more quickly than an unwillingness to consider the views of the other side (Reed and Rothenberg, 1993).

Today Norwegians seem stuck in an influential discourse coalition where the fate of the earth is left to the technology optimists. There are very few powerful voices that raise the topics of green radicalism and advance issues related to nature's limits of tolerance. To talk about limits is also a rhetorically difficult position, which seems to imply a frustrating confrontation not only with our present political economy, but with fundamental forces of human nature. Since time immemorial, we have been attracted to myths of boundless wealth and glory, in the same way as we are not drawn to the ascetic story of living as simply as possible (Witoszek, 2008). Therefore, any "green revolution" needs to be made attractive – and not be told in the language of doom and renunciation. We need fruitful dialogues about how Norway might look in the future beyond the age of fossil fuels; not only protests against industry. Our current national storytellers have to inspire creative and responsible thinking about our place in the world, and help us to comprehend and create the possibility of a better future. Stories are powerful, but not unchangeable.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agger, G. (1992): *Intertextuality Revisited: Dialogues and Negotiations in Media Studies*. Aalborg University. Retrieved October 23, 2008, from: http://www.uqtr.quebec.ca/AE/vol_4/gunhild.htm
- Allan, S. et al. (2000): *Environmental Risk and the Media*. London: Routledge.
- Anker, P. (2005): "The Ecological Colonization of Space" in *Environmental History*, 10:239-268
- Barthes, R. and Sontag, S. (1983): "Myth today" in *Selected Writings*, London: Fontana Press.
- Beck, U. (1992): *Risk Society, Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage Publications.
- Benford, R. D. and Snow, D. A. (2000): "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment" in *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26: 611-39
- Bratland, E. (2008): *Medienes makt og rolle. Hva kan vi lære av miljødebatten i Norge?* Frederikke, Organ for FoU-publikasjoner. Høgskolen i Nesna.
- Bruner, J. (1991): "The Narrative Construction of Reality" in *Critical Inquiry*, 18(1): 1-21
- Bruner, J. (2003): *Making stories. Law, Literature, life*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Bruner J. et al. (2006): *Narrative, Learning and Culture*. Copenhagen: New Social Science Monographs.
- Bulkeley, H. (2001): "Governing Climate Change: The Politics of Risk Society?" in *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 26(4): 430-47
- Carbon Footprints of Nations (2009): "Ranking." Retrieved September 9, 2009, from <http://www.carbonfootprintofnations.com/content/ranking/79/>.
- CICERO (2009): "Norsk klimapolitisk debatt og klimaforliket fra 2008." *CICERO Working Paper* 2009: 03mm

- Cox, R. (2007): "Nature's 'crisis disciplines': Does environmental communication have an ethical duty?" in *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, 1(1): 5-20
- Coulter, P. and Midttun, A. (eds.) (2009): "Escaping Climate Change. Climate Change in the Media: North and South perspectives." *CERES21 Report no. 1*
- DesJardins, J. R. (1993): *Environmental Ethics*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company.
- Dryzek, J. S. et al. (2003): *Green states and Social Movements. Environmentalism in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany and Norway*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dryzek, J. S. (2005): *The Politics of the Earth. Environmental Discourses*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fischer, F. and Hajer, M. A. (eds.) (1999): *Living With Nature. Environmental Politics as Cultural Discourse*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fisher, W. R. (1987): *Human Communication as Narration: Toward a Philosophy of Reason, Value, and Action*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
- Forskning.no (2007): "Slik blir IPCC-rapporten til." Retrieved June 7, 2009, from <http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2007/februar/1170339853.65>
- Frønes, I. (2006): *Annerledeslandet*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.
- Funtowicz, S. O. and Ravetz, J. R. (1993): "Science for the Post-Normal Age" in *Futures*, 25(6): 739-55
- Geertz, C. (1973): *The Interpretation of Cultures*. London: Fontana Press.
- Gore, A. (2006): *An Inconvenient Truth, the Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We can Do about It*. London: Bloomsbury.
- Gore, A. (2007): *An Inconvenient Truth, the Crisis of Global Warming*. New York: Viking.

- Gould, D. (2004): *Writing a Media Analysis*. Communication Consortium Media Centre. Retrieved September 10, 2008, from:
http://www.issuelab.org/research/writing_a_media_analysis
- Gullestad, M. (1996): *Everyday Life Philosophers*. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press.
- Hannigan, J. (2006): *Environmental Sociology*. London: Routledge.
- Harré, R. et al. (1999): *Greenspeak, A Study of Environmental Discourse*. London: Sage Publication.
- Heath R. L. et al. (2007): "Nature, Crisis, Risk, science, and Society: What is Our Ethical Responsibility?" in *Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture*, 1(1):34-48
- Ihlen, Ø. (2007): *Petroleumsparadiset*. Oslo: Unipub.
- IPCC (2001): "Climate Change 2001: Synthesis Report." Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Core Writing Team and Watson, R. T. (Eds.) Retrieved November 19, 2008, from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.htm
- IPCC (2004): *16 years of Scientific Assessment in Support of the Climate Convention*. Retrieved December 10, 2008, from:
<http://www.ipcc.ch/about/index.htm>
- IPCC (2007): "Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report." Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Core Writing Team, Pachauri, R.K. and Reisinger, A. (Eds.) Retrieved November 3, 2008, from:
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.htm
- Journalisten.no (2009): "Det er journalistene som styrer." Retrieved April 14, 2009, from: <http://www.journalisten.no/story/57367>

- King, R. J. H. (1999): "Narrative, Imagination, and the Search for Intelligibility in Environmental Ethics" in *Ethics and the Environment*, 4(1): 23-38
- Lash, S. et al. (1996): *Risk, Environment and Modernity. Towards a New Ecology*. London: Sage Publications.
- Leonard, M. and Small, A. (2003): *Public dipolmacy – a strategy*. Retrieved March 27, 2009, from: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/tema/norgesfremme-og-kultursamarbeid/norgesprofilering-og-omdomme/Norways-Public-Diplomacy.html?id=451284>
- Lindseth, G. (2006): *Political Discourse and Climate Change: The Challenge of Reconciling Scale of Impact with Level of Governance*. Doctoral theses at NTNU.
- Lomborg, B. (2001): *The Skeptical Environmentalist. Measuring the Real State of the World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lomborg, B. (2007): *Cool It. The Skeptical Environmentalist's Guide to Global Warming*. New York: Knopf.
- Lomborg, B. (2009): "Biography." Retrieved February 11, 2009, from: <http://www.lomborg.com/about/biography/>
- Lovelock, J. (2006): *The Revenge of Gaia. Why the Earth is Fighting Back – and How We Can Still Save Humanity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mathismoen, O. (2007): *Klima, hva skjer*. Oslo: Font Forlag.
- Ministry of Environment (2008): *Klimaforliket*. Retrieved April 27, 2009, from: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md.html?id=668>
- Ministry of Environment (2008): *Klimaløftet*. Retrieved May 5, 2009, from: <http://www.klimaloftet.no/Klimaloftet/>
- Morgenbladet (2008): "La det flyte." 3 October. Retrieved April 10, 2009, from: <http://www.morgenbladet.no/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20081003/OBOKER/85220690>
- Moser, S. C. (ed.) (2007): *Creating a Climate for Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Mühlhäusler, P. (2006): "Environmental Discourses" in *The Annual Review of Anthropology*, 35: 457-79
- Neumann, I. B. (2001): *Mening, Materialitet, Makt: En innføring i diskursanalyse*. Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
- Neumann, I. B. (2003): "International Relations as Emergent Bakhtinian Dialogue", in *International Studies Review*, 5(1): 137-140
- Norgaard, K. M. (2006): "We don't really want to know" in *Organization and Environment*, 3: 347-70
- NOU 2003:39 "Makt og Demokrati. Sluttrapport fra Makt- og Demokrati Utredningen." Oslo: Arbeids- og administrasjonsdepartementet.
- NUPI (2007): *Norske selvbilder og norsk utenrikspolitikk*. Retrieved April 8, 2009, from: <http://www.nupi.no/publikasjoner>
- NRK (2007): "Media glorifiserer Gore." 11 December. Retrieved April 10, from <http://www.nrk.no/nyheter/kultur/1.4267814>
- Omdømmeutvalgets sluttrapport (2006): *Nyskapning i samspill med naturen*. Retrieved May 5, 2009, from: www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/ud/bro/2006/0049/ddd/pdfv/275674-nyskapende_i_samspill_internett.pdf
- Paavola, J. and Lowe, I. (eds.) (2005): *Environmental Values in a Globalising World. Nature, Justice and Governance*. London: Routledge.
- Perse, E. M. (2001): *Media Effects and Society*. Mahaw: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Quinn, P. (2009): *Knowledge, Power and Control: Some issues in Epistemology*. Retrieved August 16, 2009, from <http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Poli/PoliQuin.htm>.
- Reed, P. and Rothenberg, D. (eds.) (1993): *Wisdom in the Open Air*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Ryghaug, M. (2006): "'Some like it hot' – Konstruksjon av kunnskap om klimaendringer i norske aviser" in *Norsk medietidsskrift*, 3: 197-219

- Schneider, S. H. (2005): *Mediarology: The roles of citizens, journalists, and scientists in debunking climate change myths*. Retrieved April 17, 2008, from <http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Mediarology/MediarologyFrameset.html>
- Skorstad, B. (2005): *Miljø, kunnskap og moral. Tre casestudier av miljøomsyn*. Doctoral theses at University of Tromsø.
- Skup-pris metoderapport (2008): "Klimakvoter i gråsonen." Retrieved April 22, 2009, from <http://www.skup.no/Metoderapporter/2008>
- SSB (2009a): "Focus on Oil and Gas." Retrieved September 9, 2009, from http://www.ssb.no/olje_gass_en/.
- SSB (2009b): *This is Norway. What the figures say*. Retrieved September 9, 2009, from http://www.ssb.no/norge_en/.
- St.mld.nr.34 (2006-2007): *Norsk klimapolitikk*. Retrieved October 19, 2008, from: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/md/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2006-2007/Stmeld-nr-34-2006-2007-.html?id=473411>
- St.mld.nr.13 (2008-2009): *Klima, konflikt og kapital*. Retrieved March 8, 2009, from: <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/2008-2009/stmeld-nr-13-2008-2009-.html?id=545698>
- Straume, I. S. (2005): "Depoliticizing Environmental Politics: Sustainable Development in Norway" in D. Torgerson and R. Paehlke (eds.): *Managing Leviathan*. Peterborough Ont.: Broadview Press.
- Svarstad, H. (2002): "Analysing Conservation-Development Discourses: The Story of a Biopiracy Narrative", in *Forum for Development Studies*, 1(29):63-92
- Sørensen, K. H. et al. (ed.) (2008): *Vitenskap som dialog, kunnskap i bevegelse*. Trondheim: Tapir akademisk forlag.
- The Guardian (2008): "Enjoy life while you can." 1 March. Retrieved January 20, 2009, from: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2008/mar/01/scienceofclimatechange.climatechange>

- Torgerson, D. (1999): *The Promise of Green Politics*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Trumbo, C. W. and Shanahan, J. (2000): "Social research on climate change: Where we have been, where we are, and where we might go" in *Public Understanding of Science*, 9(3): 199-204
- Tvedt, T. (2003): *Utviklingshjelp, utenrikspolitikk og makt. Den norske modellen*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk
- VG (2007): "Kåret til Norges viktigste miljøjournalist." December 23. Retrieved October 10, 2008, from: <https://www.retriever-info.com/se/>
- Witoszek, N. (1997): "The Anti-romantic Romantics; Nature, Knowledge, and Identity in Nineteenth-century Norway" in M. Teich, R. Porter and B. Gustafssons (eds.): *Nature and society in historical context*, pp. 209-227. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Witoszek, N. (1998): *Norske naturmytologier: Fra Edda til økofilosofi*. Oslo: Pax Forlag.
- Witoszek, N. (2008): "Reimagining Sustainability in the Age of Global Crisis: Perspectives on Cultural Innovation." Working paper, Centre for Development and the Environment, University of Oslo.
- Witoszek, N. (2009): *Verdens beste land*. Oslo: Aschehoug.
- Wyller, T.C. (1999): *Demokratiet og miljøkrisen: En Problemskisse*. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.
- Ytterstad, A. (2008): "God forstand i klimakampen? – En analyse av det kritiske potensialet hos norske bloggere" in *Norsk medietidsskrift*, 4: 308-26
- Zerubavel, E. (2000): *Sinnets sosiale landskap*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk-
- Østerud, Ø. et al.(2003): *Makten og demokratiet. En sluttbok fra Makt- og demokratiutredningen*. Oslo: Gyldendal Akademisk.

APPENDIX A – MEDIA ARTICLES

HEADING:	PAPER:	SECTION AND AUTHOR:	DATE:
Ansvar og avmakt	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B. Alstadheim	01.09.2007a
Det nye Atlantis	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	01.09.2007b
Varmt klima truer reinen	VG	Feature, Ø.N.Næss	01.09.2007
Krever skarpere lut	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, A.Lindeberg	03.09.2007a
Vi trenger Norge	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, M.Bertelsen	03.09.2007b
"Bare køle på"	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	05.09.2007a
Skitten bombe i grønn skog	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	05.09.2007b
Livet forsvant med tørken	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	07.09.2007
Det viktige klimavalget	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , S. Kvalvig - meteorolog og H.Holdhus – oceanograf	07.09.2007
Tredveårsperspektivet	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , A.J.Vetlesen - professor filosofi	10.09.2007
Uskyldig offer	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	11.09.2007
Vi trenger en klimaminister	Aftenposten	Kommentar, O.Mathismoen	17.09.2007
Ap-Kolberg vil stoppe veksten	VG	Nyhet, P.K.Ertzaas	17.09.2007
Trenger vi drivisen?	Aftenposten	<i>Kronikk</i> , P.Presterud – direktør Cicero	18.09.2007
Sot og varme smelter isen - Virkeligheten er verre enn rapportene	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	20.09.2007a
FN-sjefen slår alarm	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	20.09.2007b

Klima på anbud	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	20.09.2007
Enden er nær	Aftenposten	Feature, F.Schandy	21.09.2007
Grønt lys for kjerne-kraft	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	21.09.2007
Kloten minst 2°C varmere	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	24.09.2007
Verdens blåmandag	VG	Kommentar, G.Hjeltnes	24.09.2007
Dyrere natur	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, J.Sachs	24.09.2007
Vi har veldig dårlig tid	Aftenposten	Nyhet, J.Hultgren	25.09.2007
Eskimokulturen smelter bort	Aftenposten	Nyhet, S.B.Bentzrød	26.09.2007a
"Avgrunn mellom tiltak og klimamål" - FN-topp mener Norge ikke har forstått alvoret	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	26.09.2007b
Irasjonell klimapolitikk	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , K.Eig - stipendiat geologi	26.09.2007
Alle må betale klimaprisen	Aftenposten	Leder	27.09.2007
Grønne bøller i miljøkamp	VG	Kommentar, F.Jacobsen	30.09.2007
Tar høyde for klima- endringer	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.M.Rapp	02.10.2007
Strategi og åpenhet	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , G.Eskeland - forskningsleder Cicero	02.10.2007
Klimaforskere: Motet mangler	Aftenposten	Nyhet, R.Gjerde	05.10.2007
Grønlands utfordringer	VG	Feature, H.F.Høydal	06.10.2007a
Du må bli enda tøffere, Jens	VG	Klimapanelet, T.V.Johansen	06.10.2007b
Klimaløftet er tjent inn 27. Januar	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	06.10.2007
En verden i havsnød	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	08.10.2007

Grønn velferdsstat	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , M.Kolberg - partisekretær AP	08.10.2007
Dystre konklusjoner i ny miljørapport	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	10.10.2007
Apokalypse i Amazonas	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	12.10.2007
Å hindre krig	Aftenposten	Kommentar, O.Mathismoen	13.10.2007
50 tøffe år for isbjørn	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.M.Rapp	15.10.2007
Tinende bombe	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	19.10.2007
Vi må fange og lagre Co2	VG	Klimapanelet, F.Hauge	20.10.2007
FNs forsiktige panel	VG	Kommentar, H.Vikøyr	21.10.2007
Klimahysteri: ja takk	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	22.10.2007
Det farlige klimaforliket	Aftenposten	Kommentar, O.Mathismoen	24.10.2007
Ekspertenes svar om klima	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, A.Lindeberg	24.10.2007
Dødelig flaskevann	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , S.Lem - FIVH	25.10.2007
Teknologi for klima	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , S.Lier-Hansen – Adm.Dir. Norsk Industri	25.10.2007
Disse kan forsvinne - Største utryddelsesbølge siden dinosaurerne forsvant	Aftenposten	Nyhet, P.K.Aale	26.10.2007a
Når får kloden nok av oss?	Aftenposten	Feature, O.Mathismoen	26.10.2007b
Et løft for klimaet	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , J.G.Støre – utenriskminister og H.Madsen – konsernsjef Det norske veritas	26.10.2007
Oppdra dem til klima- krigere!	VG	Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig	27.10.2007a
Klimakrise gir sykdom	VG	Nyhet, P.O.Ødegård	27.10.2007b
Klimamålene kan bli skjerpet	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	02.11.2007
FN-forskernes dystre varslar	VG	Feature, T.U.Johansen	03.11.2007

Kaldt hode i het klimadebatt	Aftenposten	Innsikt, T.Nordeng	06.11.2007
Arktis har nådd sitt «tipping point», sier amerikansk forsker	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	11.11.2007
Penger på trær	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	12.11.2007
Klima-bevisene - FN's nye klimareport	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	15.11.2007
Verden kan reddes!	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	16.11.2007
Klodens skjebne	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, T.Erikstad	16.11.2007
Enda verre enn antatt - Klimaendringene skjer raskere enn det Klimapanelets sluttrapport går ut fra	Aftenposten	Nyhet, R.Gjerde	18.11.2007
Tid for ansvarlighet	VG	Leder	18.11.2007
Klimakrangel i jungelen	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	19.11.2007
Asia kan bli satt tiår tilbake	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	21.11.2007
Retten til å ha det kaldt	VG	Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig	24.11.2007
Ambisjoner og realiteter på Bali	Aftenposten	Leder	28.11.2007
Svertet av CO2	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	30.11.2007
Ball på Bali	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	01.12.2007
Satser på snøballeffekten	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	01.12.2007
Skjebnemøte på Bali	Aftenposten	Kommentar, O.Mathismoen	03.12.2007
Dyr å vente	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , E.Hambro - direktør Statens forurensningstilsyn	03.12.2007
Enorme norske CO2-utslipp	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	04.12.2007
Meidene er ukritiske	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , O.Åm – forfatter av ”Kampen om klimaet”	04.12.2007

Aner ikke rekkevidden av endringene i Arktis	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	05.12.2007
Krevende politisk balansekunst på Bali - Klimaendringer rammer alle.	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	05.12.2007
Golfstrømmen kan kjøle ned Norge - Nytt klimabevis	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	07.12.2007a
Australia tørker ut	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	07.12.2007b
"Så vanvittig urettferdig" - Saltvann dreper i Bangladesh Malaria eksploderer i Zambia	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	08.12.2007
Sivilisasjoner har gått under før – Fredsprisvinner advarer mot å mislykkes på Bali	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	09.12.2007
Krangel i klimabutikken	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	11.12.2007a
Et nasjonalt klimaråd	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , P.Prestrud – Cicero, et al.	11.12.2007b
Klimatiltak vil kreve ofre av alle	Aftenposten	Leder	11.12.2007
Seks bud for kloden	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	12.12.2007
Ikke her uten Brundtland-kommisjonen	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	12.12.2007
Flau Solheim på Bali - Liker utslippsrekorden i 2008 dårlig	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	13.12.2007a
Klamt om klima	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt – kortinnlegg</i> , N.W.Hagerup, student	13.12.2007b
Klima for konsensus	Aftenposten	Kommentar, P.K Bjørkeng	13.12.2007c
Oppgjøret på Bali	Aftenposten	Ukeslutt, J.E.Stiglitz	14.12.2007
Klima- kampen vil lønne seg	VG	Klimapanelet, F.Hauge	15.12.2007
FNs klimapanel fører deg bak lyset	VG	<i>Replikk</i> , P.J.Langerud – pensjonert ingeniør og tidligere FrP-politiker	16.12.2007a
Og bakom synger skogene	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , A.Kroglund - WWF	16.12.2007b
Klimaks i Køben	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	17.12.2007
Et barskere klima kan lamme Norge - Ingen vet hva det koster å sikre oss	Aftenposten	Nyhet, T.Strøm-Gundersen	17.12.2007

Endringene maskeres	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	18.12.2007
Gores propaganda	Aftenposten	<i>Replikk</i> , K.Andresen - tekstforfatter	20.12.2007
Månelanding eller buklanding	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , A.Hermstad – FIVH, et al.	20.12.2007
Bruker 2008 til å dra på TOUR DE KLIMA - Jens skal på klimaturer til Antarktis, Himalaya, Kongo og Amazonas	VG	Nyhet, P.K.Ertzaas	28.12.2007
Slik er den norske klimafrykten	VG	Nyhet	29.12.2007
Veikart til København	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , E.Solheim – Miljø- og utviklingsminister	31.12.2007
Overser vi sannheten?	Aftenposten	<i>Replikk</i> , T.Osmundsen – redaktør MandagMorgen	03.01.2008
Klubb for klima	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	04.01.2008
Påbud må til	Aftenposten	Kommentar, F.Ingulstad	05.01.2008
Fem mirakelkurer for jorden	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	05.01.2008a
Slik blir klimasamfunnet Norge 2050	VG	Feature, H.F.Høydal	05.01.2008b
Refser panelet han var ekspert for – Klimaekspert tror ikke på menneskeskapt oppvarming av kloden	VG	Nyhet, J.Tjersland	08.01.2008
Farvel til Jurassic Park	Aftenposten	Kommentar, A.O.Ask	11.01.2008
CO2 blir handelspolitikk	VG	Klimapanelet, F.Hauge	12.01.2008
Fra dvale til startgrop	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	18.01.2008
Jeg, en værdame på 70	VG	Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig	19.01.2008
Fem tonn isprøver i boks	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	19.01.2008
Jordas laboratorium	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , J.Stoltenberg - statsminister	19.01.2008
Splitter ny ørkenby - helt uten CO2	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	21.01.2008

Gutten som roper ulv	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , L.Mjøen – forfatter og skuespiller	24.01.2008
Ulv på het klode	Aftenposten	Leder	25.01.2008
Om dommedags- profetier	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	26.01.2008a
Global oppvarming har stanset	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	26.01.2008b
Klimadebatt i feil spor	Aftenposten	<i>Kronikk</i> , M. Jøndal – styreleder Norsk Biologiforening	01.02.2008
Lav pris på klima	Dagens Næringsliv	<i>Debatt/Innlegg</i> , V.D.Norman	02.02.2008
India lover CO2-tiltak - Skal ikke bli verre enn Vesten	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	08.02.2008
Sparkstøttingens dag	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	09.02.2008
Fremtiden hans smelter bort - Isbreene forsvinner i Nepal	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	09.02.2008
Tiner rekordraskt	VG	Nyhet, A.v.d.Fehr	10.02.2008
Bedre føre vær	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, B.Westlie	16.02.2008
Hold hodet kaldt	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt – kortinnlegg</i> , B.Holtmark - samfunnsøkonom	16.02.2008
Fra vann til sand	Dagens Næringsliv	Klode i krise, F.Frøyland	19.02.2008
Syk av klima	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	20.02.2008
Når billig blir dyrt	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	23.02.2008
Blått Arktis	VG	Klimapanelet, H.Drange	01.03.2008
Klimakrisen: er det over nå?	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	11.03.2008
Nytt klima gir mer spenning	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	12.03.2008

Dårlig klima for god moral	VG	Kommentar, J.H.Hansen	12.03.2008
Kvoter i grønn gråson	Dagens næringsliv	Nyhet, I.Bjørklund og G.Skaalmo	15.03.2008
Reddet! - Eller? Hva vil du helst lese i påsken 2050?	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	19.03.2008
Feilslått klimaskepsis	Aftenposten	<i>Kronikk</i> , C.Mauritzen – oceanograf Meterologisk institutt	19.03.2008
Vinteren er borte	VG	Nyhet, H.Vikøyr	22.03.2008
Menneske eller maskin?	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	22.03.2008
Naturlige klimaendringer	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , T.Waaler - professor emeritus farmasi	24.03.2008
Klimapolitikkens alenegjenger	Aftenposten	Leder	01.04.2008
Reinspikka populisme	VG	Nyhet, B.Haugan	05.04.2008
Tidenes konspirasjon?	Aftenposten	Kommentar, O.Mathismoen	07.04.2008a
Isfritt hav gir nytt håp - og nye farer	Aftenposten	Nyhet, M.Risa	07.04.2008b
Klima er politikk	VG	Klimapanelet, S.Kvalvig	12.04.2008
Kan vi stole på noen?	Aftenposten	<i>Kronikk</i> , R.Müller – dr.scient og O.Orheim – ph.D.	12.04.2008
«Klimadebatten trenger motstanderne» - Miljøforfattere advarer mot knebling	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	13.04.2008
Miljø må bli business	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , E.Saga og R.E.Tveten – UngeHøyre/studenter NTNU	17.04.2008
En fabrikk = hele Norge - Stoltenberg besøkte verdens verste CO-2-bombe	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	18.04.2008
Skogvern for halv milliard - Pilotavtale for å reduere avskoging i Tanzania	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	22.04.2008
Norske penger skal stoppe dette - Solheim vil inn i Kongo med regnskogmilliardene	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	27.04.2008
Klimaoppskriften	Dagens	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	07.05.2008

	Næringsliv		
Tvil og viten i klimasaken	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , D.O.Hessen – professor biologi og A.J.Vetlesen . professor filosofi	09.05.2008
Nesten ikke varmere	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , K.Stordahl. – dr. philos., et al	13.05.2008
En villet CO2-økning	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	14.05.2008
Klimarekorden	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	14.05.2008
Klimaendring rammer elgen - Varsler konsekvenser for jakten	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.Mathismoen	15.05.2008
Når sikkerhet er viktigst	VG	<i>Debatt</i> , K.Storberget - justisminister	19.05.2008
Vil ha ny verdensorden i klimakampen	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, I.G.Riisnæs	26.05.2008
Misvisende om klima	Aftenposten	<i>Kommentar</i> , J.E.Kristiansson – UiO og H.Drange – Nansen-og Bjerknessenteret	28.05.2008
De fattigste må kutte mest	Aftenposten	Het kolde, G.Magnus	29.05.2008
Algene kan redde oss - Bellona: Mulig klimaløsning	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	03.06.2008
Tvil i drivhuset	Dagens Næringsliv	Kommentar, K.B.Alstadheim	04.06.2008
Verden trenger en klimakoalisjon	Aftenposten	<i>Debatt</i> , K.M.Bondevik – Club de Madrid, F.Hauge - Bellona, C.Berg – Hafslund ASA	04.06.2008
Klimaekspert: Dyrt å ikke handle - - Pessimismen kan bli selvoppfylgende Ler av klimaskeptikerne	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	06.06.2008
Gull og grønne alger	Dagens Næringsliv	Nyhet, K.B.Alstadheim	06.06.2008
Det kan gå -hvis vi vil	VG	Klimapanelet	07.06.2008
Ro, ro til Nordpolen	VG	Kommentar, T.U.Johansen	08.06.2008
Klimakrise truer arktiske planter	Aftenposten	Nyhet, O.M.Rapp	15.06.2008

Iskald vinter hjalp ikke likevel - Mindre is i Arktis nå enn i fjor	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	16.06.2008
Afrikas jordbruk vil tørke vekk	Aftenposten	Het kolde, A.Bakken	21.06.2008
Miljøfiendtlig bensinpris	VG	Klimapanelet, K.H.Alfsen	21.06.2008
Reddes av ny teknologi?	Aftenposten	Nyhet, A.Christensen	26.06.2008
Foregangsland	VG	<i>Replikk</i> , K.Halvorsen - finansminister	26.06.2008
Folk tror ikke på klimatrusselen	Aftenposten	Het klode, O.Mathismoen	27.06.2008
Høye priser gir klimahåp	Aftenposten	Ukeslutt, J.Ulveit-Moe – konsernsjef Umoe	27.06.2008

AF: 78 texts – whereby: 36 texts from Mathismoen (21 texts from *Het Klode*)

16 contributons

DN: 45 texts – whereby: 19 texts from Alstadheim

11 texts from *Klode i Krise*

8 contributons

VG: 48 texts – whereby: 15 texts from *Klimapanelet*

10 contributons

TOTALLY: 171 texts

APPENDIX B – TRANSLATED MEDIA QUOTATIONS

4.2.1

Kloden minst 2 °C varmere. For sent?

2 graders global temperaturøkning vil føre til omfattende artsutryddelser, og millioner av mennesker vil risikere tørke, sult og flom. Sannsynligheten for å unngå en slik oppvarming er ifølge FNs klimaeksperter allerede mindre enn 10 prosent (forside, AF 20/09/07).

Både mulighetene og utfordringene knyttet til et isfritt Arktis gjør at klimautviklingen i nord vil bli fulgt med særdeles årvåkne øyne i årene som kommer. At det internasjonale polåret – et storstilt forskningssamarbeid – startet opp i nettopp 2007 gjør at vi har de beste forutsetningene for å følge klimautviklingen i Arktis (VG 01/03/08).

Den store majoriteten vitenskapsfolk – fra et utall fagdisipliner [som] roper et stadig høyere varsku. Rapportene deres, som ukentlig publiseres i vitenskapelige tidsskrifter verden rundt, er mere enn tørre fakta om observasjoner og prognoser. Det er sterk uro og frykt mellom linjene (AF 26/10/07b).

Med pomp og prakt ble Snøhvit formelt åpnet 21. august i år. Et nytt norsk gasseventyr, med verdens mest klimavennlige teknologi var for alvor i gang. [Men] (h)verken teknikk eller CO₂-utslipp har gått som planlagt på Melkøya. [Og] Snøhvit er i ferd med å bli et klimagassmareritt hverken politikerne eller StatoilHydro hadde drømt om” (AF 04/12/07).

4.2.2

Neste gang du setter deg i bilen, send en liten tanke til den rekordraske smeltingen i nord og til de som er avhengige av den. Den padlende inuitten på jakt etter mat og den kjørende nordmannen på vei til kontoret er altså uløselig knyttet sammen. Global oppvarming gjør dette tydeligere enn noensinne for oss. Og i det ligger det en optimisme. Vi er nødt til å se det vi alt for lenge har lukket øynene for (VG 24/11/07).

Selv da de så hva som skjedde, selv da jeg reiste rundt i verden og beskrev dette, beviste at isen smeltet i et vanvittig tempo rundt Nordpolen, at Himalayas breer ble omdannet

til enorme, livsfarlige innsjøer, at Australias drepende tørke bare ble avløst av noen få enda mer ødeleggende regnflommer, at Kenyas enorme flokker med vandrende gnuer og antiloper bare var en tørkeperioide unna totalt sammenbrudd. Selv da protesterte de (AF 19/03/08).

Selv om klimaproblemet er globalt i sin natur, er årsaken til problemet ikke lenger unna enn nærmeste eksosrør. Få ting gir større følelse av avmakt enn en smeltende grønlandsis. Ubehaget blir i grunnen ikke noe særlig mindre når vi innser at også hver enkelt av oss faktisk kan gjøre noe med det (DN 01/09/07).

Hytteområdet i Sirdalen er heller ikke det samme som da vi kjøpte hytte der i 2005. Tenk det. Da har landstedet på Sletten med strandlinje inne i Ryfylke vært en mye bedre investering. Vi var forutseende i 2007. Vi søkte allerede da om å få hevet både naustet og bryggen og jammen var det bra at vi gjorde det (VG 19/01/08).

[S]enke forbruket, senke transportbehovet, senke energibruken. Det krevde til dels drastiske løsninger, men nordmenn forsto ikke bare at det var nødvendig for miljøet, men også at det var en enestående økonomisk mulighet – å være i teten når klimaet endret seg (VG 05/01/08).

[Vi alle] forsto at det kom til å vokse frem et enormt marked for energieffektivitet og for alle mulige CO₂-frie løsninger [...] Det ble et kappløp for å vinne, for å tjene mest mulig penger på den kommende økorevolusjonen – som både ble en teknologisk revolusjon og en moralsk revolusjon som endret menneskenes syn på naturen som en ikke-uttømmelig ressurs (AF 19/03/08).

4.2.3

Klodens skjebne kommer til å bli avgjort de nærmeste tiårene. Aldri før i menneskets historie har det økologiske systemet som holder livet i gang, blitt utfordret slik det er nå (DN 16/11/07).

Vi ønsker ikke å ende opp i en verden der klimaet løper løpsk og gir grobunn for en uendelighet av konflikter mellom oss som er på denne kloden (VG 26/01/07).

I 2050 kan det være over ni milliarder mennesker på kloden. Det er nesten syv milliarder flere enn i 1950 og utgjør i seg selv et formidabelt klimaproblem (DN 22/10/07).

Jorden har feber. Vi kan ikke håpe på febernedsettende mirakler. Vi må utrette dem. Men hva kan vi så gjøre? Kan vi fange CO₂ fra luften for deretter å lagre den på forsvarlig vis? Hva med å skygge for solen? Dyrke alger? Noe annet? [...] En opplagt løsning er å leve i tråd med naturens bæreevne, utvikle ikke-forurensende og sikker energi, og kraftig redusere forurensningen fra kull, olje og gass. I mangel av en slik idealverden er det gjerne teknologiske forslag som rår (VG 05/01/08).

[Jeg er] klar over at mange vil le av oss. Det gjorde de da vi for 15 år siden forslo CO₂ fangst fra gasskraftverk også. Bare vent, algedyrking kommer til å prege klimadebatten fremover (AF 03/06/08).

4.2.4

Selv om Aftenposten har lansert en tematisk serie med den noe tendensiøse tittelen “Het Klode”, burde vi som lesere klare å holde hodet kaldt også når klimaspørsmål diskuteres (AF 16/02/08).

Klimadebatten har dessverre kommet inn på et spor hvor beklageligvis mange representanter for disse aktørene kappes om å beskrive veien mot klodens, og sivilisasjonens undergang. Så ille er det ikke, og det er grunn til å reise advarende pekefinger mot dem som skaper slike fremtidspessimistiske og negative bilder (AF 01/02/08).

Jeg husker mailboksen ble fylt av sinte stemmer som mente jeg drev kampanjejournalistikk da vi videreformidlet hva forskerne hadde funnet ut. Avisene flommet over med anklager om at dette var en konspirasjon for å stanse veksten, for å fremme enkeltforskere og for å spre frykt (AF 19/03/08).

[Disse skeptikerne er] en underfundig allianse [...] de er populist, engasjerte privatpersoner med egenutviklede teorier, mørkeblå, reaksjonære politiske miljøer og ymse akademikere med høyst uklare formelle klimakompetanser [...] Problemet og det triste er at det som ser ut som en vitenskapelig debatt, ikke egentlig er det. Den er basert på myter, usannheter og fordreininger (AF 07/04/08).

Er du litt usikker på dette med klimaendringer? Det er det all grunn til. Det er nemlig klimaforskerne også. Problemet er at debatten om klimaforskning blant forskere er en annen enn den debatten om klimaforskning som pågår i offentligheten. Den offentlige debatten preges av såkalte klimaskeptikere som sår tvil om det klimaforskerne er mest enige om, nemlig at kloden blir varmere og at oppvarmingen ikke kan forklares uten at menneskeskapte utslipp av CO₂ og andre gasser tas med. Debatten blant klimaforskerne handler om de neste trinnene i klimaforskningen [that is, the probable consequences and how to combat these] (DN, 04/06/08).

Drastiske utslippskutt i verdens rike land vil nesten ikke redusere oppvarmingen av kloden hvis utslippene i u-landene fortsatt øker. Det eneste som hjelper, er at verdens fattigste bruker enda mindre kull og bensin (AF 29/05/08).

5.2.1

Vi har alle og enhver godt av å komme oss ut av bilen og nærmere naturen, sanse været og føle på samhørigheten (VG 24/11/07).

Mange tror klimaendringer er noe som ligger fjernt inn i fremtiden. Det er feil, det skjer nå. Jeg reiser rundt for å lære og øke min egen forståelse, men også for å rette oppmerksomheten mot det som skjer (AF 09/02/08).

I disse landene er folk så ekstremt avhengig av primær ressursene og naturmiljøet rundt seg for å overleve. I vår del av verden vil vi overleve uansett, vi har råd til å være en del av den globaliserte økonomien og skaffe oss de produktene vi trenger (AF 03/04/08).

Et isfritt Arktis om sommeren er en god nyhet for langtransport med båt mellom Europa og Asia. Også tilgang til store olje – og gassreserver langs den sibirske kysten og mineralforekomster i polhavet blir lettere når sommerisen er borte. Situasjonen er selvsagt alvorlig for sel, isbjørn, fugl, alger og fisk som lever på, i eller under havisen (VG 01/03/08).

5.2.2

[Det er] avgjørende at vi i den veletablerte og rike del av verden nå gir all mulig støtte til land under oppbygging (VG 22/03/08).

Nedhøvlingen av regnskogen er et av verdens største klimaproblemer [...] En av fordelene med klimatiltak i regnskogen er at de sannsynligvis er billigere enn de fleste andre klimatiltak. En annen er at dette er et klimatiltak som ikke krever utvikling av ny og kostbar teknologi. En tredje er at det er positive tilleggseffekter, blant annet bevaring av mangfoldet i naturen (DN 12/11/07).

Det trengs globale løsninger for å løse disse globale problemene. Her trenger vi Norge til å lede an som vi også forventer at landet vil gjøre. Norge kan spille en avgjørende rolle, på samme måte som det har gjort i fredsarbeidet. Norge er allerede en fremtredende givernasjon og leder an i arbeidet med CO₂-rensing (DN 03/09/07).

Norge er i verdenstoppen i oljeteknologi. Vi bør som nasjon bli ledende på å løse de energiutfordringene som verden står foran. Vi trenger ikke færre, men flere månelandinger. Morgendagen ligger i en satning på andre teknologiformer enn olje og gass (AF 11/01/08).

5.3

Norge vil være i teten når klimaet endrer seg – fordi vi forsto den enestående økonomiske muligheten [...] I dag har de grisgrendte bygdene blitt effektive karbonfarmer med miljøflyktinger som billig arbeidskraft (VG 05/01/08).

[Det var] overraskende å finne ut at vi kan bli karbonnegative uten at det rammer vår økonomiske vekst. Det overrasket også hvor lite en omlegging av livsstil egentlig betyr for utslippene. De store grepene må tas av politikere og bedrifter (AF 03/06/08).

6.1.1

Hva gjør norske medier når noen setter spørsmålstegn ved verdens største og viktigste sak, kommer de løpende med et åpent sinn? [...] De norske mediene har i fellesskap lagt seg på en nesten aktivistisk linje i klimasaken (AF 13/12/07c).

6.1.2

Nå har klimapanelet etablert en vitenskapelig enighet vi ikke hadde før.

Miljøpredikanter som Al Gore, Lars Haltebrekken og Frederic Hauge kan overses. Men ikke vitenskapelige bevis. Nå vet vi at tørken i Australia og syklonen i Bangladesh kobles til klima (AF 13/12/07).

Den rike verden har det moralske ansvar for klimatrusselen. Det er vi, som med våre utslipp, har skapt problemet. [Men] (v)i klarer ikke å kutte 50-80 prosent av verdens utslipp slik FNs klimapanel sier vi må, uten at det kuttet også i den tredje verden. Ikke alt, men svært mye av regningen for å få til det må vi betale. Derfor er klimatiltak ute viktig. Det er ikke en måte å snike seg unna på, eller frita den rike verden for å gjøre noe hjemme (AF 02/11/07).

Norge vil være viktige på to arenaer. Som en av verdens ledende oljeprodusenter kan vi påvirke andre store oljeproduserende land, ikke minst når det gjelder satsing på CO₂-fangst. Og vi har en viktig rolle i tillitsbyggingen overfor u-landene, regnskogmilliardene er et eksempel (AF 13/12/07).

6.1.3

Siden Statoils oljesand ligger 500 meter under bakken, kan man ikke grave seg ned til den. Selskapet borer derfor brønner og tar i bruk en teknikk med dampinjisering [...] Det hentes ut 200.000 fat olje fra de grønne skogene her. Det tilsvarer en sjettedel av dagens Statoil-produksjon. For å komme dit kreves investeringer på nærmere 90 milliarder kroner i produksjons- og oppgraderingsanlegg [...] Fra fabrikkpipene som er plassert i månelandskapet stiger hvit røyk og en saftig CO₂-regning til værs (DN 05/09/07b).

Om vi legger naturens tålegrense til grunn, må vi si: Vi har ikke råd til vekst. Men som samfunn har vi ikke vist noen vilje til å legge klodens grenser til grunn; det er fremmed for de fleste av oss, slik naturen er det, redusert til utbytting for våre formål.

Vekstkritikk er politisk ukorrekt langt inn i dagens SV (AF 10/09/07).

Vi har så mye penger fra klimaødeleggende olje at vi kan kjøpe oss fri fra den klimadugnaden som resten av verden må være med på (VG 12/03/08).


For å kunne gjennomføre endringene mot et klimavennelig samfunn trenger vi store strukturendringer, og antakelig tvang. Å løse klimakrisen er konfliktfylt. Det private er politikk og klimatiltak er politikk. Heldigvis har vi engasjerte politikere her i landet, men er de modige nok? (VG 12/04/08)

6.2

Stoltenberg-regjeringen følger det internasjonale mønsteret ved å unngå vesentlig forhøyde energiskatter og andre upopulære tiltak, men gå for kvotehandel og skogreisning ute. Politikk er det muliges kunst, så Stoltenbergs vurdering er her riktig, selv om norsk puritanisme krever hjemlige ofre for at miljøet skal reddes (AF 27/06/08).

APPENDIX C – MEDIA STATISTICS

Dekning over tid



Søk


klima* AND endring*

01.09.1999 - 01.07.2008

Søk	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
klima* AND endring*	88	327	297	349	285	346	579	740
Totalt	88	327	297	349	285	346	579	740

Søk	2007	2008	Totalt
klima* AND endring*	2 119	845	5 975
Totalt	2 119	845	5 975

Dekning over tid



Søk

global* AND oppvarming*

01.09.1999 - 01.07.2008

Søk	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
global* AND oppvarming*	46	244	287	244	212	291	573	932
Totalt	46	244	287	244	212	291	573	932

Søk	2007	2008	Totalt
global* AND oppvarming*	2 667	879	6 375
Totalt	2 667	879	6 375